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  • Stabi Berlin  (16)
  • SB Guben
  • Alice Salomon HS
  • Bauhaus-Archiv Berlin
  • SB Ruhland
  • Levy, Neil
  • 1
    Buch
    Buch
    New York [u.a.] :Lang,
    UID:
    almafu_BV013601196
    Umfang: XII, 207 S.
    ISBN: 0-8204-5118-5
    Serie: Studies in European thought 20
    Inhalt: "It is often claimed that at some time in the recent past, philosophy underwent a profound transformation. The era inaugurated perhaps by Descartes has come to an end, and we have entered the epoch of postmodernity. This book examines that claim by focusing on two exemplary figures, representative of modernity and postmodernity respectively: Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault. Concentrating on their political thought, it shows that each is beset by the same kinds of problems and evolves parallel and complementary solutions. The continuities that exist between them are sufficient to call into question the notion that fissure runs between the two epochs they represent; nevertheless Neil Levy suggests that their thought can be seen as presenting us with the resources for thinking and criticizing our present in a manner that is alert to the paradoxes and contingencies often seen as characterizing postmodernity."--BOOK JACKET.
    Sprache: Englisch
    Fachgebiete: Philosophie
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    Schlagwort(e): 1889-1976 Heidegger, Martin ; Postmoderne ; 1905-1980 Sartre, Jean-Paul ; Postmoderne ; 1926-1984 Foucault, Michel ; Postmoderne
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Oxford : Oxford University Press
    UID:
    gbv_1794556028
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (224 p.)
    Inhalt: Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We’ve missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we’ve failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging—at least usually—changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn’t rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency
    Anmerkung: English
    Sprache: Englisch
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 3
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    Oxford : Oxford University Press
    UID:
    gbv_1832339785
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (20 p.)
    Inhalt: There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals we identify with proper names. I suggest that if we take the exercise of agency as a guide to the identification of agents, we may find that agents sometimes extend into the world: they may be constituted by several individuals and/or by institutions. These extended agents may be responsible for morally significant outcomes. I argue that institutions or extended agents may also be responsible for the failure of individuals to satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility. Individuals may believe virtuously but falsely, due to the way in which cues to reliability are socially distributed. I conclude by suggesting that a focus on individual responsibility may have distracted us from the urgent task of reforming the institutional actors responsible for widespread ignorance about morally significant facts
    Anmerkung: English
    Sprache: Unbestimmte Sprache
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 4
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : Oxford University Press
    UID:
    gbv_1778448720
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (15 p.)
    Inhalt: This chapter considers three connections between consciousness and issues in ethics: first, the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding an entity’s moral status; second, the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding moral responsibility for action; and third, the relevance of consciousness for the acquisition of moral knowledge. This is a disparate set of connections, prompting a question: is there anything about consciousness these connections have in common? One might expect the answer to be no. But debate in each area has thus far failed to settle just what about consciousness is so intuitively important for moral status, moral responsibility, and moral knowledge. Given this fact, it remains possible that there is some common connection of these different issues in ethics to consciousness. The chapter takes up this possibility in its conclusion
    Anmerkung: English
    Sprache: Englisch
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  • 5
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    [Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar] : Taylor & Francis
    UID:
    gbv_1778477666
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (10 p.)
    ISBN: 9781315689197 , 9781138909281
    Inhalt: In popular, philosophical and many scientific accounts of addiction, strong desires and other affective states carry a great deal of the explanatory burden. Much less of a role is given to cognitive states than to affective. But as Pickard and Ahmed (2016; see also Pickard 2016) note, addiction may be as much or more a disorder of cognition as of compulsion or desire. Pickard’s focus is on denial. In this chapter my focus will be different. I will argue that in many cases at least, we can explain the lapses of abstinent addicts by way of processes that do not involve motivated reasoning (as denial or self-deception plausibly do). Mechanisms that have the role of updating beliefs in response to evidence may alter addicts’ judgments concerning what they have most reason to do (in the precise circumstances in which they find themselves), and thereby cause them to act accordingly
    Anmerkung: English
    Sprache: Englisch
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  • 6
    UID:
    gbv_1778583253
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (12 p.)
    ISBN: 9781315758206
    Inhalt: In this chapter, I review recent work on neuroscientifi c threats to free will. What is it for something to threaten free will? Consider, fi rst, an apparent threat. You are walking in the dark, and a shadow looms in the distance. It certainly appears threatening, but you are not sure. What do you do? You consider the source of the threat (the thing casting the shadow, and you attempt to discover whether the threat is actual (an attacker) or merely apparent (a tree). And if the threat is actual, you attempt to discern what epistemic and behavioral changes are required of you
    Anmerkung: English
    Sprache: Englisch
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  • 7
    UID:
    gbv_774448555
    ISBN: 9789400747067
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9789400747074
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9789400747081
    Sprache: Englisch
    Fachgebiete: Philosophie
    RVK:
    Schlagwort(e): Neuroethik
    Mehr zum Autor: Clausen, Jens 1969-
    Bibliothek Standort Signatur Band/Heft/Jahr Verfügbarkeit
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  • 8
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    London : Routledge,
    UID:
    gbv_1779342802
    Umfang: 1 online resource (xxxix, 341 pages)
    ISBN: 9781315255767 , 9781351938013
    Serie: International library of essays on evolutionary thought Volume 3
    Inhalt: pt. I. Precursors to morality -- pt. II. Mechanisms -- pt. III. Altruism -- pt. IV. Meta-ethics -- pt. V. Normative ethics.
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9780754627586
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9780754627586
    Sprache: Englisch
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  • 9
    Online-Ressource
    Online-Ressource
    London : Routledge,
    UID:
    gbv_1816460087
    Umfang: 1 online resource (xlv, 410 pages)
    ISBN: 9781315255750 , 9781351937986
    Serie: International library of essays on evolutionary thought Volume 2
    Inhalt: pt. I. Theoretical background -- pt. II. The massive modularity hypothesis -- pt. III. Adaptationism -- pt. IV. The environment of evolutionary adaptedness -- pt. V. Cultural universals.
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9780754627555
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9780754627555
    Sprache: Englisch
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  • 10
    UID:
    gbv_862820707
    Umfang: xxii, 707 Seiten , Illustrationen
    ISBN: 9781138795815
    Serie: Routledge philosophy companions
    Anmerkung: Literaturangaben
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9781315758206
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9781315758206
    Weitere Ausg.: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe The Routledge companion to free will New York : Routledge, 2016 ISBN 9781315758206
    Weitere Ausg.: ISBN 9781317635475
    Sprache: Englisch
    Fachgebiete: Philosophie
    RVK:
    Schlagwort(e): Willensfreiheit ; Determinismus ; Wörterbuch
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