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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Banks and market liquidity (2015)
    Rotterdam [u.a.] : Tinbergen Inst.
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)818016884
    Format: Online-Ressource (39 S.)
    Series Statement: Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute 2015-020
    Content: I study a model of market-liquidity provision by levered intermediaries that, besides operating trading desks, run deposit-taking franchises. Levered intermediaries’ heightened incentive to absorb risk helps to counteract liquidity-provision frictions that, in an unlevered economy, would lead to price distortions and suppressed levels of asset origination ex ante. However, liquidity provision may also overshoot, leading to unhealthy price bubbles and causing asset origination to become excessive. Capital requirements are no panacea: They can spur risk taking and make bubbles bubblier. Ring fencing of trading activities can be, but is not necessarily, undesirable.
    Note: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.
    Language: English
    Keywords: Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
    URL: Volltext
    URL: Volltext
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    Online Access
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Credit Protection and Lending Relationships (2013)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792635338
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (39 p)
    Content: We examine the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) on lending relationships and credit market efficiency. CDS insulate lenders against losses from forcing borrowers into default and liquidation. This improves the credibility of foreclosure threats, which can have positive implications for borrower incentives and credit availability ex ante. However, lenders may also abuse their enhanced bargaining power vis–à–vis borrowers and extract excessive rents in debt renegotiations. If this hold up threat becomes severe, borrowers will be reluctant to agree to debt maturity designs or control rights transfers that would have been optimal in the absence of CDS markets. The introduction of CDS markets may then ultimately tighten credit constraints and be detrimental to welfare. Our analysis yields a number of empirical implications, some of which have been tested
    Note: In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-142/DSF48/IV , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 20, 2012 erstellt
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2188477
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Banking Competition and Soft Budget Constraints : How Market Power Can Threaten Discipline in Lending (2012)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792698348
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
    Series Statement: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 12-146/DSF49/IV
    Content: In imperfectly competitive credit markets, banks can face a tradeoff between exploiting their market power and enforcing hard budget constraints. As market power rises, banks eventually find it too costly to discipline underperforming borrowers by stopping their projects. Lending relationships become "too cozy", interest rates rise, and loan performance deteriorates
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 19, 2012 erstellt
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2191962
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Banking, Commerce, and Antitrust (2010)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781310629
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (28 p)
    Content: This paper analyzes the effects of a bank's equity stake in a competitor of a borrower on the financing relationship with the borrower and on product market outcomes. We show that depending on its size, the bank's equity stake in the competitor can give rise to anti-- or pro--competitive effects. Large equity stakes can facilitate anti--competitive conduct. In sharp contrast, small equity stakes are pro--competitive. The reason is that the bank's equity stake in the borrower's rival hardens the borrower's budget constraint. This alleviates credit rationing problems and enables the borrower to invest more aggressively. These findings suggest that bank equity holdings in industrial firms have non--monotonic effects on product market competition
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 2002 erstellt
    Language: Undetermined
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.241468
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 5
    Article
    Article
    Deposit competition and loan markets (2017)
    Show associated volumes
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1018504249
    ISSN: 0378-4266
    In: Journal of banking & finance, Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1977, 80(2017) vom: Juli, Seite 108-118, 0378-4266
    In: volume:80
    In: year:2017
    In: month:07
    In: pages:108-118
    Additional Edition: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.04.006
    Language: English
    Keywords: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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    Article
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  • 6
    Book
    Book
    Is bank industrial ownership anti-competitive? (2000)
    Lausanne : Univ. de Lausanne, DEEP
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)320778487
    Format: 32 S
    Series Statement: Cahiers de recherches économiques 00.22
    Language: English
    Keywords: Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
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    Book
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Ownership and Implementation of Ideas (2013)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781163634
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
    Series Statement: EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings
    Content: We study a knowledge-based economy in which efficient production relies on entrepreneurs' managerial talent, and suppliers of complementary project inputs can expropriate entrepreneurs by appropriating their ideas and deploying them elsewhere. The threat of expropriation at early contract negotiation stages forces the entrepreneur to pledge additional rents to her business partner. Once the project is underway, however, the threat of expropriation can be beneficial. This is because it commits the entrepreneur to work harder on the efficient implementation of her idea in order to make it less worthwhile for her partner to destroy project value by expropriating her. We explore the tradeoff between commitment and rent extraction, and identify natural circumstances under which the incentive effect more than outweighs the expropriation rent. A key implication is that transfers of intellectual property rights to business partners can serve as a pre-commitment device for entrepreneurs to execute their ideas in a more efficient manner
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 28, 2004 erstellt
    Language: Undetermined
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.669021
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Protective Interests and Creative Destruction (2010)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781300380
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Content: We study mechanisms by which the provision of incentives to new entrants is influenced by lenders' financial interests in incumbents. When a financier has a strong interest in protecting incumbent rents, he stifles the entrant's internal efficiency with a highly dilutive claim, and bribes her for not accessing more aggressive finance elsewhere. By contrast, when the financier's protective interest in the incumbent is less strong, then it can spur the destruction of incumbent rents. This is because it strengthens the financier's commitment to penalize the entrant for managerial slack by forcing her into market exit, which sharpens her internal efficiency and competitiveness. While the corresponding decrease in incumbent firm value is partially internalized by the financier, he is more than compensated by the incremental firm value of the entrant, part or all of which accrues to him. The model has implications for the competitive effects of industry-focused lending styles
    Note: In: Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2005 , Volltext nicht verfügbar
    Language: Undetermined
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
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  • 9
    Book
    Book
    Playing hardball : relationship banking in the age of credit derivatives (2002)
    Geneva : FAME
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)351300473
    Format: 30 S
    Series Statement: Research paper / FAME, International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering 49
    Note: Literaturverz , Internetausg.: http://www.fame.ch/research/papers/RP49.pdf
    Language: English
    Keywords: Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Does competition make banks more riskseeking? (2014)
    Rotterdam [u.a.] : Tinbergen Inst.
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)785713077
    Format: Online-Ressource (32 S.) , graph. Darst.
    Series Statement: Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute 2014-059
    Content: This article presents a model in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, competi- tion can make banks more reluctant to take excessive risks: As competition intensifies and margins decline, banks face more-binding threats of failure, to which they may respond by reducing their risk-taking. Yet, at the same time, banks become riskier. This is because the direct, destabilizing effect of lower margins outweighs the disciplining effect of competition; moreover, a substantial rise in competition reduces banks’ incentive to build precautionary capital buffers. A key implication is that the effects of competition on risk-taking and on failure risk can move in opposite directions.
    Note: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.
    Language: English
    Keywords: Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
    URL: Volltext
    URL: Volltext
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