Umfang:
1 online resource (480 pages)
Ausgabe:
2nd ed.
ISBN:
9781461421153
,
9781461421160
Inhalt:
This book discusses the social and economic costs and benefits of legalized gambling, addressing such questions as Does casino expansion simply "cannibalize" other industries, having no net effect? Or does casino gambling offer positive economic impacts?
Anmerkung:
Intro -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction to Immigration Economics -- 1.1 The Late Twentieth-Century Immigration Explosion -- 1.1.1 The Complexity of Immigration -- 1.1.2 Not Everyone Likes Immigrants -- 1.1.3 Economists´ Perspective -- 1.2 The Determinants of Immigration -- 1.2.1 Many Factors Discourage Immigration -- 1.2.2 Considering the Full Set of Push, Pull, Stay, and Stay Away Factors -- 1.2.3 Shifts in Economic Forces Influence Immigration -- 1.2.4 Immigration Is a Complex Phenomenon -- 1.3 A Brief History of Immigration -- 1.3.1 Early Migrations -- 1.3.2 Recent Immigration -- 1.4 There Are Many Types of Immigrants -- 1.4.1 Not All Immigrants Are Permanent Settlers -- 1.4.2 Forced Immigration -- 1.4.3 Some Immigrants Are Difficult to Classify -- 1.5 The Purpose and Organization of this Book -- References -- Part I: Immigration Theory and Evidence -- Modeling Immigration -- The Basic Labor Market Model of Immigration -- Who Gains and Who Loses with Immigration? -- Building on the Basic Labor Market Model -- Chapter 2: The Determinants of International Migration: Theory -- Chapter Overview -- 2.1 Early Migration Theory -- 2.1.1 Pre-1960 Theory -- 2.1.2 Ravenstein and Zipf -- 2.1.3 The Standard Modern Theory of Migration -- 2.1.3.1 The Migrant as Investor in Human Capital -- 2.1.3.2 The Migrant as Consumer -- 2.1.3.3 The Migrant as Household Producer -- 2.1.4 Further Influences on Migration -- 2.1.4.1 The Role of Past Migration -- 2.1.4.2 Migration as a Life Cycle Decision -- 2.1.4.3 The Expected Income Hypothesis -- 2.2 The Modern Model of Immigration -- 2.2.1 The First Borjas Model -- 2.2.1.1 The General Intuition of the First Model -- 2.2.1.2 The Specification of the Model -- 2.2.1.3 The Predictions of the Model -- 2.2.2 Borjas´ 1991 Model -- 2.2.3 Recent Extensions of the Borjas Model -- 2.2.3.1 The CHW Model
,
2.2.3.2 Migration as a Response to Relative Deprivation -- 2.2.3.3 Migration as Sequential Search and the Option Value of Waiting -- 2.3 The Family or Household as the Decision-Making Unit -- 2.3.1 Conflicting Interests and the Family Migration Decision -- 2.3.2 Mincer´s Model -- 2.3.3 Family Migration as a Portfolio Decision -- 2.4 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 3: Why People Immigrate: The Evidence -- Chapter Overview -- 3.1 Regression Models of Immigration -- 3.1.1 Empirical Models of Regional Migration -- 3.1.2 The Gravity Model of International Migration -- 3.1.2.1 The Basic Gravity Model of Migration -- 3.1.2.2 The Augmented Gravity Model -- 3.1.2.3 Generalizing the Gravity Model -- 3.1.3 Some Econometric Problems Related to the Gravity Model -- 3.2 The Choice of Variables in Statistical Models of Immigration -- 3.2.1 Three Examples -- 3.2.2 Representing Income Differences -- 3.2.3 Representing Migration Costs -- 3.2.4 Representing Source Country Development -- 3.2.5 Representing Immigration Restrictions -- 3.2.6 The Empirical Evidence on the Determinants of Migration -- 3.2.7 Evidence on Worldwide Migration -- 3.2.8 Evidence on Migration to Groups of OECD Countries -- 3.2.9 Evidence on US Immigration -- 3.2.10 Immigration to Other Countries -- 3.2.11 Summarizing the Results -- 3.3 Summary and Concluding Remarks -- 3.3.1 The Power of Statistical Models -- 3.3.2 The Way Forward -- References -- Chapter 4: Who Immigrates? Theory and Evidence -- Chapter Overview -- 4.1 Immigrant Selection: The Chiswick vs. Borjas Debate -- 4.1.1 Some Unfortunate Terminology -- 4.1.2 The Chiswick View -- 4.1.3 The Borjas Model -- 4.1.4 A More Detailed Look at the Borjas Model -- 4.1.5 Selection by Observed Characteristics -- 4.2 Extensions of the Borjas Model -- 4.2.1 Variable Migration Costs and Migrant Selection
,
4.2.2 Credit Constraints and Immigrant Selection -- 4.2.3 Family Migration and Selection Bias -- 4.3 The Empirical Evidence on Immigrant Selectivity -- 4.3.1 Borjas´ Empirical Results -- 4.3.2 Further Tests of Borjas´ Model -- 4.3.3 Tests Based on Counterfactual Density Functions -- 4.4 The Asymmetric Information Model -- 4.4.1 Kwok and Leland´s Model -- 4.4.2 Restoring Symmetric Information -- 4.5 The Theory of Immigrant Assimilation -- 4.5.1 The Chiswick Study of Assimilation -- 4.5.2 Potential Bias in Chiswick´s Results -- 4.5.3 Borjas´ Empirical Results -- 4.6 Addressing Borjas´ Critique -- 4.7 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 5: The Effects of Immigration on the Destination Economy: The Theory -- Chapter Overview -- 5.1 The Macro Effects of Immigration -- 5.1.1 Homogeneous Labor with Fixed Capital -- 5.1.2 Homogeneous Labor with Variable Capital -- 5.1.3 Heterogeneous Labor -- 5.1.4 Heterogeneous Labor with Constant Capital -- 5.1.5 Heterogeneous Labor and Perfectly Elastic Capital Supply -- 5.1.6 How Big Is the US Immigrant Surplus? -- 5.2 Detailing the Distributional Effects of Immigration -- 5.2.1 The Johnson Model (1980) -- 5.2.2 The Altonji and Card Model (1991) -- 5.2.3 The Ottaviano and Peri Model -- 5.2.3.1 Temporary Effects on the Capital-Labor Ratio -- 5.2.3.2 Positive Feedback Effects on Workers in Different Education Cells -- 5.2.3.3 Negative Feedback Effects on Workers That Have the Same Education, But Different Experience -- 5.3 Long-Run Adjustment Processes -- 5.3.1 Internal Migration Responses -- 5.3.2 Multiple Goods -- 5.3.3 Choice of Technology -- 5.3.4 The Demand Effect of Immigration -- 5.4 The Demand Effect of Immigration -- 5.4.1 Say´s Law of Immigration -- 5.4.2 Regional Migration and Local Demand -- 5.4.3 A Few Models of Immigrant Demand Effects -- 5.4.4 Bodvarsson and Van den Berg´s Lexington Model
,
5.4.5 The More General Case -- 5.4.6 Further Models of Immigrant Demand Effects -- 5.5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 6: How Immigration Impacts the Destination Economy: The Evidence -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Spatial Correlation Method -- 6.2.1 Cross Section Applications -- 6.2.2 Dealing with Simultaneity and Spurious Correlation -- 6.2.3 Recent Applications of the Spatial Correlation Method -- 6.2.4 Applications of the Unexpected Exogenous Supply Shock Method -- 6.2.5 The Mariel Boatlift -- 6.2.6 Russian Immigrants in Israel -- 6.2.7 Assessing the Spatial Correlation Method -- 6.3 The Production Function Method -- 6.3.1 Grossman´s Pioneering Production Study -- 