In:
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, Vol. 2, No. 1 ( 2010-02-01), p. 31-50
Abstract:
We derive a set of analytical results for optimal income taxation with tags using quasilinear preferences and a Rawlsian social welfare function. Secondly, assuming a constant elasticity of labor supply and log-normality of the skills distribution, we analytically identify the winners and losers of tagging. Third, we prove that if the skills distribution in one group first-order stochastically dominates the other, tagging calls for redistribution from the former to the latter group. Finally, we calibrate our model to the US workers using gender as tag. Welfare implications are dramatic. Only male high-wage earners lose. Everyone else gains, some substantially. (JEL H21, H23, H24)
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
1945-7731
,
1945-774X
Language:
English
Publisher:
American Economic Association
Publication Date:
2010
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2442382-8
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2452647-2
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