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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Paths to victory : lessons from modern insurgencies (2013)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1008659479
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xlii, 286 pages)
    ISBN: 9780833080547 , 0833083414 , 0833080547 , 9780833083418
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation research report series RR-291/1-OSD
    Content: When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won
    Content: When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense , Companion publication to: Paths to victory: detailed insurgency case studies , Includes bibliographical references (pages 277-286)
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Paul, Christopher, 1971- Paths to victory ©2013
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Counterinsurgency scorecard : Afghanistan in early 2013 relative to insurgencies since World War II (2013)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1008660833
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (x, 25 pages)
    ISBN: 9780833081766 , 0833083643 , 0833081764 , 9780833083647
    Content: The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies added 41 new cases to a previously studied set of 30 insurgencies, examining the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding of this research was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly discriminated the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi exercise, in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2013 Afghanistan ranks among the historical COIN winners, but its score is equal to those of the lowest-scoring historical wins. This tenuous position points to several areas in need of improvement, but particularly the need to disrupt the flow of insurgent support and the need for the Afghan government and Afghan security forces to better demonstrate their commitment and motivation. Afghanistan in early 2011 scored in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses, suggesting an overall improvement in COIN progress in that conflict by early 2013. However, conditions may change as coalition forces prepare to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces in 2014
    Content: The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies added 41 new cases to a previously studied set of 30 insurgencies, examining the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding of this research was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly discriminated the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi exercise, in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2013 Afghanistan ranks among the historical COIN winners, but its score is equal to those of the lowest-scoring historical wins. This tenuous position points to several areas in need of improvement, but particularly the need to disrupt the flow of insurgent support and the need for the Afghan government and Afghan security forces to better demonstrate their commitment and motivation. Afghanistan in early 2011 scored in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses, suggesting an overall improvement in COIN progress in that conflict by early 2013. However, conditions may change as coalition forces prepare to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces in 2014
    Note: "RAND National Defense Research Institute , "This research was ... conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface , Includes bibliographical references (page 25)
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Victory has a thousand fathers : sources of success in counterinsurgency (2010)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_100865454X
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xxx, 153 pages)
    ISBN: 9780833049612 , 0833050788 , 9781282940536 , 1282940538 , 9780833050786 , 0833049615
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation monograph series MG-964-OSD
    Content: Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations
    Content: Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of armed conflict since at least 1949, as well as the subject of countless historical and contemporary studies. Contemporary discourse on the subject is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches, practices, and tenets that make for successful operations. Relying on a collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, along with a bank of factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, several commonalities emerge. For instance, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts the outcome of a conflict. The importance of popular support is confirmed, but the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success. Twenty distinct approaches to COIN are rigorously tested against the historical record, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations
    Note: Includes bibliographical references
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780833049612
    Additional Edition: Druck-Ausgabe
    Additional Edition: Print version Paul, Christopher, 1971- Victory has a thousand fathers Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation, ©2010
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Mexico is not Colombia : alternative historical analogies for responding to the challenge of violent drug-trafficking organizations (2014)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1008661570
