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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge University Press
    UID:
    b3kat_BV017121266
    Format: XXII, 368 S. , graph. Darst.
    Edition: 1. publ.
    ISBN: 0521551846 , 0521536723 , 9780521551847 , 9780521536721
    Series Statement: Churchill lectures in economics
    Note: Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Spieltheorie ; Auktionstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Book
    Book
    New York [u.a.] :Cambridge Univ. Press,
    UID:
    kobvindex_ZIB000011167
    Format: XXII, 368 S. : , graph. Darst.
    Edition: 1
    ISBN: 0-521-55184-6
    Series Statement: Churchill lectures in economics
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    UID:
    b3kat_BV043918664
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 368 Seiten)
    ISBN: 9780511813825
    Series Statement: Churchill lectures in economics
    Uniform Title: Putting auction theory to work (2004)
    Content: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation
    Note: E-Ausgabe entspricht dem Nachdruck 2008 der Print-Ausgabe
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover ISBN 978-0-521-55184-7
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback ISBN 978-0-521-53672-1
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Auktionstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell ; Spieltheorie
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    UID:
    gbv_883326817
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 368 pages) , digital, PDF file(s)
    ISBN: 9780511813825
    Series Statement: Churchill lectures in economics
    Content: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521551847
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521536721
    Additional Edition: Print version ISBN 9780521551847
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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