Abbink, K. (2004), “Staff Rotation as an Anti-corruption Policy: An Experimental Study,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20 (4): 887–906.
Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., and Renner, E. (2000), “The Moonlighting Game,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 22: 265–77.
Abed, G. T. and H. R. Davoodi (2002), “Corruption, Structural Reforms, and Economic Performance,” Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance, ed. by Abed, G. T. and Gupta, S., Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund 489–537.
Aburish, S. (1985), Pay-Off: Wheeling and Dealing in the Arab World (New York: Harper Collins Publishers).
Acemoglu, D. and Verdier, T. (1998), “Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 108: 1381–1403.
Acemoglu, D. and Verdier, T. (2000), “The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 90: 194–211.
Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. (1995), “Competition and Corruption,” Draft Paper, Oxford: Keble College, Oxford University.
Ades, A. and R. Di Tella (1996), “The Causes and Consequences of Corruption: A Review of Recent Empirical Contributions,” Liberalization and the New Corruption, ed. by White, B. Harris and White, G. (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies Bulletin, 27): 6–12.
Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. (1997), “National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 107: 1023–42.
Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. (1999), “Rents, Competition, and Corruption,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 89: 982–94.
Adsera, A., C. Boix, and M. Payne (2000), “Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government,” Inter-American Development Bank Research Department Working Paper 438, Washington, DC.
Aidt, Toke S. (2003), “Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 113: 632–52.
Aizenman, J. and M. Spiegel (2003), “Institutional Efficiency, Monitoring Costs, and the Investment Share of FDI,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2003–06.
Alam, S. M. (1990), “Some Economic Costs of Corruption in LDC's,” Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 27: 89–97.
Alesina, A. and Weder, B. (1999), “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?,” NBER Working Paper 7108, Cambridge, MA.
Alesina, A. and Weder, B. (2002), “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?,”American Economic Review, Vol. 92 (4): 1126–37.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., and Wacziarg, R. (2003), “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 8: 155–94.
Ali, A. M. and Isse, H. S. (2003), “Determinants of Economic Corruption: A Cross-Country Comparison,” Cato Journal, Vol. 22 (3): 445–66.
Al-Marhubi, F. A. (2000), “Corruption and Inflation,” Economics Letters, Vol. 66 (2): 199–202.
Anderson, A. (1995), “Organized Crime, Mafia and Governments,” The Economics of Organized Crime, ed. by Fiorentini, G. and Peltzman, S. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 33–54.
Anderson, C. J. and Tverdova, Y. V. (2003), “Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes toward Government in Contemporary Democracies,” American Journal of Political Sciences, Vol. 47 (1): 91–109.
Andvig, J. (1995), “Corruption in the North Sea Oil Industry: Issues and Assessments,” Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 23: 289–313.
Andvig, J. C. (1991), “The Economics of Corruption: A Survey,” Studi Economici, Vol. 43: 57–94.
Andvig, J. C. and O. H. Fjeldstadt (2000), “Research on Corruption. A Policy Oriented Survey,” Chr. Michelsen Institute and Norwegian Institute for International Affairs. Online version at: www.icgg.org/downloads/contribution07_andrig.pdf
Andvig, J. C. and Moene, K. (1990), “How Corruption May Corrupt,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 13: 63–76.
Anoruo, E. and Braha, H. (2005), “Corruption and Economic Growth: The African Experience,” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, Vol. 7 (1).
Appelbaum, E. and Katz, E. (1987), “Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 97: 685–99.
Arikan, G. (2004), “Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?,”International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 11: 175–95.
Arlen, J. (1994), “The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 23: 833–67.
Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books).
Bannenberg, B. (2002), Korruption in Deutschland und ihre strafrechtliche Kontrolle: Eine kriminologisch-strafrechtliche Analyse (Neuwied/Kriftel, Germany: Luchterhand).
Bardhan, P. (1997), “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35: 1320–46.
Bartsch, E. and Thomas, I. (1993), “Spieltheoretische Ansätze in der Rent-Seeking Theorie: Ein Literaturüberblick,” Kieler Arbeitspapiere, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel, Germany, No. 564.
Bartsch, E. and Thomas, I. (1995), “Rent-Seeking, Umverteilung und soziale Kosten,” WiSt –wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, Vol. 24: 174–9.
Bates, R. (1981), Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
Bavarian Criminal Division (2005), unpublished conviction, 4th Criminal Division of the Munich District Court.
Bayley, D. H. (1966), “The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation,” The Western Political Quartely, Vol. 19 (4): 719–32. Reprinted in A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston and V. LeVine (1989), Political Corruption – A Handbook (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers): 935–52.
Beck, P. J. and Maher, M. (1986), “A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets,” Economics Letters, Vol. 20: 1–5.
Beck, P. J., Maher, M. W. and Tschoegl, A. E. (1991), “The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on US Exports,” Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 12: 295–303.
Becker, G. S. (1968), “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76: 169–217.
Becker, G. S. (1994), “To Root Out Corruption, Boot Out Big Government,” Business Week, January 31: 18.
Becker, G. S. and Stigler, G. J. (1974), “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3: 1–19.
Ben-Porath, Y. (1980), “The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 6 (1): 1–30.
Besley, T. and McLaren, J. (1993), “Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 103: 119–41.
Besley, T. and Prat, A. (2006), “Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability,” American Economic Review, Vol. 96(3): 720–736.
Bhagwati, J. N. (1982), “Directly Unproductive, Profit Seeking (DUP) Activities,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90: 998–1002.
Bhagwati, J. N. and Srinivasan, T. N. (1980), “Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of tariffs,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 87: 1069–87.
Bhagwati, J. N., R. A. Brecher, and T. N. Srinivasan (1984), “DUP activities and Economic Theory,” Neoclassical Political Economy. The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, ed. by Colander, D. C. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company): 17–32.
Björnskov, C. and M. Paldam (2004), “Corruption Trends,” The New Institutional Economics of Corruption – Norms, Trust, and Reciprocity, ed. by Lambsdorff, J. Graf, Schramm, M. and Taube, M.(London: Routledge): 59–75.
Borner, S. and C. Schwyzer (1999), “Bekämpfung der Bestechung im Lichte der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie,” Korruption im internationalen Geschäftsverkehr, Bestandsaufnahme, Bekämpfung, Prävention, ed. by Pieth, M. and Eigen, P. (Basel, Frankfurt am Main: Luchterhand): 17–39.
Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1995), Privatizing Russia (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press).
Boyko, M., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1996), “A Theory of Privatization,” Economic Journal, Vol. 106 (435): 309–19.
Braun, M. and Di Tella, R. (2000), “Inflation and Corruption,” Harvard Business School, Division of Research Working Paper00–053.
Bray, J. (1999), “Beyond Compliance: Corruption as a Business Risk,” Conference on Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries and Emerging Countries: The Role of the Private Sector, Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD) Development Centre, Washington, DC, February.
Bray, J. (2004), “The Use of Intermediaries and other ‘Alternatives’ to Bribery,” The New Institutional Economics of Corruption – Norms, Trust, and Reciprocity, ed. by Lambsdorff, J. Graf, Schramm, M., and Taube, M. (London: Routledge): 112–37.
Bray, J. (2006), International Business Attitudes to Corruption-Survey 2006. Report (London: Control Risks Group). Online version at www.control-risks.com/pdf/corruption_survey_2006_v3.pdf
Breton, A. and Wintrobe, R. (1975), “The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy (in Communications),” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83 (1): 195–208.
Broadman, H. G. and Recanatini, F. (1999), “Seeds of Corruption – Do Market Institutions Matter?,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2368, Washington, DC.
Brock, W. A. and Magee, St. P. (1978), “The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff,” The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 68: 246–50.
Brock, W. A. and St. P. Magee (1984), “The Invisible Foot and the Waste of Nations,” Neoclassical Political Economy. The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, ed. by Colander, D. C. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company): 177–86.
Browning, E. K. (1974), “On the Welfare Costs of Transfers,” Kyklos, Vol. 27: 374–7.
Brunetti, A. and Weder, B. (1998), “Investment and Institutional Uncertainty: A Comparative Study of Different Uncertainty Measures,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Vol. 134: 513–33.
Brunetti, A. and Weder, B. (2003), “A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87 (7–8): 1801–24.
Brunetti, A., G. Kisunko, and B. Weder (1997), “Institutional Obstacles for Doing Business. Data Description and Methodology of a Worldwide Private Sector Survey,” Background Paper for the World Development Report 1997, Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Brunetti, A., Kisunko, G., and Weder, B. (1998), “Credibility of Rules and Economic Growth: Evidence from a World Wide Private Sector Survey,” The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12 (3): 353–84.
Brunner, K. and Meckling, W. H. (1977), “The Perception of Man and the Conception of Government,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 9 (1): 70–85.
Buchanan, J. M. (1980), “Rent-Seeking and Profit-Seeking,” Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, ed. by Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press): 3–15.
Buchanan, J. M. (1993), “Public Choice after Socialism,” Public Choice, Vol. 72: 67–74.
Buchanan, J. M. and Tullock, G. (1962), The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press).
Bundeskriminalamt (2004), “Lagebild Korruption Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2003,” August. Online version at www.bka.de/lageberichte/ko/blkorruption2003.pdf, retreived July, 2005
Button, K. J. and Weyman-Jones, T. G. (1994), “X-Efficiency and Technical Efficiency,” Public Choice, Vol. 80: 83–104.
Campos, J. E., Lien, D., and Pradhan, S. (1999), “The Impact of Corruption on Investment: Predictability Matters,” World Development, Vol. 27 (6): 1059–67.
Cartier-Bresson, J. (1997), “The Economics of Corruption,” Democracy and Corruption in Europe, ed. by Porta, D. Della and Mény, Y. (London: Pinter): 148–65.
Center for the Study of Democracy (1998), “Relations between Citizens and Public Administration and Public Opinion on Corruption in Bulgaria,” Draft Paper, Sofia, Bulgaria.
Chang, E. and M. Golden (2004), “Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption,” mimeo, Departments of Political Science, Michigan State University and the University of California at Los Angeles, CA.
Choi, J. P. and Thum, M. (2005), “Corruption and the Shadow Economy,” International Economic Review, Vol. 46 (3): 817–36.
Ciocchini, F., Durbin, E., and Ng, D. T. C. (2003), “Does Corruption Increase Emerging Market Bond Spreads?,” Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 55: 503–28.
Coase, R. H. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, Vol. 4: 386–405.
Colombo, G. (1995), “Korruption als Flächenbrand. Bekämpfungsstrategien in Italien,” Korruption in Deutschland – Ursachen, Erscheinungsformen, Bekämpfungsstrategien, (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung): 37–44.
Congleton, R. (1980), “Competitive Process, Competitive Waste, and Institutions,” Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, ed. by Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press): 153–79.
Coolidge, J. and Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997), “High-Level Rent-Seeking and Corruption in African Regimes: Theory and Cases,” Policy Research Working Paper 1780, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Coronel, S. S. (2000), “The Jueteng Republic,” Investigating Estrada: Millions, Mansions and Mistresses, ed. by Coroner, Sheila S.(Manila: PCIJ) 26–36.
Crain, W. M. and Tollison, R. D. (1979), “The Executive Branch in an Interest-Group Perspective,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 8: 555–67.
Damania, R., Fredriksson, P. G., and Mani, M. (2004), The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence,” Public Choice, Vol. 121: 363–90.
Darroch, Fiona (2004), Lesotho – “A sheep or a springbock? The herd boy tackles Goliath,” commissioned case study, Anti-Corruption Strategies Programme, Three Strikes Against Graft, Assessing the Impact of Groundbreaking Corruption Cases in Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa; The Implications for Countering Corruption in Southern Africa, 2004. www.iss.co.za/SEMINARS/2004/1503graft/lesotho.pdf
Davidson, S. (1999), “Okeahalam and Bah on Corruption: A Comment,” South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 67 (1) March: 157–65.
Soto, H. (1989), The Other Path (New York: Harper and Row).
della Porta, D. and Vanucci, A. (1999), Corrupt Exchanges, Actors, Resources and Mechanisms of Political Corruption (New York: de Gruyter).
Dick, A. R. (1995), “When does Organized Crime Pay? A Transaction Cost Analysis,” International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 15: 25–45.
Di Tella, R. and Schargrodsky, E., (2003) “The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires.” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 46(1): 269–92.
Djankov, S., Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2002), “The Regulation of Entry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117 (1): 1–37.
