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  • 1
    UID:
    gbv_845864009
    Format: Online-Ressource (49 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451865570 , 9781451865578
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 06/297
    Content: This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks'' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks'' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845892851
    Format: Online-Ressource (50 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451872887 , 9781451872880
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 09/141
    Content: Many empirical studies of banking crises have employed ""banking crisis"" (BC) indicators constructedusing primarily information on government actions undertaken in response to bank distress. Weformulate a simple theoretical model of a banking industry which we use to identify and constructtheory-based measures of systemic bank shocks (SBS). Using both country-level and firm-level samples, we show that SBS indicators consistently predict BC indicators based on four major BCseries that have appeared in the literature. Therefore, BC indicatorsactually measure lagged government responses to systemic bank shocks, rather than the occurrence of crises per se. We re-examine the separate impact of macroeconomic factors, bank market structure, deposit insurance, andexternal shocks on the probability of a systemic bank shocks and on the probability of governmentresponses to bank distress. The impact of these variables on the likelihood of a government responseto bank distress is totally different from that on the likelihood of a systemic bank shock.Disentangling the effects of systemic bank shocks and government responses turns out to be crucial inunderstanding the roots of bank fragility. Many findings of a large empirical literature need to be re-assessed and/or re-interpreted
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
    UID:
    gbv_845892835
    Format: Online-Ressource (35 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg.
    ISBN: 1451872909 , 9781451872903
    Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 09/143
    Content: We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks'' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks'' willingness to lend
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (IMF e-Library)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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