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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Semi-state actors in cybersecurity (2022)
    New York, NY : Oxford University Press
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1800565046
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    ISBN: 9780197579312
    Series Statement: Oxford scholarship online
    Content: This is a historical interpretation of the politics of cybersecurity. Drawing on a historical analogy to pirates, privateers, and mercantile companies, Florian J. Egloff examines the political constitution of cybercrime, state-sponsored hackers, and large technology companies, and what their co-presence means for national and international security. Moreover, Egloff shows how semi-state actors are historically and contemporarily linked to understandings of statehood, sovereignty, and the legitimacy of the state.
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780197579275
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780197579282
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9780197579275
    Language: English
    Subjects: Political Science
    RVK:
    MK 3400
    Keywords: Electronic books
    DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197579275.001.0001
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
    URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis
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    Stabi Berlin
    Hertie School
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion (2005)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_495036145
    Format: Online-Ressource, 44 p., text , ill
    Series Statement: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 1643
    Content: We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a strong tendency towards linear sharing rules. Third, it delivers a simple rationale for team based incentives in many environments. Fourth, the Sufficient Statistics Result is violated. Dependent on the environment, optimal contracts may be either overdetermined or incomplete. -- contract theory ; linear contracts ; incentives ; sufficient statistics result ; inequity aversion ; incomplete contracts
    Note: Title from PDF file as viewed on 7/26/2005 , Includes bibliographical references , Also available in print , System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. , Mode of access: World Wide Web.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext
    URL: Volltext
    URL: Volltext
    Author information: Wambach, Achim 1968-
    Author information: Englmaier, Florian 1974-
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Hertie School
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