Doh, J. and Teegen, H. (2003), “Private Telecommunications Investment in Emerging Economies – Comparing the Latin American and Asian Experience,” Management Research, Vol. 1 (1): 9–26.
Dollar, D., Fisman, R., and Gatti, R. (2001), “Are Women Really the ‘Fairer’ Sex? Corruption and Women in Government,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 46 (4): 423–9.
Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row).
Drew, E. (1983), Politics and Money. The New Road to Corruption (New York: Macmillan).
Dušek, L., A. Ortmann, and L. Lízal (2005), “Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility through Experiments: A Primer, Prague Economic Papers 2. University of Economics, Prague, Czech Republic.
Efron, B. and Tibshirani, R. (1993), An Introduction to the Bootstrap, New York and London: Chapman & Hall.
EIRIS (2005), “Corporate Codes of Business Ethics: An International Survey of Bribery and Ethical Standards in Companies.” Publication of the Ethical Investment Research Services, London. Online version at www.eiris.org/files/research%20publications/corporatecodesofbusinessethicse p05. pdf, retrieved December 2006.
Elliott, K. A. (1997), “Corruption as an International Policy Problem: Overview and Recommendations,” Corruption and the Global Economy, ed. by Elliott, K. A. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics): 175–233.
Esty, D. and M. Porter (2002), “National Environmental Performance Measurement and Determinants,” in ed. by Esty, D. and Cornelius, P., Environmental Performance Measurement: The Global Report 2001–2002, (New York: Oxford University Press): 24–43.
Evans, P. B. and Rauch, J. E. (2000), “Bureaucratic Structures and Economic Performance in Less Developed Countries,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 75: 49–71.
Faccio, M. and D. C. Parsley (2006), “Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Political Connections,” ECGI – Finance Working Paper 113/2006.
Fikentscher, W. (1987), “Ersatz im Ausland gezahlter Bestechungsgelder,” Praxis des internationalen Privat– und Verfahrensrechts, (2): 86–90.
Findlay, R. and St. Wellisz (1984), “Toward a Model of Endogenous Rent-Seeking,” Neoclassical Political Economy. The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, Colander, D. C. (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company): 89–100.
Fisman, R. and Gatti, R. (2002), “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 83 (3): 325–45.
Fjeldstad, O. -H. and Tungodden, B. (2001), “Skatteunndragelse og korrupsjon i Tanzania. En studie av Tanzania Revenue Authority,” Den Ny Verden, Vol. 34 (3): 55–79.
Flowers, M. R. (1987), “Rent-Seeking and Rent Dissipation: A Critical View,” Cato Journal, Vol. 7: 431–40.
Fons, J. (1999), “Improving Transparency in Asian Banking Systems,” Internet Center for Corruption Research, Contribution No. 4. Online version at www.icgg.org/downloads/contribution04_fons.pdf
Foreign Policy (2001), “Measuring Globalization,” Foreign Policy. Online at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2493, accessed December 2006.
Friedman, E., S.Johnson, , Kaufmann, D., and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (2000), “Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 76: 459–93.
Friedman, M. (1970), “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” New York Times Magazine, September 13. Reprint, L. P. Hartmann, Business Ethics (Chicago, IL: Irwin/McGraw-Hill): 246–51.
Frisch, D. (1999), “Entwicklungspolitische Gesichtspunkte der Korruption,” Korruption im internationalen Geschäftsverkehr: Bestandsaufnahme, Bekämpfung, Prävention, ed. by Pieth, M. and Eigen, P. (Basel, Frankfurt am Main: Luchterhand): 89–100.
Furubotn, E. G. and Richter, R. (1998), Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of New Institutional Economics (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press).
Galeotti, G. and A. Merlo (1994), “Political Collusion and Corruption in a Representative Democracy,” Unpublished manuscript. Universita'di Roma “La Sapienza” and University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.
Galtung, F. (1999), “BPI Framework Document,” Transparency International Background Paper. Online version at www.transparency.org/cpi/1999/bpi_framework.html, retrieved March, 2004.
Gambetta, D. (1998), “Comment on ‘Corruption and Development,’ by Susan Rose-Ackerman,” Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1997, ed. by. Pleskovic, B. and Stiglitz, J. E. (Washington D.C.: The World Bank): 58–61.
Gardiner, J. A. and Olson, D. J. (1974), Theft of the City (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press).
Gastil, R. D. (1986), Freedom in the World. Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1985–86 (New York: Greenwood Press).
Gatti, R. (1999), “Corruption and Trade Tariffs, or a Case for Uniform Tariffs,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2216.
Gerring, J. and Thacker, S. (2004), “Political Institutions and Governance: Pluralism versus Centralism,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34 (2): 295–3.
Gerring, J. and Thacker, S. (2005), “Do Neoliberal Policies Deter Political Corruption?,” International Organization, Vol. 59: 233–54.
Ghura, D. (2002), “Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa: Effects of Economic Policies and Corruption,” Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance, ed. by Abed, G. T. and Gupta, S., Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 369–95.
Githongo, J. (1997), “Independency, Investigation and Denunciation of Corruption from the Press – The Case of Kenya,” 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Lima, Peru, September.
Glaeser, E. and Saks, R. E. (2006), “Corruption in America,” Journal of Public Economics Vol. 90(6–7): 1053–72.
Goel, R. K. and Nelson, M. A. (1998), “Corruption and Government Size: A Disaggregated Analysis,” Public Choice, Vol. 97 (1): 107–20.
Goel, R. K. and Nelson, M. A. (2005), “Economic Freedom versus Political Freedom: Cross-Country Influences on Corruption,” Australian Economic Papers, Vol. 44: 121–33.
Goetz, C. J. and Scott, R. E. (1981), “Principles of Relational Contracts,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 67: 1089–150.
Goldsmith, A. A. (1999), “Slapping the Grasping Hand: Correlates of Political Corruption in Emerging Markets,” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 58 (4): 866–83.
Graeff, P. and Mehlkop, G. (2003), “The Impact of Economic Freedom on Corruption: Different Patterns for Rich and Poor Countries,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 19: 605–20.
Granovetter, M. (1992), “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” The Sociology of Economic Life, ed. by Granovetter, M. and Swedberg, R. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press): 53–81.
Grossman, H. I. (1995), “Rival Kleptocrats: The Mafia versus the State,” The Economics of Organized Crime, ed. by Fiorentini, G. and Peltzman, S. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 143–56.
