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  • MPI Bildungsforschung  (2)
  • Topographie des Terrors und DZ
  • USA Congress  (2)
  • 1
    UID:
    b3kat_BV008219343
    Format: XVII, 324 S. , graph. Darst.
    ISBN: 0520072197 , 0520072200
    Series Statement: California series on social choice and political economy 23
    Language: English
    Subjects: Political Science , Law
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    Keywords: USA Congress ; Partei ; Ausschuss
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    gbv_1696430658
    Format: 1 online resource (352 pages)
    ISBN: 9780511344237
    Content: Demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process.
    Content: Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. A precis of procedural cartel theory -- 1.3. The procedural cartel thesis -- 1.4. Outline -- PART I WHY PARTY GOVERNMENT? -- 2 Procedural Cartel Theory -- 2.1. Theories of partisan legislative organization -- 2.1.1. Why Are There Parties in Legislatures? -- 2.1.1.1. Parties are Created to Solve Internal Collective Action Problems -- 2.1.1.2. Parties Are Created to Solve External Collective Action Problems -- 2.1.2. How Are Parties Organized? -- 2.1.2.1. Parties as Firms -- 2.1.2.2. Parties as Partnerships -- 2.1.3. What Do Parties Do? -- 2.1.3.1. Parties as Floor Voting Coalitions -- 2.1.3.2. Parties as Procedural Coalitions -- 2.1.4. How do Majority Parties Control the Agenda? -- 2.1.4.1. Parties as Allocating Proposal Rights -- 2.1.4.2. Parties as Allocating Veto Rights -- 2.2. Procedural cartel theory -- 2.3. How does the majority cartelize the agenda? -- 2.3.1. The Structure of Agenda-Setting Offices -- 2.3.2. Who Gets the Agenda-Setting Offices? -- 2.3.3. Fiduciary Behavior of Officeholders -- 2.3.4. Loyalty from the Rank and File -- 2.3.5. What About Quitting the Party? -- 2.4. conclusion -- PART II NEGATIVE AGENDA POWER -- 3 Modeling Agenda Power -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Modeling the floor agenda -- 3.2.1. Background Assumptions -- 3.2.2. Voting on the Floor -- 3.2.3. The Cartel Agenda Model -- 3.2.4. The Floor Agenda Model -- 3.3. Proposal rights and regimes of exception -- 3.4. Choosing between agenda structures -- 3.5. Conclusion -- Appendix 3.a -- 4 The Primacy of Reed's Rules in House Organization -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. House rules -- 4.2.1. Defining the Universe of Rule and Organizational Changes -- 4.2.2. Organizational Changes.
    Note: Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521853798
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9780521853798
    Additional Edition: Druckausg. Cox, Gary W., 1955 - Setting the agenda Cambridge[u.a.] : Cambridge University Press, 2005 ISBN 0521619963
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0521853796
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521853798
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780521619967
    Language: English
    Subjects: Political Science
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    Keywords: USA Congress ; House of Representatives ; Geschäftsordnung ; Ausschuss ; Mehrheitsfraktion ; Einfluss
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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