X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • UB Potsdam  (9)
  • EUV Frankfurt  (1)
  • Cox, James C.  (10)
  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Patterson's German-English dictionary for chemists (1992)
    New York u.a. : Wiley
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV005032350
    Format: LIII, 890 S.
    Edition: 4. ed.
    ISBN: 0471669911
    Former: Frühere Aufl. u.d.T Patterson, Austin M. A German English dictionary for chemists
    Language: English
    Subjects: Chemistry/Pharmacy
    RVK:
    VB 1210
    Keywords: Englisch ; Chemie ; Deutsch ; Chemie ; Deutsch ; Chemie ; Englisch ; Enzyklopädie ; Mehrsprachiges Wörterbuch ; Wörterbuch ; Mehrsprachiges Wörterbuch ; Wörterbuch ; Enzyklopädie ; Wörterbuch
    URL: http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/wiley034/90045365.html
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Book
    Stabi Berlin get availability status
    FU Berlin get availability status
    UB Potsdam get availability status
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Chapter 36 Laboratory Tests of Job Search Models (2008)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831633167
    ISBN: 0080887961
    Content: This chapter is concerned with laboratory tests of job search models. Formal models of job search specify certain common elements, i.e., the length of the search horizon, the searcher's discounting rate of interest, the net costs (subsidies) to search in each period of the search horizon, and the searcher's knowledge about the wage offer distribution he or she faces. Because these factors are difficult, if not impossible, to observe in the naturally-occurring economy, controlled laboratory tests of the search model offer the only practical means for formally testing search models. A basic job search model of interest to economists specifies a finite search horizon. Searchers know the (discrete) wage offer distribution and must accept or decline an offer when it is received. The search model has sharp predictions for a utility maximizing, risk neutral agent. In this case the agent seeks to maximize the expected present value of the income from search. This can be accomplished by choosing an appropriate (minimally acceptable) reservation wage each period.
    In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 311-318, 0080887961
    In: 9780080887968
    In: 9780444826428
    In: 0444826424
    In: year:2008
    In: pages:311-318
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00036-4
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
    UB Potsdam
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Chapter 19 Experiments in Decentralized Monopoly Restraint (2008)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831633337
    ISBN: 0080887961
    Content: This chapter focuses on laboratory experimental examinations of a particular class of institutions, policies or mechanisms of monopoly control. These are mechanisms which take the existence of a monopoly as a given and ask how might the abuses of monopoly be controlled in a decentralized manner. The most prevalent form of monopoly control in the United States for many decades was cost-based rate of return regulation. The academic and practitioner critics of rate of return regulation were numerous. In general, the arguments were that the incentives in the rate of return regulatory process itself led to distortions relative to standard measures of efficiency. This chapter focuses exclusively on experiments that do more than simply reform centralized price regulation, that is, we examine decentralized forms of monopoly control.
    In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 153-162, 0080887961
    In: 9780080887968
    In: 9780444826428
    In: 0444826424
    In: year:2008
    In: pages:153-162
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00019-4
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
    UB Potsdam
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Chapter 11 First Price Independent Private Values Auctions (2008)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831633418
    ISBN: 0080887961
    Content: The first price sealed bid auction is the market institution in which the high bidder acquires ownership of the auctioned item and pays a price equal to the amount of the highest bid. This market institution is distinguished from the second price sealed bid auction in which the high bidder obtains the auctioned item and pays an amount equal to the second highest bid. Bids in sealed bid auctions are often literally sealed in envelopes but need not be; the essential distinction is from a real time auction in which the time at which bids are submitted during the auction is an essential feature of the market institution. This chapter presents experimental tests, using independent private values, of the consistency of bidding behavior in the first price auction with three nested Nash equilibrium bidding models. The reported tests have various implications for the three nested models. Depending on which test is used, data for only 010 of the subjects are consistent with the risk neutral model. This conclusion is the same regardless of whether one conducts the tests with market prices, individual subjects' bids and values, or subjects' expected foregone earnings. Tests with individual subjects' bids and values indicate that data for about 48 of the subjects are consistent with the constant relative risk averse model and data for almost all subjects are consistent with the log-concave model.
    In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 92-98, 0080887961
    In: 9780080887968
    In: 9780444826428
    In: 0444826424
    In: year:2008
    In: pages:92-98
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00011-X
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
    UB Potsdam
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Chapter 104 Preference Reversals (2008)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831632470
    ISBN: 0080887961
    Content: Study of preference reversals originated with cognitive psychologists and has spread to experimental economics because it is directly relevant to the empirical validity of economic theories of decision-making under uncertainty. A preference reversal experiment involves paired choice and valuation responses, usually over simple two-outcome gambles. Subjects are asked to choose which of a pair of gambles they want to play. They are also asked to place minimum selling prices on the gambles in an experimental context in which telling the truth is a dominant strategy. A preference reversal occurs when a subject places a lower selling price on the gamble that he/she chooses than on the other gamble in a pair. Preference reversals call into question the empirical validity of economic theory because they provide support for the conclusion that the preferences that subjects reveal vary with the response mode (choice or valuation) that is used to elicit the preferences.