Gupta, M. R. and Chaudhuri, S. (1997), “Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis,” Economica, 64: 331–43.
Gupta, S., Mello, L., and Sharan, R. (2001a), “Corruption and Military Spending,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17 (4): 749–77.
Gupta, S., H. Davoodi, and E. R. Tiongson (2001b), “Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services,” The Political Economy of Corruption, ed. by Jain, A. K. (London: Routledge): 111–41.
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., and Alonso-Terme, R. (2002), “Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?,” Economics of Governance, Vol. 3: 23–45.
Gylfason, T. (2001), “Nature, Power and Growth,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 48: 558–88.
Gymiah-Brempong, K. (2002), “Corruption, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality in Africa,” Economics of Governance, Vol. 3: 183–209.
Gwartney, J. and Lawson, R. (2000), “Economic Freedom of the World: 2000 Annual Report,” (Vancouver, BC): Fraser Institute.
Habib, M. and Zurawicki, L. (2001), “Country-Level Investments and the Effect of Corruption: Some Empirical Evidence,” International Business Review, Vol. 10 (6): 687–700.
Habib, M. and Zurawicki, L. (2002), “Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment,” Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 33 (2): 291–307.
Hall, R. and Jones, C. (1999), “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114: 83–116.
Hall, T. and G. Yago (2000), “Estimating the Cost of Opacity Using Sovereign Bond Spreads,” unpublished manuscript, Milken Institute, Santa Monica, CA.
Harden, B. (1993), Africa. Dispatches from a Fragile Continent (London: Harper Collins Publishers, paperback edition).
Hart, A. G. (1970), “Fiscal Policy in Latin America,” Part 2: Key Problems of Economic Policy in Latin America, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 78 (4): 857–89.
Hart, O. D. (1987), “Incomplete Contracts,” The New Palgrave-Allocation, Information and Markets, Vol. 2, ed. by Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P., (London: Macmillan): 752–9.
Hart, O. D. (1991), “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,” The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development, ed. by Williamson, O. D. and Winter, S. G. (New York: Oxford University Press): 138–58.
Hasker, K. and C. Okten (2004), Intermediaries and Corruption, unpublished working paper, Ankara, Turkey: Bilkent University. Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
Heidenheimer, A., Johnston, M. and LeVine, V. (1989), Political Corruption – A Handbook, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers).
Henderson, D. R. (1999), “Power Corrupts – Editorial Comment,” The Wall Street Journal, April 19.
Henisz, W. (2000), “The institutional environment for multinational investment,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 16 (2): 334–64.
Hepkema, S. and Booysen, W. (1997), “The Bribery of Public Officials: An IBA Survey,” International Business Lawyer, Vol. 25 (9): 415–16, 422.
Herrera, A. and P. Rodriguez (2003), “Bribery and the Nature of Corruption,”unpublished manuscript, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI and The Darden School, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, July.
Herzfeld, T. and Weiss, C. (2003), “Corruption and legal (in)effectiveness: an empirical investigation,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 19: 621–32.
Heymann, P. B. (1995), “Korruption in den USA. Rechtliche, wirtschaftliche und ethische Aspekte,” Korruption in Deutschland – Ursachen, Erscheinungsformen, Bekämpfungsstrategien, (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung): 49–56.
Hillman, A. L. and Katz, E. (1984), “Risk Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power,” Economic Journal, Vol. 94: 104–10.
Hines, J. R. (1995), “Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business after 1977,” NBER Working Paper 5266, Cambridge, MA.
Hirshleifer, J. (1976), “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation: Comment,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 19: 241–4.
Hofstede, G. (1997), Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (New York: McGraw Hill).
Huntington, S. P. (1968), “Modernization and Corruption,” Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press): 59–71. Reprinted in A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston, and V. LeVine (1989), Political Corruption – A Handbook (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers): 377–88.
Husted, B. (1999), “Wealth, Culture, and Corruption,” Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 30 (2): 339–60.
Husted, B. W. (1994), “Honor Among Thieves: A Transaction-Cost Interpretation of Corruption in Third World Countries,” Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 4: 17–27.
Huther, J. and A. Shah, (1998), “A Simple Measure of Good Governance and its Application to the Debate on the Appropriate Level of Fiscal Decentralization,” World Bank Working Paper, 1894, Washington, DC.
Hwang, J. (2002), “A Note on the Relationship between Corruption and Government,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 27 (2): 161–77.
Isham, J. and Kaufmann, D. (1999), “The Forgotten Rationale for Policy Reform: The Productivity of Investment Projects,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114: 149–84.
Jagannathan, N. V. (1986), “Corruption, Delivery Systems, and Property Rights,” World Development, Vol. 14: 127–32.
Jain, A. K. (1998), “Models of Corruption,” Economics of Corruption, ed. by Jain, A. K. (Boston, London, and Dordrecht): 13–34.
Jarvin, S. (1986), “Aus der Praxis des ICC Schiedgerichtshofes,” Recht und Praxis der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit der Internationalen Handelskammer. Schriftenreihe des Deutschen Instituts für Schiedsgerichtsverfahren, ed. by Böckstiegel, K. -H. (Köln: Heymann): 7–51.
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1998), “Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy,” The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 88: 387–92.
Kapstein, E. (2001), “Five Basic Principles for a Worldwide Code of Business Ethics,” International Herald Tribune, January 24.
Kargl, W. (2002), “Über die Bekämpfung des Anscheins der Kriminalität bei der Vorteilsannahme (§ 331 StGB),” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (ZStW), Vol. 114 (4): 763–81.
Kaufmann, D. and Wei, S. -J. (1999), “Does ‘Grease Money’ Speed up the Wheels of Commerce?,” NBER Working Paper 7093, Cambridge, MA.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1999a), “Aggregating Governance Indicators,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2195, Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1999b), “Governance Matters,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2196, October, Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Khalil, F. and Lawarree, J. (1995), “Collusive Auditors,” The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 85 (2): 442–6.
Klein, B. (1996), “Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships,” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 34: 444–63.
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., and Alchian, A. A. (1978), “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 21: 297–326.
Kleinschmidt, P., H. Achatz, and J. Graf Lambsdorff (2005), “The Corruption Perceptions Index and the Linear Ordering Problem,” presented at the Annual International Conference of the German Operations Research Society (GOR), September 9, 2005.
