In:
Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 70, No. 5 ( 2003-12), p. 1184-1194
Abstract:
I argue here that critics of biological explanations of human nature are mistaken when they maintain that the truth of genetic determinism implies the end of critical evaluation and reform of our social institutions. Such a claim erroneously presupposes that our social values, practices, and institutions have nothing to do with what makes biological explanations troublesome. What constitutes a problem for those who are concerned with social justice is not the fact that particular behaviors might be genetically determined, but the fact that our value system and social institutions create the conditions that make such behaviors problematic.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0031-8248
,
1539-767X
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
2003
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2066891-0
SSG:
11
SSG:
19,2
SSG:
5,1
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