Format:
1 Online-Ressource (xi, 286 pages)
,
illustrations
ISBN:
9780691212913
,
0691212910
Series Statement:
Princeton paperbacks
Content:
From World War I to Operation Desert Storm, American policymakers have repeatedly invoked the "lessons of history" as they contemplated taking their nation to war. Do these historical analogies actually shape policy, or are they primarily tools of political justification? Yuen Foong Khong argues that leaders use analogies not merely to justify policies but also to perform specific cognitive and information-processing tasks essential to political decision-making. Khong identifies what these tasks are and shows how they can be used to explain the U.S. decision to intervene in Vietnam. Relying on interviews with senior officials and on recently declassified documents, the author demonstrates with a precision not attained by previous studies that the three most important analogies of the Vietnam era--Korea, Munich, and Dien Bien Phu--can account for America's Vietnam choices. A special contribution is the author's use of cognitive social psychology to support his argument about how humans analogize and to explain why policymakers often use analogies poorly.--
Note:
Includes bibliographical references (pages 265-277) and index
,
Ch. 1 Analogical Reasoning in Foreign Affairs: Two Views -- Ch. 2 The AE Framework -- Ch. 3 America's Vietnam Options -- Ch. 4 Containment, Analogies, and the Pre-1965 Vietnam Decisions -- Ch. 5 Korea -- Ch. 6 Dien Bien Phu -- Ch. 7 Munich and the 1930s -- Ch. 8 The Psychology of Analogical Reasoning -- Ch. 9 Conclusion.
,
In English
Additional Edition:
0691078467
Additional Edition:
0691025355
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Khong, Yuen Foong, 1956- Analogies at war Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©1992
Language:
English
Subjects:
Political Science
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