Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Format: XXII, 368 S. , graph. Darst.

Edition: 1. publ.

ISBN: 0521551846 , 0521536723 , 9780521551847 , 9780521536721

Series Statement: Churchill lectures in economics

Note: Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke

Language: English

Subjects: Economics

Keywords: Spieltheorie ; Auktionstheorie ; Mathematisches Modell

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URL: Table of contents

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Format: XXII, 368 S. : , graph. Darst.

Edition: 1

ISBN: 0-521-55184-6

Series Statement: Churchill lectures in economics

Language: English

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Format: 1 online resource (394 pages)

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 9780521551847 , 9780511164170

Series Statement: Churchill Lectures in Economics Series

Content: A comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its applications. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used

Note: Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Foreword -- CHAPTER ONE: Getting to Work -- 1.1 Politics Sets the Stage -- 1.2 Designing for Multiple Goals -- 1.2.1 Substitutes and Complements -- 1.2.2 New Zealand's Rights Auction -- 1.2.3 Better Auction Designs -- 1.2.4 The FCC Design and Its Progeny -- 1.3 Comparing Seller Revenues -- 1.4 The Academic Critics -- 1.4.1 Resale and the Coase Theorem -- 1.4.2 Mechanism Design Theory -- 1.4.3 Theory and Experiment -- 1.4.4 Practical Concerns -- 1.5 Plan for This Book -- REFERENCES -- PART ONE: THE MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH -- Formalities of the Mechanism Design Model -- The Chapters of Part I -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER TWO: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms -- 2.1 Formulation -- Definition -- 2.2 Always Optimal and Weakly Dominant Strategies -- 2.3 Balancing the Budget -- 2.4 Uniqueness -- 2.5 Disadvantages of the Vickrey Auction -- 2.5.1 Practical Disadvantages -- 2.5.2 Monotonicity Problems -- 2.5.3 The Merger-Investment Disadvantage -- 2.6 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER THREE: The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence -- 3.1 Hotelling's Lemma -- 3.2 The Envelope Theorem in Integral Form -- 3.3 Quasi-linear Payoffs -- 3.3.1 Holmstrom's Lemma -- 3.3.2 The Green-Laffont-Holmstrom Theorem -- 3.3.3 Myerson's Lemma -- 3.3.4 Revenue Equivalence Theorems -- 3.3.5 The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem -- 3.3.5.1 Application: Auctions Versus Lotteries -- 3.3.6 The Jehiel-Moldovanu Impossibility Theorems -- 3.3.7 Myerson and Riley-Samuelson Revenue-Maximizing Auctions -- Definitions -- 3.3.8 The McAfee-McMillan Weak-Cartels Theorem -- 3.3.9 Sequential Auctions and Weber's Martingale Theorem -- 3.3.10 Matthews' Theorem: Risk Averse Payoff Equivalence -- 3.4 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER FOUR: Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences -- 4.1 The Single Crossing Conditions , 4.1.1 The Monotonic Selection Theorem -- 4.1.2 The Sufficiency Theorem -- 4.1.3 The Constraint Simplification Theorem -- 4.1.4 The Mirrlees-Spence Representation Theorem -- 4.2 Deriving and Verifying Equilibrium Strategies -- 4.2.1 The Second-Price Auction with a Reserve Price -- 4.2.2 The Sealed Tender, or First-Price, Auction -- 4.2.3 The War of Attrition Auction -- 4.2.4 The All-Pay Auction -- 4.3 Revenue Comparisons in the Benchmark Model -- 4.3.1 Payoff Equivalence without Revenue Equivalence -- Risk Averse Sellers -- Risk Averse Bidders -- 4.3.2 Budget Constraints -- 4.3.3 Endogenous Quantities -- 4.3.4 Correlated Types -- 4.4 Expected-Revenue-Maximizing Auctions -- 4.4.1 Myerson's Theorem -- Examples -- 4.4.2 Bulow-Klemperer Theorem -- 4.4.3 The Irregular Case -- 4.5 Auctions with Weak and Strong Bidders -- 4.6 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER FIVE: Interdependence of Types and Values -- 5.1 Which Models and Assumptions are "Useful"? -- 5.1.1 Payoffs Depend Only on Bids and Types -- 5.1.2 Types Are One-Dimensional and Values Are Private -- 5.1.3 Types Are Statistically Independent -- 5.2 