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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press
    UID:
    (DE-603)213048000
    Format: VI, 423 S.
    ISBN: 9780199299720 , 9780199594962
    Note: Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
    Language: English
    Subjects: Philosophy
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Aufsatzsammlung
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  • 2
    Book
    Book
    Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press
    UID:
    (DE-602)b3kat_BV035435633
    Format: VI, 423 S.
    Edition: 1. publ.
    ISBN: 9780199299720
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    Language: English
    Subjects: Philosophy
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Medizin ; Wissenschaftlich-technischer Fortschritt ; Ethik ; Enhancement ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Aufsatzsammlung
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  • 3
    UID:
    (DE-627)1727685016
    ISSN: 1467-8519
    In: Bioethics, Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, 1987, 30(2016), 5, Seite 300-303, 1467-8519
    In: volume:30
    In: year:2016
    In: number:5
    In: pages:300-303
    Language: English
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Oxford : Oxford University Press | The Hague : OAPEN FOUNDATION
    UID:
    (DE-603)514336994
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (21 p.)
    ISBN: 9780192871688
    Content: Liberty-restricting measures are basic measures in combatting any pandemic. But whose liberty should be restricted? One standard response in public health ethics is to appeal to the “least restrictive alternative” necessary to achieve a public health goal. The problem is that in practice, greater restriction of liberty can lead to greater control of the pandemic and save more lives, though with increasing burdens to others. Liberty restriction is thus a question of the distribution of benefitsbenefits benefits and burdens in a population, a question of distributive justice. In this chapter, I argue that in some pandemics, such as COVID-19, it may be a more proportionate restriction of liberty to restrict the liberty of certain groups, rather than the population as a whole. Two arguments were given in the COVID-19 pandemic for liberty restriction: (1) protection of the vulnerable; (2) protection of the health service. These These are, however, more fundamentally issues about distributive justice. I explore how several approaches to distributive justice can support the differential differential differentialdifferentialdifferential restriction of liberty. In addition, I argue that the commonly accepted justificationjustificationjustificationjustificationjustification justification justification justification for liberty restrictions (that liberty restrictions may be justifiedjustifiedjustifiedjustifiedjustified justified to prevent direct harm to others) - can be overly simplistic, as illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. I argue that where risk groups (such as the elderly in the COVID-19 pandemic) are more likely to utilise limited health resources, they pose an indirect threat to others during the pandemic that warrants coercion. I argue there should be a side-constraint on justice of non-maleficence.non-maleficence.non-maleficence. non-maleficence. non-maleficence. non-maleficence. This This requires that there is a limit to harm which can be imposed on individuals for others, best captured by a collective duty of easy rescue. For groups such as the young, vaccination or lockdown may not constitute an “easy rescue” of those at greatest risk. I address the issue of whether selective restriction of liberty constitutes unjust discrimination and I propose an algorithm for making decisions about selective restriction of liberty.
    Language: English
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  • 5
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781877386
    ISSN: 1467-8519
    Content: This paper is a response to John Harris’ provocative ‘Justice and Equal Opportunities in Health Care’. The aim of this short response is to locate the difference between Harris and me within a broader debate about the nature of reasons for action. I argue that Harris is appealing to a desire-based conception of normative reasons. I highlight some of the deficiencies of a desire-based conception of reasons, and contrast it with a value-based account.