Klitgaard, R. (1988), Controlling Corruption (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
Knack, S. and Azfar, O. (2003), “Trade Intensity, Country Size and Corruption,” Economics of Governance, Vol. 4 (1): 1–18.
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995), “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics, Vol. 7: 207–27.
Knapp, W. (1986), “Sittenwidrige Vermittlung von Regierungsaufträgen durch Bestechungsgelder,” RIW – Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft: 999–1001.
Kofman, F. and Lawarree, J. (1996), “On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 61: 383–407.
Kranton, R. E. (1996), “Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 86 (4): 830–51.
Kreps, D. M. (1990), “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. by Alt, J. and Shepsle, K. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 90–143.
Kreps, D. M. and Wilson, R. (1982), “Reputation and Imperfect Information,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27: 253–79.
Krueger, A. (1974), “The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society,” American Economic Review, Vol. 64: 291–303.
Krueger, A. (1990), “Government Failures in Development,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4: 9–23.
Kunicova, J. (2005), “Are Presidential Systems More Susceptible to Political Corruption?,” mimeo, Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT.
Kunicova, J. (2002), “When Are Opposition's Lips Sealed? Comparative Political Corruption in Democracies,” mimeo, Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT.
Kunicova, J. and Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005), “Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35 (4): 573–606.
Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1997), “Trust in Large Organizations,” The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 137 (2): 333–8.
Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1999), “The Quality of Government,” The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 15 (1): 222–79.
Laffont, J. -J. and Tirole, J. (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Lambert-Mogiliansky, A. (2002), “Why Firms Pay Occasional Bribes: The Connection Economy,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 18: 47–60.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (1998a), “An Empirical Investigation of Bribery in International Trade,” European Journal for Development Research, Vol. 10: 40–59. Reprinted in Corruption and Development, ed. by M. Robinson (London: Frank Cass Publishers): 40–59.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (1999), “Korruption im internationalen Geschäftsverkehr. Bestandsaufnahme, Bekämpfung, Prävention,” Korruption als mühseliges Geschäft –eine Transaktionskostenanalyse, ed. by Pieth, M. and Eigen, P. (Basel, Frankfurt am Main: Luchterhand): 56–88.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2000), “De la propension des exportateurs à verser des pots-de-vin –l'impact sur les échanges,” Revue Tiers Monde, Vol. 41 (161): 89–116.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2002a), “Making Corrupt Deals – Contracting in the Shadow of Law,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 48 (3): 221–41.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2002b), “Corruption and Rent-Seeking,” Public Choice, Vol. 113 (1/2): 97–125.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2002c), “How Confidence facilitates illegal Transactions,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 61 (4): 829–54.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2003a), “How Corruption Affects Productivity,” Kyklos, Vol. 56 (4): 459–76.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2003b), “How Corruption Affects Persistent Capital Flows,” Economics of Governance, Vol. 4 (3): 229–44.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2005a), “Between Two Evils – Investors Prefer Grand Corruption!,” University of Passau, Discussion Paper V-31–05, January.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2005b), “Determining Trends for Perceived Levels of Corruption,” Passau University, Discussion Paper V-38–06.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf (2006), “Ten Years of the CPI: Determining trends,” Global Corruption Report 2006, Transparency International.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf and M. Nell (2005), “Let Them Take Gifts, and Cheat Those Who Seek Influence,” Economics Faculty of Passau University, Discussion Paper 41–05, December 2005.
Lambsdorff, J. Graf and P. Cornelius (2000), “Corruption, Foreign Investment and Growth,” The Africa Competitiveness Report 2000/2001, ed. by Schwab, K., Cook, L., Cornelius, P., Sachs, J. D., Sievers, S., and Warner, A. joint publication of the World Economic Forum and the Institute for International Development, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University and Oxford: Oxford University Press: 70–78.
Lambsdorff, J.Graf, M. Schramm, and Taube, M. (2004), The New Institutional Economics of Corruption – Norms, Trust, and Reciprocity, (London: Routledge).
Landes, W. M. and Posner, R. A. (1975), “The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 18: 875–901.
LaPalombara, J. (1994), “Structural and Institutional Aspects of Corruption,” Social Research, Vol. 61: 325–50.
Lederman, D., N. Loayza, and R. Reis Soares (2001), “Accountability and Corruption. Political Institutions Matter,” The World Bank Working Paper 2708.
Lee, C. M. and D. Ng (2004), “Corruption and International Valuation. Does Virtue Pay?,” unpublished manuscript, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.
Leff, N. H. (1964), “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 8 (3): 8–14. Reprinted in A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston, and V. LeVine (1989), Political Corruption – A Handbook (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers) 389–403.
Leite, C. and Weidemann, J. (1999), “Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth,” International Monetary Fund Working Paper 99/85, July.
Li, H., Xu, L. C., and Zou, H. -F. (2000), “Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth,” Economics and Politics, Vol. 12 (2): 155–82.
Lien, D. H. D. (1986), “A Note on Competitive Bribery Games,” Economics Letters, Vol. 22: 337–41.
Lindstedt, C. and D. Naurin (2005), “Transparency and Corruption. A Cross-Country Study of the Significance of a Free Press,” paper prepared for the 3rd ECPR Conference, The Quality of Democracy, Budapest, September.
Lipset, S. M. and G. S. Lenz (2000), “Corruption, Culture, and Markets,” In Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, ed. by Harrison, L. E. and Huntington, S. P. (New York: Basic Books): 112–24.
Lui, F. T. (1985), “An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93: 760–81.
MacGuire, M. C. and Olson, M. (1996), “The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 34: 72–96.
Macneil, I. R. (1974), “The Many Futures of Contracts,” Southern California Law Review, Vol. 47: 691–816.
Macneil, I. R. (1978), “Contracts: Adjustment of Long Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law,” Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 72: 854–905.
Magee, St. P. (1984), “Endogenous Tariff Theory,” Neoclassical Political Economy. The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, ed. by Colander, D. C. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company): 41–54.
Mankiw, N. G. (2000), Principles of Economics, 2nd ed. (Fort Worth, TX, Harcourt College Publishers).
Manow, P. (2005), “Politische Korruption und politischer Wettbewerb: Probleme der quantitativen Analyse,” Dimensionen politischer Korruption, ed. by U. von Alemann, PVS – Politische Vierteljahresschrift, VS – Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: Wiesbaden, Sonderheft 35: 249–66.
