In:
Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press (CUP), Vol. 12, No. 2 ( 1945-04), p. 72-97
Abstract:
Among the various meanings in which the word ‘probability’ is used in everyday language, in the discussion of scientists, and in the theories of probability, there are especially two which must be clearly distinguished. We shall use for them the terms ‘probability 1 ’ and ‘probability 2 '. Probability 1 is a logical concept, a certain logical relation between two sentences (or, alternatively, between two propositions); it is the same as the concept of degree of confirmation. I shall write briefly “c” for “degree of confirmation,” and “c( h, e )” for “the degree of confirmation of the hypothesis h on the evidence e “; the evidence is usually a report on the results of our observations. On the other hand, probability 2 is an empirical concept; it is the relative frequency in the long run of one property with respect to another. The controversy between the so-called logical conception of probability, as represented e.g. by Keynes, and Jeffreys, and others, and the frequency conception, maintained e.g. by v. Mises and Reichenbach, seems to me futile. These two theories deal with two different probability concepts which are both of great importance for science. Therefore, the theories are not incompatible, but rather supplement each other.
Type of Medium:
Online Resource
ISSN:
0031-8248
,
1539-767X
Language:
English
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publication Date:
1945
detail.hit.zdb_id:
2066891-0
SSG:
11
SSG:
19,2
SSG:
5,1
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