In:
Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 34, No. 3 ( 1967-09), p. 273-275
Abstract:
In his article “Explanation Sketches” [3], Fred Newman argues that Scriven is mistaken in his interpretation of Hempel's notion of explanation sketch. According to Scriven, to complete an explanation is to fill in further initial conditions so that the explanandum of the sketch would be entailed by the new enlarged set of initial conditions. The point may be alternatively put by saying that according to Scriven to have a complete explanation is to have a covering-law which connects initial conditions with the explanandum of the original sketch. Now Scriven's point against the deductive theory as applied to History is just that very often when we try to complete a given explanation sketch, we only succeed in unearthing a law which is either false or else trivial. Newman, however, contends that this is an excusable but, nevertheless, unsympathetic way of interpreting Hempel. He suggests an alternative account to the effect that to complete an explanation we need not necessarily produce a covering-law connecting initial conditions with the explanandum; all we need to do is to mention other initial conditions and certain laws which need not necessarily contain mention of the explanandum of the sketch. As he himself puts the point: “However, generously interpreted, when Hempel speaks of a sketch vaguely indicating laws we may take him as merely suggesting that some laws are vaguely indicated which would make up the explanans of an explanation of the event in question—not necessarily in the terms which describe the event in the sketch's explanandum. ” ([3], p. 170).
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0031-8248
,
1539-767X
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
1967
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2066891-0
SSG:
11
SSG:
19,2
SSG:
5,1
Bookmarklink