Marcoullier, D. and Young, L. (1995), “The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory State and the Informal Economy,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 85 (3): 630–46.
Marshall, A. (1897), “The Old Generation of Economists and the New,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 11 (2): 115–35.
Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110 (3): 681–712.
Mauro, P. (1997a), “The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis,” Corruption and the Global Economy, ed. by Elliott, K. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics): 83–107.
Mauro, P. (1997b), “Why Worry about Corruption?,” Economic Issues No. 6 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).
Mauro, P. (1998), “Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 69: 263–79.
Mbaku, J. M. (1992), “Bureaucratic Corruption as Rent-Seeking Behavior,” Konjunkturpolitik, Vol. 38: 247–65.
Mbaku, J. M. (1998), “Corruption and Rent-Seeking,” The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, ed. by Borner, S. and Paldam, M. (London and New York: Macmillan Press and St. Martins Press): 193–211.
McChesney, F. S. (1987), “Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 16: 101–18.
McChesney, F. S. (1997), Money for Nothing. Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
McGuire, M. C. and Olson, M. (1996), “The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 34: 72–96.
Méon, P. -G. and Sekkat, K. (2004), “Does the Quality of Institutions Limit the MENA's Integration in the World Economy?,” The World Economy, Vol. 27 (9): 1475–98.
Méon, P. -G. and Sekkat, K. (2005), “Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?,” Public Choice, Vol. 122: 69–97.
Miller, W. L., Grødeland, Å, and Koshechkina, T. Y. (2001), A Culture of Corruption – Coping with Government in Post-communist Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press).
Mo, P. H. (2001), “Corruption and Economic Growth,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 29: 66–79.
Mocan, N. (2004), “What Determines Corruption? International Evidence from Micro Data,” NBER Working Paper 10460.
Moe, T. M. (1984), “The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28 (4): 739–77.
Montinola, G. and Jackman, R. W. (2002), “Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32: 147–70.
Moody-Stuart, G. (1994), “Grand Corruption in Third World Development,” Transparency International (TI) Working Paper, Berlin: Transparency International.
Moody-Stuart, George (1997), Grand Corruption. How Business Bribes Damage Developing Countries (Oxford, UK: WorldView Publishing).
Mookherjee, D. and Png, I. P. L. (1995), “Corruptible Law Enforcers: How should they be compensated?,”The Economic Journal, Vol. 105: 145–59.
Moran, Th. (2006), “How Multinational Investors Evade Developed Country Laws,” Center for Global Development Working Paper 79. online version at www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/6113
Morgan, Th. (1964), “The Theory of Error in Centrally-Directed Economic Systems,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 78 (3): 395–419.
Moselle, B. and Polak, B. (2001), “A Model of a Predatory State,” Journal of Law Economics and Organization, Vol. 17 (1): 1–33.
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1993), “Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?,”The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 82 (2): 409–14.
Myrdal, G. (1956), An International Economy (New York: Harper and Bros.).
Myrdal, G. (1968), Asian Drama. Vol. II (New York: Random House).
Neeman, Z., Paserman, M., and Simhon, A. (2003), “Corruption and Openness,” CEPR Discussion Paper 4057. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Nelson, W. and Winter, S. G. (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press).
Neugebauer, G. (1978), Grundzüge einer ökonomischen Theorie der Korruption. Eine Studie über die Bestechung. Basler sozialökonomische Studien (Zürich: Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag).
Niskanen, W. (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago, IL: Aldine Press).
Niskanen, W. (1975), “Bureaucrats and Politicians,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 18: 617–43.
North, D. C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History (New York and London: Norton).
North, D. C. (1984), “Three Approaches to the Study of Institutions,” Neoclassical Political Economy. The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, ed. by Colander, D. C. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company): 33–40.
North, D. C. (1993), “Institutions and Credible Commitment,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 149: 11–23.
North, D. C. and Weingast, B. R. (1989), “The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England,” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 49: 803–32.
Nye, J. S. (1967), “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost Benefit Analysis,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 61 (2): 417–27. Reprinted in A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston, and V. LeVine (1989), Political Corruption – A Handbook (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers): 963–83.
OECD (2003), Business Approaches to Combating Corrupt Practices, Study prepared by the Capital Movements, International Investment and Services Division, OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, September.
Okeahalam, C. C. and Bah, I. (1998), “Perceived Corruption and Investment in Sub-Saharan African,” South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 67 (1), March: 386.
Oldenburg, P. (1987), “Middlemen in Third-World Corruption: Implications of an Indian Case,” World Politics, Vol. 39: 508–35.
Olsen, T. and Torsvik, G. (1998), “Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption,” International Economic Review, Vol. 39 (2), May: 413–38.
Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Olson, M. (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
Orchard, L. and Stretton, H. (1997), “Public Choice,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 21 (3): 409–30.
Paldam, M. (2001), “Corruption and Religion. Adding to the Economic Model,” Kyklos, Vol. 54 (2/3): 383–414.
Paldam, M. (2002), “The Big Pattern of Corruption. Economics, Culture and the Seesaw Dynamics,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 18: 215–40.
Panizza, U. (2001), “Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality,” Economics and Politics, Vol. 13 (3): 311–42.
Pechlivanos, L. (1998), “Self-Enforcing Corruption and Optimal Deterrence,” unpublished manuscript, Université des Sciences Sociales, Toulouse, France.
Pechlivanos, L. (2004), “Self-Enforcing Corruption: Information Transmission and Organizational Response,” The New Institutional Economics of Corruption – Norms, Trust, and Reciprocity, ed. by Lambsdorff, J. Graf, Schramm, M., and Taube, M.London: Routledge: 93–111.
Pellegrini, L. and Gerlagh, R. (2004), “Corruption's Effect on Growth and its Transmission Channels,” Kyklos, Vol. 57 (3): 429–56.
Pellegrini, L. and S. Vujic (2003), “Corruption, Economic Development and Environmental Policy,” Political Economy of the Environment, Institute for Environmental Studies, IVM, Working Paper, the Netherlands.
Peltzman, S. (1976), “Towards a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 20: 322–40.
Peltzman, S. (1989), “The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation,” Brooking Papers of Economic Activity: Microeconomics, ed. by Baily, M. N. and Winston, C. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution): 1–41.
