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  • BSZ  (4)
Type of Publication
Consortium
Language
  • 1
    UID:
    (DE-627)1791400094
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
    Content: This study focuses on the rule prohibiting insider trading in securities law and its effectiveness. In theory, a pending M&A activity has great potential to induce substantial price movement in the public market after its announcement. However, a prohibition of insider trading prevents people who have the knowledge about a pending M&A from using this information to garner the price difference, when a latter announcement leads to increasing public price. In this view, in an ideal world, when a prohibition of insider trading is in place and taking its full effect, the price should only start to move toward the target price right after the news of M&A activity is publicly announced. Conversely, if the stock price starts to reflect the target price before its public announcement, that implies a likely leak of private information and a failure of insider trading prohibition rule. In other words, through observing the price movements before and after the mergers and acquisitions event samples, we can produce an approximation of the effectiveness of the insider trading law in place. This paper examines M&A data in Taiwan, collecting from the disclosure system administered by Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission from 2004 to 2016, as evidence to test the actual implementation of insider trading law in Taiwan and how forceful it is. The pattern of information leakage, when observed, provides a valuable understanding for the law enforcement department and its improvement. This result of empirical investigation, and the insight it provides, are particularly important because (1) insider trading is considered to be highly detrimental to the securities market and investor confidence, and (2) insider trading activities are not directly observable due to the secretive way the related information is exchanged and thus hard to gauge its level of actual occurrence
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 13, 2017 erstellt
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    UID:
    (DE-627)1790949815
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (39 p)
    Content: The enforcement of insider trading law, as well as its effect, has been a quandary in securities law. The main reason for this perplexity comes from the fact that there is no tally of how many illegal trading activities are actually taking place. The exchange of information that incites insider trading is secretive or disguised, and the purported victim has no sense of being harmed or defrauded. If unreported, the crime may go uninvestigated. So, despite the highly publicized insider trading cases that are hailed in newspapers or the victories won in court, it is unclear how many other activities go undetected and how solid the acclaimed victory truly is. This study proposes and applies a method for testing the effectiveness of a law against insider trading through an event study. We use pre-announcement price run-up as a proxy for measuring the effectiveness of Taiwanese insider trading law. After examining mergers and acquisitions data from Taiwan's Financial Supervisory Commission from 2003 to 2016 and adjusting for market effect, we arrive at an average cumulative abnormal return of 6.62% before the official announcement of the events, which constitutes a 58.8% run-up compared with the post-announcement price increase. This investigation is important because it is the first to suggest an objectively empirical observation that approximates the overall size of illegal insider trading activities in a market. More importantly, this method could serve as a sensitive tool for measuring temporal changes brought about by different legal arrangements within a single country or for measuring comparatively across different legal regimes
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 15, 2018 erstellt
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    UID:
    (DE-627)179112965X
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
    Content: This study focuses on the rule prohibiting insider trading in securities law and its effectiveness. In theory, a pending M&A activity has great potential to induce substantial price movement in the public market after its announcement. However, a prohibition of insider trading prevents people who have the knowledge about a pending M&A from using this information to garner the price difference, when a latter announcement leads to increasing public price. In this view, in an ideal world, when a prohibition of insider trading is in place and taking its full effect, the price should only start to move toward the target price right after the news of M&A activity is publicly announced. Conversely, if the stock price starts to reflect the target price before its public announcement, that implies a likely leak of private information and a failure of insider trading prohibition rule. In other words, through observing the price movements before and after the mergers and acquisitions event samples, we can produce an approximation of the effectiveness of the insider trading law in place. This paper examines M&A data in Taiwan, collecting from the disclosure system administered by Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission from 2004 to 2016, as evidence to test the actual implementation of insider trading law in Taiwan and how forceful it is. The pattern of information leakage, when observed, provides a valuable understanding for the law enforcement department and its improvement. This result of empirical investigation, and the insight it provides, are particularly important because (1) insider trading is considered to be highly detrimental to the securities market and investor confidence, and (2) insider trading activities are not directly observable due to the secretive way the related information is exchanged and thus hard to gauge its level of actual occurrence
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 14, 2017 erstellt
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
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