In:
Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 87, No. 4 ( 2020-10), p. 685-703
Kurzfassung:
Computer scientists have provided a distinct justification of Occam’s Razor. Using the probably approximately correct framework, they provide a theorem that they claim demonstrates that we should favor simpler hypotheses. The argument relies on a philosophical interpretation of the theorem. I argue that the standard interpretation of the result in the literature is misguided and that a better reading does not, in fact, support Occam’s Razor at all. To this end, I state and prove a very similar theorem that, if interpreted the same way, would justify the contradictory Anti-Occam’s Razor—the principle that we should favor more complex hypotheses.
Materialart:
Online-Ressource
ISSN:
0031-8248
,
1539-767X
Sprache:
Englisch
Verlag:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publikationsdatum:
2020
ZDB Id:
2066891-0
SSG:
11
SSG:
19,2
SSG:
5,1
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