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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    SAGE Publications ; 2022
    In:  Science, Technology, & Human Values Vol. 47, No. 3 ( 2022-05), p. 429-458
    In: Science, Technology, & Human Values, SAGE Publications, Vol. 47, No. 3 ( 2022-05), p. 429-458
    Abstract: We propose a new approach for tracing value change. Value change may lead to a mismatch between current value priorities in society and the values for which technologies were designed in the past, such as energy technologies based on fossil fuels, which were developed when sustainability was not considered a very important value. Better anticipating value change is essential to avoid a lack of social acceptance and moral acceptability of technologies. While value change can be studied historically and qualitatively, we propose a more quantitative approach that uses large text corpora. It uses probabilistic topic models, which allow us to trace (new) values that are (still) latent. We demonstrate the approach for five types of value change in technology. Our approach is useful for testing hypotheses about value change, such as verifying whether value change has occurred and identifying patterns of value change. The approach can be used to trace value change for various technologies and text corpora, including scientific articles, newspaper articles, and policy documents.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0162-2439 , 1552-8251
    Language: English
    Publisher: SAGE Publications
    Publication Date: 2022
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2021122-3
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    SSG: 3,4
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2005
    In:  Science in Context Vol. 18, No. 2 ( 2005-06), p. 309-315
    In: Science in Context, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 18, No. 2 ( 2005-06), p. 309-315
    Abstract: As in other countries, the public in Argentina became aware of the existence of something called “the theory of relativity” only after November 1919. Although the news of Arthur Eddington's eclipse expedition, which provided the first confirmation of Einstein's theory, was poorly reported in the newspapers, by the end of 1920 Einstein had become a household name for the educated middle class of Buenos Aires, the capital city of the country. This was in great measure the result of the activity of a few enthusiastic lecturers. Significantly, none of them belonged to the prestigious Institute of Physics of the University of La Plata, which during the decade of the 1910s was considered the most important center of physical research in Latin America. Between July and August 1920 the Spanish physicist Blas Cabrera – perhaps the greatest popularizer of Einstein's theory in Spain – visited Argentina and talked about relativity. In September Georges Duclout, a French engineer who had graduated from the Zurich Polytechnic and by then was professor of applied mechanics at the School of Exact, Physical and Natural Sciences (FCEFyN) of the University of Buenos Aires, also gave a series of conferences on the subject. That same month José Ubach, a Jesuit astronomer trained at the Ebro Observatory in Spain, and established in Buenos Aires, lectured on relativity at the Colegio del Salvador.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0269-8897 , 1474-0664
    RVK:
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2005
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2084819-5
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 284093-5
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 5,1
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2020
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 87, No. 5 ( 2020-12), p. 921-932
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 87, No. 5 ( 2020-12), p. 921-932
    Abstract: The understanding that comes with scientific explanation is regarded as one of the central epistemic aims of science. In earlier work I have argued that scientists achieve understanding of phenomena by basing their explanations on intelligible theories, where intelligibility is a contextually determined value. In this article, I address the question of how the aim of understanding relates to other epistemic aims of science, such as prediction of empirical evidence and accurate description of phenomena. Moreover, I examine the associated values and analyze their role and interaction through a historical case study.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2020
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1958
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 25, No. 2 ( 1958-04), p. 140-140
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 25, No. 2 ( 1958-04), p. 140-140
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
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    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1958
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2004
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 71, No. 1 ( 2004-01), p. 98-109
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 71, No. 1 ( 2004-01), p. 98-109
    Abstract: J.D. Trout (2002) presents a challenge to all theorists of scientific explanation who appeal to the notion of understanding. Trout denounces understanding as irrelevant, if not dangerous, from an epistemic perspective and he endorses a radically objectivist view of explanation instead. In this note I accept Trout's challenge. I criticize his argument and defend a non-objectivist, pragmatic conception of understanding that is epistemically relevant.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2004
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2016
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 83, No. 4 ( 2016-10), p. 500-520
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 83, No. 4 ( 2016-10), p. 500-520
    Abstract: The argument from inductive risk has been embraced by many as a successful account of the role of values in science that challenges the value-free ideal. We argue that it is not obvious that the argument from inductive risk actually undermines the value-free ideal. This is because the inductive risk argument endorses an assumption held by proponents of the value-free ideal: that contextual values never play an appropriate role in determining evidence. We show that challenging the value-free ideal ultimately requires rejecting this assumption.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2016
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2019
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 86, No. 4 ( 2019-10), p. 814-817
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 86, No. 4 ( 2019-10), p. 814-817
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2019
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2009
    In:  Science in Context Vol. 22, No. 2 ( 2009-06), p. 195-216
    In: Science in Context, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 22, No. 2 ( 2009-06), p. 195-216
    Abstract: Since the linguistic turn, the role of rhetoric in the circulation and the popular representation of knowledge has been widely accepted in science studies. This article aims to analyze not a textual form of scientific rhetoric, but the crucial role of materiality in scientific debates. It introduces the concept of material rhetoric to understand the promotional regimes in which material objects play an essential argumentative role. It analyzes the phenomenon by looking at two students of prehistory from nineteenth-century Belgium. In the study of human prehistory and evolution, material data are either fairly abundant stone tools or very scarce fossil bones. These two types of material data stand for two different strategies in material rhetoric. In this article, the first strategy is exemplified by Aimé Rutot, who gathered great masses of eoliths (crudely chipped stones which he believed to be prehistoric tools). The second strategy is typified by the example of Julien Fraipont, who based his scientific career on only two Neanderthal skeletons. Rutot sent his “artifacts” to a very wide audience, while Fraipont showed his skeletons to only a few selected scholars. Unlike Rutot, however, Fraipont was able to monitor his audience's interpretation of the finds by means of personal contacts. What an archaeologist gains in reach, he or she apparently loses in control. In this article we argue that only those scholars who find the right balance between the extremes of reach and control will prove to be successful.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0269-8897 , 1474-0664
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2009
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2084819-5
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 284093-5
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 5,1
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2022
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 89, No. 5 ( 2022-12), p. 1075-1084
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 89, No. 5 ( 2022-12), p. 1075-1084
    Abstract: A recent controversy about neural networks allegedly capable of detecting a person’s sexual orientation raises the question of whether all research on homosexuality should be permitted. This paper considers two arguments for limits to such research, and concludes that there are good reasons to limit at least the dissemination of applied research on the etiology of homosexuality. The paper then briefly sketches how this could work, and looks at three objections against these limitations.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2022
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2003
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 70, No. 5 ( 2003-12), p. 1184-1194
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 70, No. 5 ( 2003-12), p. 1184-1194
    Abstract: I argue here that critics of biological explanations of human nature are mistaken when they maintain that the truth of genetic determinism implies the end of critical evaluation and reform of our social institutions. Such a claim erroneously presupposes that our social values, practices, and institutions have nothing to do with what makes biological explanations troublesome. What constitutes a problem for those who are concerned with social justice is not the fact that particular behaviors might be genetically determined, but the fact that our value system and social institutions create the conditions that make such behaviors problematic.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2003
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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