6.3.2 Gang and Rivera-Batiz -- 6.3.3 Assessing the Production Function Method -- 6.4 The Skill Cell Approach -- 6.4.1 Borjas´ Use of National Data Versus Regional Data -- 6.4.2 Ottaviano and Peri´s Extension of Borjas´ Skill Cell Model -- 6.4.3 Other Types of Labor Market Cells -- 6.5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 7: Estimating Immigration´s Impact: Accounting for All Adjustments -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Does Immigration Trigger Internal Migration? -- 7.2.1 Evidence That Immigrants Induce Native Out-Migration -- 7.2.2 Evidence That Immigration Has Little Effect on Native Out-Migration -- 7.3 Migration Biases Estimates of Immigration´s Wage Effect -- 7.4 Does Immigration Change Industry Structure? -- 7.5 Measuring the Demand Effects of Immigration -- 7.5.1 Hercowitz and Yashiv´s Estimates -- 7.5.2 Bodvarsson and Van den Berg´s Lexington, Nebraska, Study -- 7.5.3 Estimating the Demand Effect of the Mariel Boatlift -- 7.5.4 Additional Estimates of the Demand Effects of Immigration -- 7.6 The Costs of Government Services for Immigrants -- 7.6.1 Recent Studies for the USA -- 7.6.2 Are US Immigrants More Costly Today than in the Past?
,
7.6.3 Estimates of Fiscal Costs for Other Countries -- 7.7 Immigration´s External Effects -- 7.7.1 Economies of Scale -- 7.7.2 Are There Negative Externalities Associated with Immigration? -- 7.8 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Chapter 8: Immigration and the Source Country -- 8.1 Remittances and Demand Effects in the Source Country -- 8.1.1 Supply and Demand Effects -- 8.1.2 Immigrants and Remittances -- 8.1.3 A Two-Country View of Remittances -- 8.2 What We Know About Immigrant Remittances -- 8.2.1 The Growth of Immigrant Remittances -- 8.2.2 Remittances as a Percentage of Source Country GDP -- 8.2.3 The Reliability of Remittance Data -- 8.2.4 The Recent Data on the Growth of Immigrant Remittances -- 8.2.5 Policies to Encourage Remittances -- 8.2.6 How Remittances Are Used in the Source Countries -- 8.2.7 Remittances: Tentative Conclusions -- 8.3 The Brain Drain -- 8.3.1 Human Capital of Immigrants -- 8.3.2 The Brain Drain as a Development Issue -- 8.3.3 How Big Is the Brain Drain? -- 8.3.4 Why Human Capital Flees Capital-Scarce Countries -- 8.3.5 Brain Drain and Brain Waste -- 8.4 A Reassessment of the Brain Drain -- 8.4.1 Remittances Again -- 8.4.2 The Brain Drain as an Incentive to Seek Education -- 8.4.3 A Simple Case -- 8.4.4 A More Realistic Case -- 8.5 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 9: Economic Growth and Immigration -- 9.1 The Early Models of Economic Growth -- 9.1.1 Adam Smith´s Broad View of Growth -- 9.1.2 The Classicals and Diminishing Returns -- 9.1.3 The Role of Immigration in the Classical Model -- 9.1.4 Was the Classical Model a Failure? -- 9.1.5 Forgetting the Classicals and Marx: The Neoclassical School -- 9.1.6 Keynes and the Harrod-Domar Model -- 9.2 The Solow Growth Model -- 9.2.1 A Graphic Representation of the Solow Model -- 9.2.2 Immigration Similarly Has No Long-Run Effects
,
9.2.3 How an Economy Achieves Permanent Growth
Weitere Ausg.:
Print version Bodvarsson, Ö B. The Economics of Immigration New York, NY : Springer,c2013 ISBN 9781461421153
Sprache:
Englisch
Schlagwort(e):
Electronic books
URL:
FULL
((OIS Credentials Required))
Bookmarklink
