Format:
1 Online-Ressource (53 p)
Content:
The main aims of this paper are to review the finance literature on the managerial risk-taking incentives that uses fixed effect models; (2) to discuss the differences between industry and firm fixed effect models under different assumptions; and (3) to investigate the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on firm value, investment policy, financing policy, payout policy, and profitability as examples to support the discussion. In our investigation, we use Vega to measure the incentives (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006) in a sample of annual data on US listed firms for the period from 1993 to 2018. Our results show that a firm fixed effect model provides more consistent results when we examine the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on various corporate decisions. In particular, we find that firms with high Vega have low values, capital expenditures, high leverages, and high payouts
Note:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 8, 2022 erstellt
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.4052290
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