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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    UID:
    (DE-627)724223975
    Format: Online-Ressource (1 online resource (29 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausg. World Bank E-Library Archive
    Content: This paper suggests a new factor that makes civil war more likely: the inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected governments pursue public policies that leave citizens less well-off and more prone to revolt. At the same time, these actors have a reduced ability to build an anti-insurgency capacity in the first place, since they are less able to prevent anti-insurgents from themselves mounting coups. But while reducing the risk of conflict overall, increasing credibility can, over some range, worsen the effects of natural resources and ethnic fragmentation on civil war. Empirical tests using various measures of political credibility support these conclusions
    Additional Edition: Keefer, Philip Insurgency And Credible Commitment In Autocracies And Democracies
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    Book
    Book
    Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy
    UID:
    (DE-627)327946458
    Format: 47 S
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 2543
    Note: Internetausg.: http://econ.worldbank.org/files/1402_wps2543.pdf
    Language: English
    Keywords: Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
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  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, DC : World Bank
    UID:
    (DE-627)797534687
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper 4185
    Content: This paper suggests a new factor that makes civil war more likely: the inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected governments pursue public policies that leave citizens less well-off and more prone to revolt. At the same time, these actors have a reduced ability to build an anti-insurgency capacity in the first place, since they are less able to prevent anti-insurgents from themselves mounting coups. But while reducing the risk of conflict overall, increasing credibility can, over some range, worsen the effects of natural resources and ethnic fragmentation on civil war. Empirical tests using various measures of political credibility support these conclusions.
    Note: English
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 4
    UID:
    (DE-627)834966190
    Format: Online-Ressource (47 p)
    Edition: 2010 World Bank eLibrary
    Content: Much of the research on ethnicity, development and conflict implicitly assumes that ethnic groups act collectively in pursuit of their interests. Collective political action is typically facilitated by political parties able to make credible commitments to pursue group interests. Other work, however, emphasizes the lack of political credibility as a source of adverse development outcomes. Evidence presented here uses partisan preferences across 16 Sub-Saharan African countries to distinguish these positions. The evidence is inconsistent with the credibility of party commitments to pursue collective ethnic interests: ethnic clustering of political support is less widespread than expected; members of clustered ethnic groups exhibit high rates of partisan disinterest and are only slightly more likely to express a partisan preference; and partisan preferences are more affected by factors, such as gift-giving, often associated with low political credibility. These findings emphasize the importance of looking beyond ethnicity in analyses of economic development
    Additional Edition: Keefer, Philip The Ethnicity Distraction ?
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
    UID:
    (DE-627)79761043X
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper 6583
    Content: The ability of citizens to act collectively plays a central role in major debates in the political economy of development, including the causes and consequences of democratization and clientelism. This essay uses two lines of research to underscore the importance of explicitly introducing the organization of collective action into these debates. Exhaustive research on the management of open access resources demonstrates that citizens' ability to act collectively depends on non-trivial organizational arrangements that allow leaders to sanction free-riding and allow members to replace leaders if they shirk. Other research demonstrates wide variability in the organization of political parties. In countries where political parties do not have these two organizational characteristics, public policies are less friendly to economic development. This evidence suggests that in future research on democracy, state-building and development, citizen organization should be a central object of analysis.
    Note: English , en_US
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 6
    UID:
    (DE-627)797534369
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper 4154
    Content: The existing literature emphasizes and contrasts the role of political checks and balances and legal origin in determining the pace of financial sector development. This paper expands substantially on one aspect of this debate: the fact that government actions that promote financial sector development, whether prudent financial regulation or secure property and contract rights, are public goods and sensitive to political incentives to provide public goods. Tests of hypotheses emanating from this argument yield four new conclusions. First, two key determinants of those incentives-the credibility of pre-electoral political promises and citizen information about politician decisions-systematically promote financial sector development. Second, these political factors, along with political checks and balances, operate in part through their influence on the security of property rights, an argument asserted but not previously tested. Third, contrary to findings elsewhere in the literature, the political determinants of financial sector development are significant even in the presence of controls for legal origin. Finally, and again in contrast to the literature, the evidence here suggests that legal origin primarily proxies for political phenomena. Legal origin is a largely insignificant determinant of financial sector development when those phenomena are fully taken into account.
    Note: English
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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  • 7
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge University Press
    UID:
    (DE-605)HT015542249
    Format: XVII, 308 S.
    ISBN: 9780521887588
    Content: Economic consequences of terrorism in developed and developing countries : an overview / Walter Enders and Todd Sandler -- The costs of responding to the terrorist threat : the U.S. case / Gregory F. Treverton ... [et al.] -- From (no) butter to guns? understanding the economic role in transnational terrorism / S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory D. Hess -- The lexus and the olive branch : globalization, democratization, and terrorism / S. Brock Blomberg and Gregory D. Hess -- Kto kogo? : a cross-country study of the origins and targets of terrorism / Alan B. Krueger and David D. Laitin -- Terrorism and civil war / Nicholas Sambanis -- The political, economic, and organizational sources of terrorism / David D. Laitin and Jacob Shapiro -- Economics and terrorism : what we know, what we should know, and the data we need / Fernanda Llusa and Jos Tavares
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    Language: English
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  • 8
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781790450
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
    Content: This paper develops and tests a model of the effect of political checks and balances on the incentives of elected veto players to cater to special interests. A larger number of veto players reduces political incentives to make deals with special interests, but the effect is declining in the rents available from such deals. Evidence from country responses to banking crises supports these conclusions: governments make smaller fiscal transfers to the financial sector and are less likely to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions the larger the number of political veto players, conditional on the value of rents at stake. This simple explanation for special interest influence is robust to controls for more subtle institutional effects that are prominent in the literature, including the competitiveness of elections, regime type (presidential versus parliamentary) and electoral rules (majoritarian versus proportional)
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2001 erstellt
    Language: Undetermined
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  • 9
    UID:
    (DE-627)1741281008
    ISBN: 9780191577482
    In: The Oxford handbooks of political science ; [1]: The Oxford handbook of comparative politics, Oxford [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, 2009, (2009), 9780191577482
    In: year:2009
    Language: English
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  • 10
    UID:
    (DE-627)1781255687
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Content: In Evaluating Recipes for Development Success Avinash Dixit criticizes recent efforts to identify the fundamental causes of development and to distill policy recommendations from these efforts. This comment focuses on the strand of that literature related to institutions and development. Two arguments are important: that the rule of law and the security of property rights are important for growth and that they are the product of political institutions. Professor Dixit argues that identification and other concerns undermine the second argument and inhibit the formulation of policy recommendations. While these concerns are valid, research has begun to disaggregate broad political institutions (democracy and autocracy) and to look at the details of political competition, such as voter information and politician credibility, which are both more robust determinants of political decision-making and more susceptible to policy interventions
    Note: In: The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 22, Issue 2, pp. 159-164, 2007 , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments Fall 2007 erstellt , Volltext nicht verfügbar
    Language: English
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