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (191 pages)
    ISBN: 9780833084415 , 0833084410 , 9780833084439 , 0833084437 , 9780833084422 , 9780833084408
    Content: "Despite the scope of the threat they pose to Mexico's security, violent drug-trafficking organizations are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. While there is no perfectly analogous case from history, Mexico stands to benefit from historical lessons and efforts that were correlated with improvement in countries facing similar challenges related to violence and corruption"--Provided by publisher
    Note: Includes bibliographical references
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780833084408
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Paul, Christopher, 1971- Mexico is not Colombia Santa Monica, CA : RAND, [2014]
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    What works best when building partner capacity and under what circumstances? (2012)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1008658596
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xxiv, 101 pages)
    ISBN: 9780833078506 , 0833083155 , 083307850X , 9780833083159
    Content: The United States has a long history of helping other nations develop and improve their military and other security forces. However, changing economic realities and the ongoing reductions in overall defense spending related to the end of more than a decade of war will affect the funding available for these initiatives. How can the U.S. Department of Defense increase the effectiveness of its efforts to build partner capacity while also increasing the efficiency of those efforts? And what can the history of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity reveal about which approaches are likely to be more or less effective under different circumstances? To tackle these complex questions and form a base of evidence to inform policy discussions and investment decisions, a RAND study collected and compared 20 years of data on 29 historical case studies of U.S. involvement in building partner capacity. In the process, it tested a series of validating factors and hypotheses (many of which are rooted in "common knowledge") to determine how they stand up to real-world case examples of partner capacity building. The results reveal nuances in outcomes and context, pointing to solutions and recommendations to increase the effectiveness of current and future U.S. initiatives to forge better relationships, improve the security and stability of partner countries, and meet U.S. policy and security objectives worldwide
    Content: The United States has a long history of helping other nations develop and improve their military and other security forces. However, changing economic realities and the ongoing reductions in overall defense spending related to the end of more than a decade of war will affect the funding available for these initiatives. How can the U.S. Department of Defense increase the effectiveness of its efforts to build partner capacity while also increasing the efficiency of those efforts? And what can the history of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity reveal about which approaches are likely to be more or less effective under different circumstances? To tackle these complex questions and form a base of evidence to inform policy discussions and investment decisions, a RAND study collected and compared 20 years of data on 29 historical case studies of U.S. involvement in building partner capacity. In the process, it tested a series of validating factors and hypotheses (many of which are rooted in "common knowledge") to determine how they stand up to real-world case examples of partner capacity building. The results reveal nuances in outcomes and context, pointing to solutions and recommendations to increase the effectiveness of current and future U.S. initiatives to forge better relationships, improve the security and stability of partner countries, and meet U.S. policy and security objectives worldwide
    Note: "RAND National Defense Research Institute , "This research was ... conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute"--Preface , Includes bibliographical references (pages 99-101)
    Additional Edition: ISBN 083307850X
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780833078506
    Additional Edition: Available in another form ISBN 9780833078506
    Additional Edition: Available in another form ISBN 083307850X
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Paths to victory : detailed insurgency case studies (2013)
    Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1008659487
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xxxvii, 468 pages)
    ISBN: 9780833081094 , 0833083422 , 0833081098 , 9780833083425
    Series Statement: Rand Corporation research report series RR-291/2-OSD
    Content: Detailed overviews of 41 insurgency cases. UK in Palestine, 1944-1947 -- Greece, 1945-1949 -- Indochina, 1946-1954 -- Philippines (Huk Rebellion), 1946-1956 -- Colombia ("La Violencia"), 1948-1958 -- Malaya, 1948-1955 -- Kenya, 1952-1956 -- Algerian Independence, 1954-1962 -- Cyprus, 1955-1959 -- Cuba, 1956-1959 -- Oman (Imamate Uprising), 1957-1959 -- Indonesia (Darul Islam), 1958-1962 -- Tibet, 1956-1974 -- Guatemala, 1960-1996 -- Laos, 1959-1975 -- Namibia, 1960-1989 -- South Africa, 1960-1990 -- South Vietnam, 1960-1975 -- Eritrea, 1961-1991 -- Iraqi Kurdistan, 1961-1975 -- Angolan Independence, 1961-1974 -- Guinea-Bissau, 1962-1974 -- Mozambican Independence, 1962-1974 -- Yemen, 1962-1970 -- Uruguay, 1963-1972 -- Oman (Dhofar Rebellion), 1965-1975 -- Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1965-1980 -- Argentina, 1969-1979 -- Cambodia, 1967-1975 -- Northern Ireland, 1969-1999 -- Jordan, 1970-1971 -- Bangladesh, 1971 -- Philippines (MNLF), 1971-1996 -- Baluchistan, 1973-1978 -- Angola (UNITA), 1975-2002 -- Indonesia (East Timor), 1975-2000 -- Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990 -- Western Sahara, 1975-1991 -- Indonesia (Aceh), 1976-2005 -- Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976-1995 -- Sri Lanka, 1976-2009
