In:
American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 95, No. 1 ( 2001-03), p. 208-209
Abstract:
With friends like Edwin Meese and Robert Bork, "jurispru-
dence of original intent" (p. 3) needs no enemies. These polemicists have so corrupted originalism by associating it
with reactionary ideology and partisan politics that, in Keith Whittington's words, "the task now is to convince critics to
take [it] seriously again" (p. xii). Constitutional Interpretation
ably performs this task. Whittington's rescue of originalist jurisprudence from its strangest bedfellows in itself is a major
contribution to the study of constitutional law. But, although originalism has found a genuine friend, the book's powerful
argument against "dismissing originalism as an interpretive method" (p. 162) does not constitute an affirmative defense.
Whittington's efforts to make this case are informative and provocative, but they fail. This failure is traceable to serious
defects in both the structure and content of the book.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0003-0554
,
1537-5943
DOI:
10.1017/S0003055401312017
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
2001
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2010035-8
detail.hit.zdb_id:
123621-0
SSG:
7,26
SSG:
3,6
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