    In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 967-975, 0080887961
    In: 9780080887968
    In: 9780444826428
    In: 0444826424
    In: year:2008
    In: pages:967-975
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00104-7
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
    UB Potsdam
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Chapter 114 Experimetrics: The Use of Market Experiments to Evaluate the Performance of Econometric Estimators (2008)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831632365
    ISBN: 0080887961
    Content: Experiments with human subjects have been widely used to test hypotheses derived from economic theory and to provide stylized facts about empirical regularities in economics. One of the clear implications of experimental economics is that the efficiency and distributional properties of market allocations are dependent on the market institutions through which exchange takes place. This makes clear the limitations of economic theories of markets that are institution-free. Econometric theory, as conventionally taught in graduate schools and applied by many economists, is largely institution-free. Properties of econometric estimators are derived from assumptions about the data generating process (DGP) and the error distribution. A clear example is provided by the most central simultaneous equations in economics, supply and demand equations. The basic results in econometric textbooks, that ordinary least squares is an inconsistent estimator and two stage least squares is a consistent estimator, are derived from the assumption that the DGP is competitive equilibrium with zero-mean random error.
    In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 1078-1086, 0080887961
    In: 9780080887968
    In: 9780444826428
    In: 0444826424
    In: year:2008
    In: pages:1078-1086
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00114-X
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
    UB Potsdam
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Chapter 103 Utility Maximization (2008)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831632489
    ISBN: 0080887961
    Content: A testable form of the utility hypothesis results from identifying necessary condition(s) for the existence of a utility function that rationalizes the price and quantity data, meaning a utility function that correctly predicts choices that do not violate an agent's budget constraint. Possible inconsistencies with utility-maximizing choices are of no clear economic interest unless the objects of choice are scarce. In order for the chosen commodities to be scarce, the agent's budget constraint must be binding. Hence, a specific testable form of the utility hypothesis must incorporate scarcity. There are various ways to incorporate scarcity in the model of the utility-maximizing agent. The model of the utility-maximizing agent is central to theoretical and applied economics and to economics education. But how can one test for the presence of utility maximization? More specifically, how can one test the utility hypothesis, defined as the hypothesis that real economic agents behave as if they maximize utility functions subject to binding budget constraints?
    In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 958-966, 0080887961
    In: 9780080887968
    In: 9780444826428
    In: 0444826424
    In: year:2008
    In: pages:958-966
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00103-5
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
    UB Potsdam
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Chapter 71 Procurement Contracting (2008)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1831632810
    ISBN: 0080887961
    Content: Purchases by government agencies from private sector firms are often initiated by solicitation of bids to supply the desired items. Payment to the firm that is awarded the supply contract may be determined by (a) the bid price or (b) bid price plus a share of the difference between observable production cost and the bid price or (c) observable production cost plus an additional fee that may be a function of costs. Interest in the theory and behavior of procurement contracting stems mainly from two features of the political economy: (a) government may have multiple, possibility-conflicting objectives in procurement; and (b) there may be an asymmetry in knowledge of some components of firms' production costs. One objective that government is likely to have in procurement contracting is minimization of the budgetary cost of making the purchases. Another objective that the government may have in conducting its economic activities, including procurement, may be the promotion of allocative efficiency. As we shall see, budgetary cost minimization and economic efficiency maximization can be conflicting objectives when there is a cost information asymmetry.
    In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 669-675, 0080887961
    In: 9780080887968
    In: 9780444826428
    In: 0444826424
    In: year:2008
    In: pages:669-675
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00071-6
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    Stabi Berlin
    UB Potsdam
  • 9
    Book
    Book
    Special issue: Experimental and behavioral economics of healthcare (2016)
    Amsterdam : Elsevier
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV044027753
    Format: Seiten A1-A4, 208 Seiten , Illustrationen, Diagramme
    Series Statement: Journal of economic behavior & organization volume 131, part B (November 2016)
    Language: English
    Keywords: Aufsatzsammlung
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Book
    EUV Frankfurt get availability status
  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Risk aversion in experiments (2008)
    Bingley : JAI
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_686848705
    Format: Online-Ressource (vii, 440 p) , ill
    Edition: Online-Ausg. Palo Alto, Calif ebrary 2011 Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    ISBN: 0762313846 , 9780762313846
    Series Statement: Research in experimental economics v. 12
    Content: Presents research utilizing laboratory experimental methods in economics. This series includes examples such as: papers with complete presentation of experimental instructions and data, papers which report replication and robustness results, methodological papers, and theoretical papers motivated specifically by experimentation
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Risk Aversion in Experiments; Copyright page; Contents; List of contributors; Chapter 1. Risk aversion in experiments: an introduction; Chapter 2. Risky decisions in the large and in the small: Theory and experiment; Chapter 3. Risk Aversion in the Laboratory; Chapter 4. Stochastic models for binary discrete choice under risk: a critical primer and econometric comparison; Chapter 5. Measuring risk aversion and the wealth effect; Chapter 6. Risk aversion in the presence of background risk: Evidence from an economic experiment; Chapter 7. Risk aversion in laboratory asset markets , Chapter 8. Risk aversion in game showsChapter 9. Further reflections on the reflection effect; frntcover.pdf , Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    Additional Edition: Druckausg. Risk aversion in experiments Bingley [u.a.] : Emerald JAI, 2008 ISBN 9780762313846
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Online Access
    UB Potsdam
Nothing or not found what you are looking for? Please check your search query or use the Interlibrary Loan Search.
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. Further information can be found on the KOBV privacy pages