    Content: Detailed overviews of 41 insurgency cases. UK in Palestine, 1944-1947 -- Greece, 1945-1949 -- Indochina, 1946-1954 -- Philippines (Huk Rebellion), 1946-1956 -- Colombia ("La Violencia"), 1948-1958 -- Malaya, 1948-1955 -- Kenya, 1952-1956 -- Algerian Independence, 1954-1962 -- Cyprus, 1955-1959 -- Cuba, 1956-1959 -- Oman (Imamate Uprising), 1957-1959 -- Indonesia (Darul Islam), 1958-1962 -- Tibet, 1956-1974 -- Guatemala, 1960-1996 -- Laos, 1959-1975 -- Namibia, 1960-1989 -- South Africa, 1960-1990 -- South Vietnam, 1960-1975 -- Eritrea, 1961-1991 -- Iraqi Kurdistan, 1961-1975 -- Angolan Independence, 1961-1974 -- Guinea-Bissau, 1962-1974 -- Mozambican Independence, 1962-1974 -- Yemen, 1962-1970 -- Uruguay, 1963-1972 -- Oman (Dhofar Rebellion), 1965-1975 -- Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1965-1980 -- Argentina, 1969-1979 -- Cambodia, 1967-1975 -- Northern Ireland, 1969-1999 -- Jordan, 1970-1971 -- Bangladesh, 1971 -- Philippines (MNLF), 1971-1996 -- Baluchistan, 1973-1978 -- Angola (UNITA), 1975-2002 -- Indonesia (East Timor), 1975-2000 -- Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990 -- Western Sahara, 1975-1991 -- Indonesia (Aceh), 1976-2005 -- Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976-1995 -- Sri Lanka, 1976-2009
    Note: "National Defense Research Institute , "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense , Companion publication to: Paths to victory: lessons from modern insurgencies , Includes bibliographical references (pages 441-468)
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Paul, Christopher, 1971- Paths to victory ©2013
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Counterinsurgency scorecard update : Afghanistan in early 2015 relative to insurgencies since World War II (2016)
    Santa Monica, Calif : RAND
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1008665487
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xi, 38 pages)
    ISBN: 9780833092625 , 0833093835 , 0833092626 , 9780833093837
    Series Statement: Research report RR-1273-OSD
    Content: "Previous RAND research examined 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2010 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices corresponded perfectly with the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices was always positive when the outcome was a COIN win (insurgent loss) and always negative when the outcome was a COIN loss (insurgent win). Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in 2015. The effort involved an expert elicitation in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. It was the third Afghanistan-focused exercise conducted with the scorecard, allowing rough comparisons with scores assigned by expert panels in 2011 and 2013. The 2015 consensus results indicated that Afghanistan continues to have a positive score, though its score is tied with the lowest-scoring historical wins. Two factors remained absent in Afghanistan in 2015 but essential to success in historical COIN campaigns: disrupting flows of tangible support to the insurgents and a demonstration (and improvement) of commitment and motivation on the part of the Afghan National Security Forces, the primary COIN force since the coalition drawdown. Despite some potentially positive developments resulting from the 2014 election of a new government in Afghanistan, it appears that the most promising end to the conflict will be a negotiated settlement in which the Afghan government makes some concessions to the insurgents and in which external powers, including the United States and Pakistan, help broker a satisfactory power-sharing agreement that brings greater stability to the country"--Publisher's description
    Note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 37-38) , Preface -- Figure and Tables -- Summary -- Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update: Afghanistan in Early 2015 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War II -- Findings from Previous Research on Insurgency: Findings from Previous Research on Insurgency -- The Counterinsurgency Scorecard -- Endgames for Insurgencies: Getting to Negotiated Settlements -- Scoring the Ongoing Conflict in Afghanistan: Using the Delphi Method -- Building on Previous Scorecards -- 2015 Scorecard Results: Specific Factors in the Current Case -- Notes on Factors Present or Absent in 2015 but Tenuous in the Future -- 2015 Results Compared with Previous Results and Analyses: What Improved? -- What Declined? -- What Stayed the Same? -- Scorecard and Duration of Conflict -- Summary of Scorecard Analyses -- Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement -- Conclusions and Recommendations -- APPENDIX -- References.
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: kostenfrei
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    Stabi Berlin
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