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  • Stabi Berlin  (7)
  • Zentrum Info.arbeit Bundeswehr
  • 2010-2014  (7)
  • Berger, Allen N.  (7)
  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press
    UID:
    b3kat_BV035011611
    Format: XXXVII, 994 S. , graph. Darst.
    Edition: 1. publ.
    ISBN: 9780199236619
    Note: Literaturangaben
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Kreditwesen ; Bankpolitik ; Kreditwesen ; Internationaler Vergleich ; Kreditwesen ; Bankgeschäft ; Bankpolitik ; Bankenaufsicht ; Bank ; Management ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Handbuch ; Aufsatzsammlung
    Author information: Berger, Allen N.
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press
    UID:
    b3kat_BV041924143
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (XLV, 994 S.) , graph. Darst.
    Edition: 1. publ. in paperback
    ISBN: 9780191749506
    Note: Orig. publ.: 2010 , Includes bibliographical references and index
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback ISBN 978-0-19-964093-5
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover ISBN 978-0-19-923661-9
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics , General works
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Kreditwesen ; Bankgeschäft ; Bankpolitik ; Bankenaufsicht ; Kreditwesen ; Internationaler Vergleich ; Bank ; Management ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Handbuch ; Aufsatzsammlung
    Author information: Berger, Allen N.
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  • 3
    Book
    Book
    Frankfurt am Main : Dt. Bundesbank, Eurosystem
    UID:
    gbv_715622102
    Format: 71 S. , graph. Darst.
    ISBN: 9783865587954 , 9783865587947
    Series Statement: Discussion paper / Deutsche Bundesbank Eurosystem ; 2012,03
    Content: Little is known about how socioeconomic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we show how age, gender, and education composition of executive teams affect risk taking of financial institutions. First, we establish that age, gender, and education jointly affect the variability of bank performance. Second, we use difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements and find that younger executive teams increase risk taking, as do board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives. In contrast, if board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, risk taking declines.
    Note: Zsfassungen in dt. u. engl. Sprache , Zsfassungen in dt. u. engl. Sprache
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9783865587954
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Bank ; Vorstandsmitglied ; Geschlecht ; Altersstruktur ; Risikoverhalten
    Author information: Berger, Allen N.
    Author information: Kick, Thomas 1972-
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  • 4
    UID:
    gbv_797549196
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy, Research working paper 3632
    Content: The authors jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance. They argue that it is important to include indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model. "Nonrobustness" checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument. Using data from Argentina in the 1990s, their strongest and most robust results concern state ownership. State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect. However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 5
    UID:
    gbv_797550887
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper 3795
    Content: The authors propose a more complete conceptual framework for analysis of credit availability for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In this framework, lending technologies are the key conduit through which government policies and national financial structures affect credit availability. They emphasize a causal chain from policy to financial structures which affect the feasibility and profitability of different lending technologies. These technologies, in turn, have important effects on SME credit availability. Financial structures include the presence of different financial institution types and the conditions under which they operate. Lending technologies include several transactions technologies, plus relationship lending. The authors argue that the framework implicit in most of the literature is oversimplified, neglects key elements of the chain, and often yields misleading conclusions. A common oversimplification is the treatment of transactions technologies as a homogeneous group, unsuitable for serving informationally opaque SMEs, and a frequent misleading conclusion is that large institutions are disadvantaged in lending to opaque SMEs.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    UID:
    gbv_797533192
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper 4696
    Content: Under the traditional "competition-fragility" view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative "competition-stability" view, more market power in the loan market may result in greater bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it more difficult to repay loans and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. But even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. The authors test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. The results suggest that - consistent with the traditional "competition-fragility" view - banks with a greater degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provide some support for one element of the "competition-stability" view - that market power increases loan portfolio risk. The authors show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 7
    UID:
    gbv_797545239
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper 3862
    Content: The authors formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank ownership types-foreign, state-owned, and private domestic banks-in banking relationships, using data from India. The empirical results are consistent with all of their hypotheses with regard to foreign banks. These banks tend to serve as the main bank for transparent firms, and firms with foreign main banks are most likely to have multiple banking relationships, have the most relationships, and diversify relationships across bank ownership types. The data are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms with state-owned main banks are relatively unlikely to diversify across bank ownership types. However, state-owned banks often do not provide the main relationship for firms they are mandated to serve (for example, small, opaque firms), and the predictions of negative effects on multiple banking and number of relationships hold for only one type of state-owned bank.
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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