Statistical Dependence and Revenue-Maximizing Auctions -- 5.3 Wilson's Drainage Tract Model -- 5.3.1 Equilibrium -- 5.3.2 Profits and Revenues -- 5.3.3 Bidder Information Policy -- 5.3.4 Seller Information Policy -- 5.4 Correlated Types and Interdependent Values -- 5.4.1 Affiliation -- 5.4.2 The Milgrom-Weber Ascending Auction Models -- 5.4.2.1 The (Second-Price) Button Auction with Minimal Information -- 5.4.2.2 The Button Auction with Maximal Information -- 5.4.2.3 Some Revenue Comparisons -- 5.4.3 First-Price Auctions -- 5.5 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER SIX: Auctions in Context -- 6.1 The Profit and Surplus Contribution of an Entrant -- 6.2 Symmetric Models with Costly Entry -- 6.2.1 Symmetric Bidders and Uncoordinated Entry , 6.2.1.1 Equilibrium in Entry and Bidding Decisions -- 6.2.1.2 Setting the Reserve Price -- 6.2.2 Coordinating Entry among Symmetric Competitors -- 6.2.2.1 Pre-qualifying Bidders -- 6.2.2.2 Auctions, Negotiations, and Posted Prices -- 6.2.2.3 Buy Prices -- 6.3 Asymmetric Models: Devices to Promote Competition -- 6.3.1 Example of Set-asides -- 6.3.2 Example of Bidding Credits -- 6.3.3 Example of Lot Structure and Consolation Prizes -- 6.3.4 Premium Auctions -- 6.3.5 Dutch vs. English Auctions and the Anglo-Dutch Design -- 6.4 After the Bidding Ends -- 6.4.1 Bankruptcy and Non-performance -- 6.4.2 Scoring Rules vs. Price-Only Bids -- 6.5 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- PART TWO: MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER SEVEN: Uniform Price Auctions -- 7.1 Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions -- 7.1.1 Demand Reduction -- 7.1.2 Low-Price Equilibria -- 7.2 Simultaneous Ascending Auctions -- 7.2.1 The Simultaneous Ascending Auction and the Walrasian Tatonnement -- Notation and Definitions -- 7.2.2 Clock Auctions -- 7.2.3 Strategic Incentives in Uniform Price Auctions -- 7.2.3.1 The Basic Clock Auction Model -- 7.2.3.2 The Alternating-Move Clock Auction -- 7.2.3.3 Strategic Incentives with Elastic Supply -- 7.3 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- CHAPTER EIGHT: Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding -- 8.1 Vickrey Auctions and the Monotonicity Problems -- 8.1.1 Bidders' Vickrey Payoffs Bound Their Core Payoffs -- 8.1.2 Vickrey Auctions and the Entry Puzzle -- Definitions -- 8.1.3 When Are Vickrey Outcomes in the Core? -- 8.1.4 Substitute Goods and Core Outcomes -- 8.1.5 Substitute Goods and Vickrey Outcomes -- 8.2 Bernheim-Whinston First-Price Package Auctions -- 8.2.1 Formulation -- 8.2.2 Profit-Target Strategies -- 8.2.3 Equilibrium and the Core -- 8.3 Ausubel-Milgrom Ascending Proxy Auctions -- 8.3.1 The Proxy Auction with Unlimited Budgets , 8.3.1.1 Proxy Outcomes Are Core Outcomes -- 8.3.1.2 Profit-Target Strategies and Equilibrium -- 8.3.1.3 The Proxy Auction When Goods Are Substitutes -- 8.3.2 The Non-transferable-Utility Proxy Auction -- 8.4 Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- Bibliography -- Author Index -- Subject Index

Additional Edition: Print version Milgrom, Paul Putting Auction Theory to Work Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,c2004 ISBN 9780521551847

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic books

URL: FULL  ((OIS Credentials Required))

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Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 368 pages) , digital, PDF file(s)

ISBN: 9780511813825

Series Statement: Churchill lectures in economics

Content: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)

Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521551847

Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521536721

Additional Edition: Print version ISBN 9780521551847

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Milgrom, Paul, 1948 - Putting auction theory to work Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2004 ISBN 9780521536721

Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521551847

Additional Edition: ISBN 0521536723

Additional Edition: ISBN 0521551846

Language: English

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511813825

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)