In:
Managerial and Decision Economics, Wiley, Vol. 36, No. 7 ( 2015-10), p. 487-498
Abstract:
People do not like to delegate the distribution of favors. To explain this reluctance, we disentangle reward motives in an experiment in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the transfer values of the investor and delegate, we find that the trustee's rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who ultimately decides gets a higher reward. Unlike studies on the punishment of delegated unkind decisions, our results do not reveal a more sophisticated reward behavior that takes people's responsibility into account. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0143-6570
,
1099-1468
Language:
English
Publisher:
Wiley
Publication Date:
2015
detail.hit.zdb_id:
1491342-2
SSG:
3,2
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