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  • Stabi Berlin  (21)
  • Berlin International
  • Akademie d. Wiss.
  • Bundesarchiv
  • Klein, Michael  (21)
  • Open access  (21)
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  • Stabi Berlin  (21)
  • Berlin International
  • Akademie d. Wiss.
  • Bundesarchiv
  • HU Berlin  (1)
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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Aid and the Resource Curse : How Can Aid Be Designed to Preserve Institutions? (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797571590
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Viewpoint Note no. 291 (April 2005)
    Content: Many studies have found that countries with abundant natural resources grow more slowly than those without a phenomenon often known as the resource curse or the curse of oil. Some development specialists are concerned that foreign aid may also cause a resource curse. Recent research is not conclusive, but certainly does not rule out the possibility. This Note suggests ways to avoid this risk and urges more attention be devoted to it
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Private Finance : Are Private Loans and Charitable Giving Replacing Aid? (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797571604
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Viewpoint
    Content: Private financial flows to developing countries, such as debt,equity, remittances, and private charitable giving, have increaseddramatically over the past 20 years. One commentator has eventrumpeted the privatization of foreign aid. Since privatecharitable giving remains small and developing country governmentsare borrowing more, not less, from official sources, this claim ismisleading. But unprecedented sums are indeed flowing to theprivate sector in developing countries
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Supply of Aid : How Are Donors Giving, and to Whom? (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797571922
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Viewpoint Note no. 276 (October 2004)
    Content: This Note reviews trends in official development assistance, focusing on volumes, sources, forms, and recipients. Several patterns emerge. First, a long-term trend of official flows taking the form of hard loans rather than grants and soft loans, with low interest and long maturities, has been reversed in the past five years. Second, both grants and loans are increasingly aimed at middle-income countries rather than the poorest. And third, official flows have fallen relative to rich-country income by 30 percent in the past 30 years
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Aid Agency Competition : A Century of Entry, But No Exit (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797571876
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector Note 277
    Content: Critics of the aid industry have accused it of acting like a cartel (Easterly 2002). The accusation has some bite-globally the industry remains somewhat concentrated, and for the typical recipient country, highly concentrated. Yet the most striking fact about the industry is how relentlessly competitive pressures are building. There has been a constant stream of new entrants, a steady fall in global and local concentration, and a clear tendency for donors to break out of historical patterns of aid and compete with one another. Could greater competition improve the efficiency of the aid system?
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Transaction Costs in Private Infrastructure Projects - Are They Too High? (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797575421
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Viewpoint Note no. 95 (October 1996)
    Content: While the number of private infrastructure projects continues to grow, tales of endless delays and exorbitant development costs still scare both developers and governments. The authors show that these costs are related not to project size but to the characteristics of the policy environment. As governments gain experience and clarify policy, these costs will inevitably fall
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Aid Effectiveness : Can Aid Agencies Be Smarter Than the Invisible Hand? (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_79757154X
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Viewpoint Note no. 292 (June 2005)
    Content: Private financial flows such as foreign direct investment seem toencourage economic growth and relieve poverty in part because theycreate excellent incentives for transferring know-how and in partbecause they are subject to a stern market test that ensures they areallocated and monitored carefully. For aid flows, not automaticallysubject to these disciplines, it is difficult to be as effective. ThisNote argues that aid agencies, by learning what makes private flowsso effective, can bring better aid to the poorest
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Market for Aid : Understanding Aid by Looking Forward and Looking Back (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797571515
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector Note 293
    Content: The market for aid is changing. These days donors use a far greater array of instruments than in the past, and operate in a context of far larger private financial flows. Poor countries are growing richer, but there are legitimate doubts about whether the aid industry deserves credit. Measurement of the effectiveness of aid has not yet produced some of the results that would really help, such as credible ratings of aid agencies or rigorous randomized trials of specific programs. This information might pull the aid debate away from minimizing the costs of aid competition and toward trying to maximize the benefits: widespread experimentation and innovation.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Designing Auctions for Concessions : Guessing the Right Value to Bid and the Winner's Curse (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_79757462X
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector Note 160
    Content: Once a government has decided to award a concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of auction to use. For concessions the standard is a first-price sealed bid auction in which bidders submit sealed envelopes containing their offer and the highest offer determines the price. The bidding may occur in one or two stages. In two-stage bidding the technical parameters of the bids are made comparable in the first stage, and only the main offer on the core bid parameter is submitted in the second. The main offer may relate to a price, a level of subsidy, a payment for net worth, or any other appropriate parameter; the discussion in this Note focuses on price.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Rebidding for Concessions (2012)
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797574611
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Viewpoint Note no. 161 (November 1998)
    Content: The longer a concession lasts, the less effect the initial rounds of bidding will have on the terms of the concession over its full life. Much more influential will be periodic renegotiations or price reviews, which under standard concessions are hard to settle by competition. It has been suggested that competition could be brought to bear by periodically reauctioning a concession, which would limit the potential for exercise of market power by concessionaires. If contracts can be well written and rebidding is practical, periodic reauctioning offers an effective solution to the natural monoply problem. Price regulation may no longer be necessary, and rebidding may help with contract adjustment. This Note examines the case for rebidding.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Stabi Berlin
  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Enrichment with Growth (2012)
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_797521836
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research working paper WPS 5855
    Content: This essay first sets out the "business model" problems entailed by corruption and their effects as well as implications for economic growth. Key issues are the need for secrecy and co-operation with partners in crime. Dealing with these leads to behavior which is ostensibly bizarre and undermines economic efficiency, but is in fact a rational way of managing corrupt practices. However, different economic policies can be pursued that are compatible with corruption. Some are more pro-growth than others. Pro-growth corrupt policies hold the promise of enriching the corrupt elite more in absolute terms even though the share of national wealth diverted may be smaller. The most effective pro-growth polices that help enrich an elite resemble fairly orthodox economic policy prescriptions. Eventually the abolition of corruption holds the greatest promise to enhance growth and with it the wealth of elites. The expectation of such growth may explain why more and more political elites pursue "sound" economic policy and may embrace anti-corruption efforts, while securing legal ways of enrichment for themselves. Country examples illustrate policy approaches with different combinations of enrichment and growth properties.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Stabi Berlin
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