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  • The Royal Society  (3)
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  • The Royal Society  (3)
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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Royal Society ; 2011
    In:  Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences Vol. 278, No. 1713 ( 2011-06-22), p. 1858-1863
    In: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, The Royal Society, Vol. 278, No. 1713 ( 2011-06-22), p. 1858-1863
    Abstract: Recent evidence indicates that priming participants with religious concepts promotes prosocial sharing behaviour. In the present study, we investigated whether religious priming also promotes the costly punishment of unfair behaviour. A total of 304 participants played a punishment game. Before the punishment stage began, participants were subliminally primed with religion primes, secular punishment primes or control primes. We found that religious primes strongly increased the costly punishment of unfair behaviours for a subset of our participants—those who had previously donated to a religious organization. We discuss two proximate mechanisms potentially underpinning this effect. The first is a ‘supernatural watcher’ mechanism, whereby religious participants punish unfair behaviours when primed because they sense that not doing so will enrage or disappoint an observing supernatural agent. The second is a ‘behavioural priming’ mechanism, whereby religious primes activate cultural norms pertaining to fairness and its enforcement and occasion behaviour consistent with those norms. We conclude that our results are consistent with dual inheritance proposals about religion and cooperation, whereby religions harness the byproducts of genetically inherited cognitive mechanisms in ways that enhance the survival prospects of their adherents.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0962-8452 , 1471-2954
    Language: English
    Publisher: The Royal Society
    Publication Date: 2011
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1460975-7
    SSG: 12
    SSG: 25
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Royal Society ; 2010
    In:  Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences Vol. 277, No. 1686 ( 2010-05-07), p. 1315-1323
    In: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, The Royal Society, Vol. 277, No. 1686 ( 2010-05-07), p. 1315-1323
    Abstract: Strong reciprocity is characterized by the willingness to altruistically reward cooperative acts and to altruistically punish norm-violating, defecting behaviours. Recent evidence suggests that subtle reputation cues, such as eyes staring at subjects during their choices, may enhance prosocial behaviour. Thus, in principle, strong reciprocity could also be affected by eye cues. We investigate the impact of eye cues on trustees' altruistic behaviour in a trust game and find zero effect. Neither the subjects who are classified as prosocial nor the subjects who are classified as selfish respond to these cues. In sharp contrast to the irrelevance of subtle reputation cues for strong reciprocity, we find a large effect of explicit, pecuniary reputation incentives on the trustees' prosociality. Trustees who can acquire a good reputation that benefits them in future interactions honour trust much more than trustees who cannot build a good reputation. These results cast doubt on hypotheses suggesting that strong reciprocity is easily malleable by implicit reputation cues not backed by explicit reputation incentives.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0962-8452 , 1471-2954
    Language: English
    Publisher: The Royal Society
    Publication Date: 2010
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1460975-7
    SSG: 12
    SSG: 25
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Royal Society ; 2016
    In:  Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences Vol. 283, No. 1822 ( 2016-01-13), p. 20151439-
    In: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, The Royal Society, Vol. 283, No. 1822 ( 2016-01-13), p. 20151439-
    Abstract: Time is an extremely valuable resource but little is known about the efficiency of time allocation in decision-making. Empirical evidence suggests that in many ecologically relevant situations, decision difficulty and the relative reward from making a correct choice, compared to an incorrect one, are inversely linked, implying that it is optimal to use relatively less time for difficult choice problems. This applies, in particular, to value-based choices, in which the relative reward from choosing the higher valued item shrinks as the values of the other options get closer to the best option and are thus more difficult to discriminate. Here, we experimentally show that people behave sub-optimally in such contexts. They do not respond to incentives that favour the allocation of time to choice problems in which the relative reward for choosing the best option is high; instead they spend too much time on problems in which the reward difference between the options is low. We demonstrate this by showing that it is possible to improve subjects' time allocation with a simple intervention that cuts them off when their decisions take too long. Thus, we provide a novel form of evidence that organisms systematically spend their valuable time in an inefficient way, and simultaneously offer a potential solution to the problem.
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    ISSN: 0962-8452 , 1471-2954
    Language: English
    Publisher: The Royal Society
    Publication Date: 2016
    detail.hit.zdb_id: 1460975-7
    SSG: 12
    SSG: 25
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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