    In: Bioethics, Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, 1987, 13(1999), 5, Seite 405-413, 1467-8519
    In: volume:13
    In: year:1999
    In: number:5
    In: pages:405-413
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 6
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781878137
    ISSN: 1467-8519
    Content: Eugenic selection of embryos is now possible by employing in vitro fertilization (IVF) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). While PGD is currently being employed for the purposes of detecting chromosomal abnormalities or inherited genetic abnormalities, it could in principle be used to test any genetic trait such as hair colour or eye colour. Genetic research is rapidly progressing into the genetic basis of complex traits like intelligence and a gene has been identified for criminal behaviour in one family. Once the decision to have IVF is made, PGD has few ‘costs’ to couples, and people would be more inclined to use it to select less serious medical traits, such as a lower risk of developing Alzheimer Disease, or even for non-medical traits. PGD has already been used to select embryos of a desired gender in the absence of any history of sex-linked genetic disease. I will argue that: (1) some non-disease genes affect the likelihood of us leading the best life; (2) we have a reason to use information which is available about such genes in our reproductive decision-making; (3) couples should select embryos or fetuses which are most likely to have the best life, based on available genetic information, including information about non-disease genes. I will also argue that we should allow selection for non-disease genes even if this maintains or increases social inequality. I will focus on genes for intelligence and sex selection. I will defend a principle which I call Procreative Beneficence: couples (or single reproducers) should select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information.
    In: Bioethics, Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, 1987, 15 (2001), 5-6, Seite 413-426, 1467-8519
    In: volume:15
    In: year:2001
    In: number:5/6
    In: pages:413-426
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 7
    UID:
    (DE-627)1741267161
    ISBN: 9780191577475
    In: The Oxford handbook of bioethics, New York : Oxford University Press, 2009, (2009), 9780191577475
    In: year:2009
    Language: English
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  • 8
    UID:
    (DE-627)1816121630
    ISSN: 1473-4257
    Content: The attitudes of Australian practitioners working in clinical genetics and obstetrical ultrasound were surveyed on whether termination of pregnancy (TOP) should be available for conditions ranging from mild to severe fetal abnormality and for non-medical reasons.These were compared for terminations at 13 weeks and 24 weeks. It was found that some practitioners would not facilitate TOP at 24 weeks even for lethal or major abnormalities, fewer practitioners support TOP at 24 weeks compared with 13 weeks for any condition, and the difference in attitudes to TOP between 13 weeks and 24 weeks is most marked for pregnancies which are normal or involve a mild disorder. It is argued that a fetal abnormality criterion for late TOP is inconsistently applied, discriminatory and eugenic. Four possible moral justifications for current practice are examined, each of which would require significant changes to current practice. I argue in favour of a maternal interests criterion for any TOP.
    In: Journal of medical ethics, London : BMJ Publ., 1975, 27(2001), 3, Seite 165-171, 1473-4257
    In: volume:27
    In: year:2001
    In: number:3
    In: pages:165-171
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 9
    UID:
    (DE-627)1816122130
    ISSN: 1473-4257
    Content: Over the next few issues, you will notice some changes to the Journal of Medical Ethics. Box 1 summarises the new structure for the journal. Box 1. Summary of the new structure of the journal Regular sections Editorial Guest Editorial Current Controversies (free web access) Leading Article (free web access) Peer reviewed original contributions New special sections •Teaching and Learning Ethics •Clinical Ethics •Research Ethics •Global Medical Ethics •Law, Ethics and Medicine •Review Essay Ethics Briefings Book Reviews Letters and eLetters News and notes Occasional sections Brief Reports Debate Point of view Medical Student Essay Glossary Current Controversies will briefly describe a current issue of public interest. Informal comment will be invited from a number of commentators from a variety of disciplines. The goal of this section is to provide a publicly accessible resource to promote informed general debate. There will be free web access to the Current Controversies.The Leading Article …
    In: Journal of medical ethics, London : BMJ Publ., 1975, 27(2001), 5, Seite 289-290, 1473-4257
    In: volume:27
    In: year:2001
    In: number:5
    In: pages:289-290
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 10
    UID:
    (DE-627)1816146560
    ISSN: 1473-4257
    Content: I argue that Brierley et al are wrong to claim that parents who request futile treatment are acting against the interests of their child. A better ethical ground for withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment is not that it is in the interests of the patient to die, but rather on grounds of the limitation of resources and the requirements of distributive justice. Put simply, not all treatment that might be in a person's interests must ethically be provided.
    In: Journal of medical ethics, London : BMJ Publ., 1975, 39(2013), 9, Seite 583-584, 1473-4257
    In: volume:39
    In: year:2013
    In: number:9
    In: pages:583-584
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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