Persson, T., Tabellini, G., and Trebbi, F. (2003), “Electoral Rules and Corruption,” Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1 (4): 958–89, formerly published in: NBER Working Paper 8154, March 2001.
Poirson, H. (1998), “Economic Security, Private Investment, and Growth in Developing Countries,” International Monetary Fund Working Paper 98/4, January.
Pope, J. (2000), The Transparency International Source Book 2000 – Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System (Berlin: Transparency International). Online version at www.transparency.org/sourcebook/, retrieved December 2006.
Posner, R. A. (1974), “Theories of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management, Vol. 5 (2): 335–58.
Posner, R. A. (1975), “The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83: 807–27.
Pritzl, R. F. J. (1995), “La Corrupción pública: una forma dinámica e ilegal de rentismo o rent-seeking en la lucha distributiva de los grupos de interés organizados,” Corrupción. Contribuciones. Publication Trimestral 4 (Buenos Aires: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and CIEDLA).
Pryor, F. L. (1984), “Rent-Seeking and the Growth and Fluctuations of Nations. Empirical Tests of Some Recent Hypothesis,” Neoclassical Political Economy. The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, ed. by Colande, D. C. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company): 155–75.
Putnam, R. D. (1993), Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Rasmusen, E. and Ramseyer, J. M. (1994), “Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators,” Public Choice, Vol. 74: 305–27.
Robertson, C. J. and Watson, A. (2004), “Corruption and Change: The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment,” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 25 (4): 385–96.
Rock, M. T. and Bonnett, H. (2004), “The comparative politics of corruption: Accounting for the East Asian paradox in empirical studies of corruption growth and investment,” World Development, 32 (6): 999–1017.
Root, H. (1999), “The Importance of Being Small,” Center for International Studies Working Paper 99–13, Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1975), “The Economics of Corruption,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 4: 187–203.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978), Corruption – A Study in Political Economy (New Haven, CT: Academic Press).
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1998), “The Role of the World Bank in Controlling Corruption,” Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 29: 93–114.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999), Corruption and Government. Causes, Consequences and Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2005), From Elections to Democracy. Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Sachs, J. and Warner, A. (1995), “Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 25 (1): 1–118.
Sandholtz, W. and Gray, M. (2003), “International Integration and National Corruption,” International Organization, Vol. 57 (4): 761–800.
Sandholtz, W. and Koetzle, W. (2000), “Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy, and Trade,” Industrial Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44: 31–50.
Sandholtz, W. and Taagepera, R. (2005), “Corruption, Culture, and Communism,” International Review of Sociology, Vol. 15 (1): 109–131.
Sayed, A. (2004): Corruption in International Trade and Commercial Arbitration (The Hague.: Kluwer Law International).
Schrag, J. and Scotchmer, S. (1997), “The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Crime,” International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 17: 325–35.
Schramm, M. and M. Taube (2003), “The Institutional Economics of Legal Institutions, Guanxi, and Corruption in the PR China,” Fighting Corruption in Asia. Causes, Effects and Remedies ed. by Kidd, J. and Richter, J., New Jersey, London, Singapore, and Hong Kong): 271–96.
Schulze, G. and Frank, B. (2003), “Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility,” Economics of Governance, Vol. 4 (2): 143–60.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros.).
Scott, J. C. (1972), Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall).
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1993), “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108: 599–617.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1998), The Grabbing Hand – Government Pathologies and their Cures. Cambridge, MA: (Harvard University Press): 1–17.
Shugart, M. S. (1999), “Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries,” Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 10: 53–88.
Smarzynska, B. K. and Wei, S. (2000), “Corruption and the Composition of Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-Level Evidence,” World Bank Discussion Paper 2360, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Smith, R. J., Muir, R. D. J., Walpole, M. J., Balmford, A. and Leader-Williams, N. (2003), “Governance and the loss of biodiversity,” Nature, Vol. 426: 67–70.
Soskice, D. (1999), “Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1990s,” Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. by Kitschelt, H., Lange, P., Marks, G., and Stephens, J. (New York: Cambridge University Press).
Stansbury, N. (2004), Anti-corruption Initiative in the Construction and Engineering Industry, Report Five: The Prevention of Bribery Through Agency Commissions, Transparency International (UK).
Stigler, G. J. (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 2: 3–21.
Stiglitz, J. (1998a), “Redefining the Role of the State – What Should it do? How Should it do it? And How Should these Decisions be Made?,” Paper presented on the Tenth Anniversary of MITI Research Institute, Tokyo. Online version at www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/redefine.pdf, retrieved December 2006.
Stiglitz, J. (1998b), “Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12 (2): 3–22.
Stratmann, T. (2003), “Do Strict Electoral Campaign Finance Rules Limit Corruption?,” CESifo DICE Report 1: 24–27.
Straub, S. (2003), “Opportunism, Corruption and the Multinational Firm's Mode of Entry,” Edinburgh School of Economics, Discussion Paper 102.
Strausz, R. (1995), “Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal – Supervisior – Agent Relationship,” Center for Economic Research, Discussion Paper 9548, Netherlands: Tilburg University.
Sung, H. -E. (2002), “A Convergence Approach to the Analysis of Political Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 38 (2): 137–160.
Sung, H. -E. (2003), “Fairer Sex or Fairer System? Gender and Corruption Revisited,” Social Forces, Vol. 82 (2): 703–23.
Sung, H. -E. (2004), “Democracy and Political Corruption: A Cross-National Comparison,” Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 41 (2): 179–93.
Sung, H. -E. and Chu, D. (2003), “Does Participation in the Global Economy Reduce Political Corruption? An Empirical Inquiry,” International Journal of Comparative Criminology, Vol. 3 (2): 94–118.
Svensson, J. (2003), “Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118 (1): 207–30.
Svensson, J. (2005), “Eight Questions about Corruption,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 19 (3): 19–42.
Swamy, A., Knack, St., Lee, Y., and Azfar, O. (2001), “Gender and Corruption,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 64: 25–55.
Tanzi, V. (1995), “Corruption: Arm's–length Relationships and Markets,” The Economics of Organized Crime, ed. by Fiorentini, G. and Peltzman, S. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 161–180.
Tanzi, V. and H. Davoodi (1997), “Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth,” International Monetary Fund Working Paper 97/139.
