In:
Philosophy, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 5, No. 19 ( 1930-07), p. 392-407
Abstract:
The classical and scholastic view of things was of neutral substance to which qualities were attached as substantial adjuncts. Qualities could apparently not be conceived of otherwise than as entities: blueness, hardness, pliability, toughness, translucency, and so on. Noun substantives were the part of speech by which they could most properly be referred to. The use of adjectives did not imply that these qualities were not substantival entities, but emphasized their subordinateness to the thing itself, and were useful in giving pliability, lightness, and elegance to speech. But qualities could not be conceived of otherwise than as something superadded to the neutral substance which carried them.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0031-8191
,
1469-817X
DOI:
10.1017/S0031819100017757
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
1930
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2274770-9
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1466487-2
detail.hit.zdb_id:
208822-8
SSG:
5,1
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