In:
Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 36, No. 3 ( 1969-09), p. 311-315
Abstract:
The purpose of this note is to examine the claim made by Howard Smokler that “Goodman's paradox should be considered as an independent argument against a conception of inductive logic which makes use of rules of acceptance” ([4], p. 76). Smokler's claim arises from his treatment of Goodman's paradox in the form given it by Israel Scheffler ([2] ). Schefflerhas discussed this paradox primarily in the context of a methodology of induction which views inductive rules as rules of acceptance permitting one to assert detached conclusions. The inductive rule considered by Scheffler is described as follows: What leads us to make one particular prediction rather than its opposite is not its deducibility froIII evidence but rather its congruence with a generalization thoroughly in accord with all such evidence, and the correlative disconfirmation of the contrary generalization by the same evidence. (I shall refer to this hereafter as the “generalization formula”) ([2], p. 177).
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0031-8248
,
1539-767X
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
1969
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2066891-0
SSG:
11
SSG:
19,2
SSG:
5,1
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