Tanzi, V. and H. Davoodi (2001), “Corruption, Growth, and Public Finances,” Political Economy of Corruption, ed. by Jain, A. K. (London: Routledge): 89–110.
Tavares, S. (2005), “Does Rapid Trade Liberalization Increase Corruption?,” paper presented at the European Public Choice Society Conference 2005.
Tellenbach, S. (1997), “Türkei,” Korruptionsbekämpfung durch Strafrecht, ed. by Eser, A., Überhofen, M., and Huber, B.. Freiburg, Germany: Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht.
Testa, C. (2003), “Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures: Is One Chamber Better than Two?,” mimeo, Royal Holloway College, University of London.
Thompson, D. F. (1993), “Mediated Corruption: The Case of the Keating Five,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87: 369–381.
Tollison, R. D. (1982), “Rent Seeking: A Survey,” Kyklos, Vol. 35: 575–602.
Tonoyan, V. (2004), “The Bright and Dark Sides of Trust: Corruption and Entrepreneurship,” Trust and Entrepreneurship: A West-East-Perspective, ed. by H. Höhmann and F. Welter (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). Online version at: www.icgg.org/downloads/contribution11_tonoyan.pdf
Transparency International, (1999), Newsletter. Berlin: Transparency International, September.
Treisman, D. (1999), “Decentralization and Corruption: Why are Federal States Perceived to be More Corrupt,” paper prepared for the presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September.
Treisman, D. (2000), “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 76: 399–457.
Tullock, G. (1967), “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft,” Western Economic Journal, Vol. 5 (3): 224–32.
Tullock, G. (1971), “The Cost of Transfers,” Kyklos, Vol. 24: 629–43.
Tullock, G. (1975), “Competing for Aid,” Public Choice, Vol. 21: 41–52.
Tullock, G. (1980a), “Rent Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game,” Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, ed. by Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press): 16–36.
Tullock, G. (1980b), “Efficient Rent Seeking,” Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, ed. by Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press): 97–112.
Tullock, G. (1989), “Klitgaard, Robert, Controlling Corruption,” The Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 27: 658–9.
Tullock, G. (1993), Rent Seeking, The Shaftesbury Papers 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Uhlenbruck, K., P. Rodriguez, J. Doh, and L. Eden (2006), “The Impact of Corruption on Entry Strategy: Evidence from Telecommunication Projects in Emerging Economies,” Organization Science, Vol. 17(3): 402–14.
United Nations (2006), “Seventh United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, covering the period 1998–2000” Report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved in December 2006 from: www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_survey_ seventh.html
Uslaner, E. (2004), “Trust and Corruption,” The New Institutional Economics of Corruption – Norms, Trust, and Reciprocity, ed. by Lambsdorff, J. Graf, Schramm, M., and Taube, M. (London: Routledge): 76–92.
Rijckeghem, C. and Weder, B. (2001), “Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service affect Corruption, and by How Much?,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 65 (2): 307–31.
Vanucci, A. (2000), “Corruption, Political Parties and Political Protection,” European University Institute Economics Department, Working Paper 62, Badia Fiesolana: San Domenico.
Voigt, S., Feld, L., and Aaken, A. (2004), “Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator,” Draft Version, Economics Faculty, University of Kassel, Germany.
Weber, M. (1920), Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr & Siebeck). Reprinted 1988.
Wedeman, A. (1997), “Looters, Rent-scrapers, and Dividend–Collectors: Corruption and Growth in Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines,” The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 31: 457–78.
Wei, S. -J. (1997), “Why is Corruption so Much More Taxing than Tax? Arbitrariness Kills,” NBER Working Paper 6255, Cambridge, MA.
Wei, S. -J. (2000a), “Natural Openness and Good Government,” World Bank Poliy Research Working Paper 2411 and NBER Working Paper 7765.
Wei, S. -J. (2000b), “How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 82 (1): 1–11.
Wei, S. -J. (2000c), “Corruption, Composition of Capital Flows, and Currency Crises,” World Bank Working Paper 2429.
Wei, S. -J. and Sievers, S. (1999), “The Cost of Crony Capitalism,” The Asian Competitiveness Report 1999. Geneva: World Economic Forum, 50–55.
Wei, S. -J. and Y. Wu (2001), “Negative Alchemy? Corruption, Composition of Capital Flows, and Currency Crises,” NBER Working Paper 8187, March.
Weingast, B. R. (1993), “Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 149: 286–311.
Wellisz, St. and R. Findlay (1984), “Protection and Rent-Seeking in Developing Countries,” Neoclassical Political Economy. The Analysis of Rent-Seeking and DUP Activities, ed. by Colander, D. C. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company): 141–54.
Welsch, H. (2004), “Corruption, Growth, and the Environment: A Cross-Country Analysis,” Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 9: 663–93.
Wheeler, D. and Mody, A. (1992), “International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of U.S. Firms,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 33: 57–76.
Wiehen, M. (1996), “OECD Recommendations and Enquiry,” Uganda International Conference on Good Governance in Africa (Berlin: Transparency International): 115–22.
Wiggins, S. (1991), “The Economics of the Firm and Contracts: A Selective Survey,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 147: 603–61.
Williamson, J. (1993), “Exchange Rate Management,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 103: 188–97.
Williamson, O. E. (1983), “Credible Commitments: The Use of Hostages to Support Exchange,” American Economic Review, Vol. 83: 519–40.
Williamson, O. E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (New York: The Free Press).
Winston, G. C. (1979), “The Appeal of Inappropriate Technologies: Self-Inflicted Wages, Ethnic Price and Corruption,” World Development, Vol. 7 (8/9): 835–45.
Wintrobe, R. (1998a), “Some Lessons on the Efficiency of Democracy from a Study of Dictatorship,” The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, ed. by Borner, S. and Paldam, M. (London and New York: Macmillan Press and St. Martin Press): 20–37.
Wintrobe, R. (1998b), The Political Economy of Dictatorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Wintrobe, R. and Breton, A. (1986), “Organizational Structure and Productivity,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (3): 530–8.
World Bank (1997), World Development Report 1997 (Washington, DC: World Bank).
Wyatt, G. (2002), “Corruption, Productivity and Transition,” Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, (CERT) Discussion Paper 205, Heriot Watt University, Edinburgh, United Kingdom.
You, J. -S. and Khagram, S. (2005), “Inequality and Corruption,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 70 (1): 136–57.
