Format:
1 Online-Ressource (42 p)
Series Statement:
World Bank E-Library Archive
Content:
Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences
Additional Edition:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Beath, Andrew Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2015
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1596/1813-9450-7361
URL:
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