feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • MPI Bildungsforschung  (80)
  • GB Petershagen  (4)
  • GB Großbeeren  (2)
Type of Medium
Language
Region
Library
Virtual Catalogues
Access
  • 1
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076225
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (38 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: June 2000 - Economists in the field of industrial organization, antitrust, and regulation have long recognized certain factors as potent determinants of opportunistic behavior, corruption, and capture of government officials. Only now are these relationships becoming conventional wisdom among specialists in economies in transition. Ten years into the transition, corruption is so pervasive that it could jeopardize the best-intentioned reform efforts. Broadman and Recanatini present an analytical framework for examining the role market institutions play in rent-seeking and illicit behavior. Using recently available data on the incidence of corruption and on institutional development, they provide preliminary evidence on the link between the development of market institutions and incentives for corruption. Virtually all of the indicators they examine appear to be important, but three are statistically significant: · The intensity of barriers to the entry of new business.
    Content: · The effectiveness of the legal system. · The efficacy and competitiveness of services provided by infrastructure monopolies. The main lesson emerging from their analysis: a well established system of market institutions - clear and transparent rules, fully functioning checks and balances (including strong enforcement mechanisms), and a robust competitive environment - reduces opportunities for rent-seeking and hence incentives for corruption. Both the design and effective implementation of such measures are important if a market system is to be effective. It is not enough, for example, to enact first-rate laws if they are not enforced. The local political economy greatly affects whether a given policy reform will curtail corruption. Especially important are the following factors in the political economy: · The credibility of the government's commitment to carrying out announced reforms.
    Content: · The degree to which government officials are captured by the entities they regulate or oversee. · The stability of the government itself. · The political power of entrenched vested interests. Economists in the field of industrial organization, antitrust, and regulation have long recognized these factors as potent determinants of opportunistic behavior, corruption, and capture of government officials. Only now are they becoming conventional wisdom among specialists in economies in transition. This paper - a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to analyze the determinants of corruption and develop remedies. The authors may be contacted at hbroadman@worldbank.org or frecanatini@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Recanatini, Francesca Seeds of Corruption
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040617176
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Edition: Also available in print.
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2539
    Content: The transition from plan to market provides a rare opportunity for insight into the endogenous development of economic institutions. Economic activities during the Soviet regime were coordinated by a central authority. These coordinating mechanisms were disrupted during the transition period, leading to an increase in the transaction costs for firms. Many researchers emphasize the negative impact of this 'disorganization' on output behavior at the beginning of transition. This paper examines one of the key institutions that have emerged spontaneously in an environment characterized by widespread 'disorganization'. It documents the emergence of business associations at the beginning of transition and provides evidence that these new coordinating institutions mitigated the initial output decline
    Note: "January 2001"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-29). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 19, 2002 , Nebentitel: Emergence of business associations in a transition economy
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Recanatini, Francesca Disorganization or self-organization? 2001
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040617277
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Edition: Also available in print.
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2640
    Note: "July 2001. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 24-25). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 06, 2002 , Weitere Ausgabe: Broadman, Harry G: Where has all the foreign investment gone in Russia?
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Broadman, Harry G. Where has all the foreign investment gone in Russia? 2001
    Language: English
    Keywords: Russland ; Auslandsinvestition ; Quelle
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076285
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (50 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: March 2000 - How to make firm-level surveys more consistent, yielding data more relevant to policy analysis. The World Bank has increasingly focused on firm-level surveys to build the data foundation needed for accurate policy analysis in developing and transition economies. Recanatini, Wallsten, and Xu take stock of some recent Bank surveys and discuss how to improve their results. Lessons on data issues and hypothesis testing: · Use panel data, if possible. · Have enough information about productivity to estimate a production function. · Avoid the paradigm of list the severity of the obstacle/problem on a scale of 1 to 5. Instead, ask for data on specific dimensions of the problem that will shed light on alternative hypotheses and policy recommendations. · Pick particular disaggregated industries and sample those industries in each survey.
    Content: · Identify the most important policy interventions of interest and consider how you will empirically identify specific changes by picking instruments useful for doing so. Lessons on questionnaire design: · Incorporate only one idea or dimension in each question. Do not ask, in one question, about the quality, integrity, and efficiency of services, for example. · Consider the costs and benefits of numeric scales compared with adjectival scales. Scales in which each point is labeled may be more precise than numeric scales in which only the endpoints are labeled. But responses are very sensitive to the exact adjective chosen and it may be impossible to translate adjectives precisely across languages, making it impossible to compare responses across countries. · Recognize that the share of respondents expressing opinions will be biased upward if the survey does not include a middle (indifferent or don't know) category and downward if it does include the middle category.
