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  • 2005-2009  (6)
  • Stern, Scott  (6)
  • Furman, Jeffrey L.  (1)
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  • 1
    UID:
    b3kat_BV023592450
    Format: 50 S. , graph. Darst. , 22 cm
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 12523
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV023593138
    Format: 44 S. , graph. Darst. , 22 cm
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13232
    Content: This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor.
    Note: Literaturverz. S. 27 - 29
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 3
    UID:
    b3kat_BV023593141
    Format: 43 S. , graph. Darst. , 22 cm
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13235
    Content: This paper examines the impact of vertical integration on the dynamics of performance over the automobile product development lifecycle. Building on recent work in organizational economics and strategy, we evaluate the relationship between vertical integration and different performance margins. Outsourcing facilitates access to cutting-edge technology and the use of high-powered performance contracts. Vertical integration allows firms to adapt to unforeseen contingencies and customer feedback, maintain more balanced incentives over the lifecycle, and develop firm-specific capabilities over time. Together, these effects highlight a crucial tradeoff: while outsourcing is associated with higher levels of initial performance, vertical integration will be associated with performance improvement over the product lifecycle. We test these ideas using detailed data from the luxury automobile segment, establishing three key results. First, initial performance is declining in the level of vertical integration. Second, the level of performance improvement is significantly increasing in the level of vertical integration. Finally, the impact of vertical integration on alternative performance margins is mediated by the level of pre-existing capabilities, by the salience of opportunities to access external technology leaders, and by the scope for learning over the product lifecycle. Together, the findings highlight a strategic governance tradeoff between short-term performance and the evolution of firm capabilities.
    Note: Literaturverz. S. 25 - 28
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 4
    UID:
    b3kat_BV023593140
    Format: 38 S. , graph. Darst. , 22 cm
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13234
    Content: This paper considers the impact of the intellectual property (IP) system on the timing of cooperation/licensing by start-up technology entrepreneurs. If the market for technology licenses is efficient, the timing of licensing is independent of whether IP has already been granted. In contrast, the need to disclosure complementary (yet unprotected) knowledge, asymmetric information, or search costs may retard efficient technology transfer. In these cases, reductions in uncertainty surrounding the scope and extent of IP rights may facilitate trade in the market for ideas. We employ a dataset combining information about cooperative licensing and the timing of patent allowances (the administrative event when patent rights are clarified). While pre-allowance licensing does occur, the hazard rate for achieving a cooperative licensing agreement significantly increases after patent allowance. Moreover, the impact of the patent system depends on the strategic and institutional environment in which firms operate. Patent allowance seems to play a particularly important role for technologies with longer technology lifecycles or that lack alternative mechanisms such as copyright, reputation, or brokers. The findings suggest that imperfections in the market for ideas may be important, and that formal IP rights may facilitate gains from technological trade.
    Note: Literaturverz. S. 26 - 29
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 5
    UID:
    b3kat_BV023591571
    Format: 51 S. , 22 cm
    Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 11465
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research
    UID:
    gbv_646964305
    Format: Online-Ressource (xv, 215 p) , ill , 24 cm
    Edition: Online-Ausg. 2009 Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    ISBN: 9780262101189 , 0262101181 , 9780262600682 , 0262600684
    Series Statement: NBER Innovation Policy and the Economy Ser. v.6
    Content: Intro -- Innovation Policy and the Economy: Introduction to Volume 6 -- 1 Policy Implications of Weak Patent Rights -- 2 Innovation and Its Discontents -- 3 Consumer Benefi t from Use of the Internet -- 4 Opportunities for Improving the Drug Development Process: Results from a Survey of Industry and the FDA -- 5 Does Globalization of the Scientifi c/Engineering Workforce Threaten U.S. Economic Leadership? -- 6 Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate?.
    Note: Includes bibliographical references , Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780262101189
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9780262101189
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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