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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1990
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 57, No. 1 ( 1990-03), p. 78-95
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 57, No. 1 ( 1990-03), p. 78-95
    Abstract: A computational theory of induction must be able to identify the projectible predicates, that is to distinguish between which predicates can be used in inductive inferences and which cannot. The problems of projectibility are introduced by reviewing some of the stumbling blocks for the theory of induction that was developed by the logical empiricists. My diagnosis of these problems is that the traditional theory of induction, which started from a given (observational) language in relation to which all inductive rules are formulated, does not go deep enough in representing the kind of information used in inductive inferences. As an interlude, I argue that the problem of induction, like so many other problems within AI, is a problem of knowledge representation. To the extent that AI-systems are based on linguistic representations of knowledge, these systems will face basically the same problems as did the logical empiricists over induction. In a more constructive mode, I then outline a non-linguistic knowledge representation based on conceptual spaces. The fundamental units of these spaces are “quality dimensions”. In relation to such a representation it is possible to define “natural” properties which can be used for inductive projections. I argue that this approach evades most of the traditional problems.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1990
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1967
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 34, No. 2 ( 1967-06), p. 116-136
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 34, No. 2 ( 1967-06), p. 116-136
    Abstract: In his original paper of 1905, “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”, Einstein described a procedure for synchronizing distant clocks at rest in any inertial system K. Clocks thus synchronized may be said to be in standard signal synchrony in K. It has often been claimed that there are no logical or physical reasons for preferring standard signal synchronizations to any of a range of possible non-standard ones. In this paper, the range of consistent non-standard signal synchronizations, first for any one inertial system, and second for any set of such systems, is investigated, and it is shown that the requirement of consistency leaves much less room for choice than is commonly supposed. Nevertheless consistent non-standard signal synchronizations appear to be possible. However, it is also shown that good physical reasons for preferring standard signal synchronizations exist, if the Special Theory of Relativity yields correct predictions. The thesis of the conventionality of distant simultaneity espoused particularly by Reichenbach and Grünbaum is thus either trivialized or refuted.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1967
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1996
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 63, No. 2 ( 1996-06), p. 175-182
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 63, No. 2 ( 1996-06), p. 175-182
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1996
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1990
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 57, No. 2 ( 1990-06), p. 349-350
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 57, No. 2 ( 1990-06), p. 349-350
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1990
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2014
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 81, No. 5 ( 2014-12), p. 866-878
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 81, No. 5 ( 2014-12), p. 866-878
    Abstract: Drawing on models of communication due to Lewis and Skyrms, I contrast sender-receiver systems as they appear within and between organisms, and as they function in the bridging of space and time. Within the organism, memory can be seen as the sending of messages over time, communication between stages as opposed to spatial parts. Psychological memory and genetic memory are compared with respect to their relations to a sender-receiver model. Some puzzles about “genetic information” can be resolved by seeing the genome as a cell-level memory with no sender.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2014
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2022
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 89, No. 1 ( 2022-01), p. 42-69
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 89, No. 1 ( 2022-01), p. 42-69
    Abstract: We model scientific theories as Bayesian networks. Nodes carry credences and function as abstract representations of propositions within the structure. Directed links carry conditional probabilities and represent connections between those propositions. Updating is Bayesian across the network as a whole. The impact of evidence at one point within a scientific theory can have a very different impact on the network than does evidence of the same strength at a different point. A Bayesian model allows us to envisage and analyze the differential impact of evidence and credence change at different points within a single network and across different theoretical structures.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2022
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2007
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 74, No. 5 ( 2007-12), p. 749-760
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 74, No. 5 ( 2007-12), p. 749-760
    Abstract: I examine recent arguments based on functionalism that claim to show that Bohm's theory fails to solve the measurement problem, or if it does so, it is only because it reduces to a form of the many-worlds theory. While these arguments reveal some interesting features of Bohm's theory, I contend that they do not undermine the distinctive Bohmian solution to the measurement problem.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2007
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1985
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 52, No. 2 ( 1985-06), p. 256-273
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 52, No. 2 ( 1985-06), p. 256-273
    Abstract: In clinical and agricultural trials, there is the danger that an experimental outcome appears to arise from the causal process or treatment one is interested in when, in reality, it was produced by some extraneous variation in the experimental conditions. The remedy prescribed by classical statisticians involves the procedure of randomization, whose effectiveness and appropriateness is criticized. An alternative, Bayesian analysis of experimental design, is shown, on the other hand, to provide a coherent and intuitively satisfactory solution to the problem.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1985
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 2007
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 74, No. 3 ( 2007-07), p. 364-385
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 74, No. 3 ( 2007-07), p. 364-385
    Abstract: Accounts of the concepts of function and dysfunction have not adequately explained what factors determine the line between low-normal function and dysfunction. I call the challenge of doing so the line-drawing problem . Previous approaches emphasize facts involving the action of natural selection (Wakefield 1992a, 1999a, 1999b) or the statistical distribution of levels of functioning in the current population (Boorse 1977, 1997). I point out limitations of these two approaches and present a solution to the line-drawing problem that builds on the second one.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 2007
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge University Press (CUP) ; 1998
    In:  Philosophy of Science Vol. 65, No. 4 ( 1998-12), p. 688-708
    In: Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 65, No. 4 ( 1998-12), p. 688-708
    Abstract: Why does classical equilibrium statistical mechanics work? Malament and Zabell (1980) noticed that, for ergodic dynamical systems, the unique absolutely continuous invariant probability measure is the microcanonical. Earman and Rédei (1996) replied that systems of interest are very probably not ergodic, so that absolutely continuous invariant probability measures very distant from the microcanonical exist. In response I define the generalized properties of epsilon-ergodicity and epsilon-continuity, I review computational evidence indicating that systems of interest are epsilon-ergodic, I adapt Malament and Zabell's defense of absolute continuity to support epsilon-continuity, and I prove that, for epsilon-ergodic systems, every epsilon-continuous invariant probability measure is very close to the microcanonical.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0031-8248 , 1539-767X
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: English
    Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
    Publication Date: 1998
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 2066891-0
    SSG: 11
    SSG: 19,2
    SSG: 5,1
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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