Format:
26 S.
,
graph. Darst.
Series Statement:
National Bureau of Economic Research 〈Cambridge, Mass.〉: NBER working paper series 10104
Content:
This paper constructs a simple model of pair-wise tournament competition to investigate categorical redistribution in winner-take-all markets. We consider two forms of redistribution: category-sighted, where employers are allowed to use categorical information in pursuit of their redistributive goals; and category-blind, where they are not. It is shown that the equilibrium category-sighted redistribution scheme involves a constant handicap given to agents in the disadvantaged category. Equilibrium category-blind redistribution creates a unique semi-separating equilibrium in which a large pool of contestants exerts zero effort, and this pool is increasing in the aggressiveness of the redistribution goal.
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
Language:
English
URL:
Volltext
(kostenfrei)