    Content: · When asking degree-of-concern and how-great-an-obstacle questions, consider first asking a filter question (such as Do you believe this regulation is an obstacle or not?). If the answer is yes, then ask how severe the obstacle is. · Be aware of the effects of context. The act of asking questions can affect the answers given on subsequent, related questions. · Think carefully about how to ask sensitive questions. Consider using a self-administered module for sensitive questions. Alternatively, a randomized response mechanism may be a useful, truth-revealing mechanism. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to develop consistent cross-country firm level surveys. The authors may be contacted at frecanatini@worldbank.org, wallsten@leland.stanford.edu, or lxu1@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Xu, Lixin Surveying Surveys and Questioning Questions
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040617278
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Edition: Also available in print.
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2641
    Note: "July 2001"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-31). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 06, 2002 , Weitere Ausgabe: Broadman, Harry G: Is Russia restructuring?
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Broadman, Harry G. Is Russia restructuring? 2001
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 6
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049074130
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (42 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery "tax." This paper explores the price and quantity components of the relationship between governance and service delivery using micro-level survey data. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. Trust in state institutions decreases the probability of being discouraged, while knowledge of mechanisms to report corruption and extent of social network increase it, suggesting that households may rely on substitutes through networks. The study complements the household analysis with supply-side analysis based on data from public officials, and constructs agency-level measures for access to public services and institutional factors. Econometric results suggest that corruption reduces the supply of services, while voice mechanisms and clarity of the public agency's mission increase it
    Additional Edition: Kaufmann, Daniel How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ?
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 7
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049074307
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (42 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: This paper investigates who is most affected by informal competition and how regulation and enforcement affect the extent and nature of this competition. Using newly-collected enterprise data for 6,466 manufacturing formal firms across 14 countries in Latin America, the authors show that formal firms affected by head-to-head competition with informal firms largely resemble them. They are small credit constrained, underutilize their productive capacity, serve smaller customers, and are in markets with low entry costs. In countries where the government is effective and business regulations onerous, formal firms in industries characterized by low costs to entry feel the sting of informal competition more than in other business environments. Finally, the analysis finds that in an economy with relatively onerous tax regulations and a government that poorly enforces its tax code, the percentage of firms adversely affected by informal competition will be reduced from 38.8 to 37.7 percent when the government increases enforcement to cover all firms
    Additional Edition: Gonzalez, Alvaro S Who Fears Competition From Informal Firms ?
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Alexandria, VA : Alexander Street Press | [S.l.] : G. Ricordi
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040732747
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (1 score (2 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe 2008 Music Online Reference Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041175-9
    Edition: Classical scores library
    Note: Title from HTML t.p
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Caccini, Francesca, 1587-1641 Dove io credea 1908
    Language: Italian
    Author information: Caccini, Francesca 1587-1641
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 9
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048269218
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (28 p)
    Series Statement: World Bank E-Library Archive
    Content: This paper studies the relationship between access to credit, demand shocks, and export market adjustments using firm-level panel survey data for 24 economies in the Eastern Europe and Central Asian region. The study finds that domestic shocks to demand have a significant influence on the firm's decision to participate in international markets (extensive margin) and on the firm's share of foreign sales (intensive margin). Foreign shocks to demand only affect the firm's share of foreign sales. Conversely, the role of financial constraints on either the extensive or the intensive margin is more nuanced. The results are robust to various specifications of financial constraints and different estimation methods
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe de Nicola, Francesca Firms' Export Decisions: Demand Trumps Financial Shocks Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2017
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 10
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048266279
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
    Content: This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the degree of co-movement among the nominal price returns of 11 major energy, agricultural and food commodities based on monthly data between 1970 and 2013. A uniform-spacings testing approach, a multivariate dynamic conditional correlation model and a rolling regression procedure are used to study the extent and the time-evolution of unconditional and conditional correlations. The results indicate that (i) the price returns of energy and agricultural commodities are highly correlated; (ii) the overall level of co-movement among commodities increased in recent years, especially between energy and agricultural commodities and in particular in the cases of maize and soybean oil, which are important inputs in the production of biofuels; and (iii) particularly after 2007, stock market volatility is positively associated with the co-movement of price returns across markets
    Additional Edition: de Nicola, Francesca Co-Movement of Major Commodity Price Returns
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. Further information can be found on the KOBV privacy pages