Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
Type of Material
Type of Publication
Consortium
Language
  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier
    UID:
    (DE-605)HT019685681
    Format: IX, 504 S.
    Edition: Reprint
    ISBN: 9780762311156 , 0762311150
    Series Statement: Research in law and economics 21
    Note: Einzelaufnahme eines Zeitschr.-Bd
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)1791799620
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (42 p)
    Content: One major reason why healthcare spending is much higher in America than in other countries is that our prices are exceptionally high. This Article addresses whether we ought to rely more heavily on buyer power to reduce those prices, as other nations do. It focuses on two sectors where greater buyer power could easily be exercised: prescription drugs covered by Medicare and hospital and physician services covered by private insurance.The Article concludes that the biggest buyer of all, the federal government, should be allowed to negotiate Medicare prescription drug prices. This would likely reduce the prices of many branded drugs substantially without causing a large reduction in innovation. Multiple studies indicate that drug companies have been exceptionally profitable in recent years. As a result, they could lower prices on many drugs and still earn a competitive return on most research and development. Moreover, the incentive to develop important new medicines would remain high because the government would have little leverage over the prices of these drugs. Finally, if problems with innovation develop, payments for new drugs can be increased.In contrast, encouraging large insurance companies to merge does not appear to be a promising way of lowering healthcare costs. While some large mergers may be procompetitive — lowering both excessive provider prices and insurance premiums — most would present significant competitive risks. They may allow the merged firm to exert monopsony power over small providers, they may create market power and lead to higher premiums, or they may permit the merged firm to gain a discriminatory advantage over smaller insurance companies, threatening downstream competition. Because of these dangers, it would not be wise, as a general rule, to permit large health insurers to merge
    Note: In: Washington Law Review, Vol. 91 (2016) , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 16, 2015 erstellt
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)1791126529
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (59 p)
    Content: Antitrust has returned to the national agenda. Leading Senators, progressiveorganizations, and many scholars are calling for stronger antitrust enforcement.One important step, overlooked in the discussion to date, is to reform howmarket power—an essential element in most antitrust violations—is determined.At present, the very definition of market power is unsettled. While there iswidespread agreement that market power is the ability to raise price profitablyabove the competitive level, no consensus exists on how to determine thecompetitive level. Moreover, courts virtually never measure market power (or,its larger variant, monopoly power) by identifying the competitive level andcomparing a defendant's price to it. Rather, courts define a relevant market andcalculate the defendant's market share, a process that is often complex andmisleading.This Article proposes a new approach that would infer market power from thelikely effects of the challenged conduct. Courts ought to identify market powerby asking whether the challenged conduct is likely to enable the defendant(s) toraise price above the prevailing level or maintain price above the but for level(the level to which price would fall absent the challenged conduct). This methodwould not only close the definitional gap, it would simultaneously enable courtsto resolve two critical elements of most antitrust offenses—market power andanticompetitive effects— while inferring the relevant market from the result. Byreducing the cost and improving the accuracy of antitrust enforcement, this stepwould enhance its impact
    Note: In: 98 B.U. L. REV. 1169 (2018) , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 23, 2017 erstellt
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792890672
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
    Content: This article looks first at the process courts use to resolve merger challenges and finds that in the area of product market definition, merger analysis is reasonably strong. Market definition remains complex and subjective, however, and could be improved, or avoided altogether, through econometric techniques such as merger simulation. Judicial analysis of entry is much weaker. Courts ask whether the market is protected by entry barriers but rarely ask whether the barriers are high enough to make entry unprofitable. The article also examines the results of “marginal” mergers, mergers that would have been blocked if the government and courts had been somewhat more aggressive. Measured in this way, merger analysis is not seriously off target: the merger retrospectives find that very few transactions led to sharp price changes. They also find, however, that a large proportion of marginal mergers resulted in small price increases, which suggests that in appropriate cases, enforcement agencies and courts should be more willing to predict anticompetitive effects
    Note: In: Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 56, No. 3, p. 543, 2011 , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments Fall 2011 erstellt
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    Book
    Book
    Amsterdam : Elsevier, Jai
    UID:
    (DE-602)gbv_470436727
    Format: IX, 504 S , graph. Darst
    Edition: 1. ed.
    ISBN: 0762311150
    Series Statement: Research in law and economics 21.2004
    Note: Enth. 10 Beitr
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe Antitrust law and economics Amsterdam : Elsevier JAI, 2004 ISBN 0762311150
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780080471983
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780762311156
    Language: English
    Keywords: USA ; Antitrustrecht ; Wirtschaft ; Aufsatzsammlung
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 6
    Book
    Book
    Amsterdam : Elsevier, Jai
    UID:
    (DE-627)470436727
    Format: IX, 504 S , graph. Darst
    Edition: 1. ed.
    ISBN: 0762311150
    Series Statement: Research in law and economics 21.2004
    Note: Enth. 10 Beitr
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe Antitrust law and economics Amsterdam : Elsevier JAI, 2004 0762311150
    Additional Edition: 9780080471983
    Additional Edition: 9780762311156
    Language: English
    Keywords: USA ; Antitrustrecht ; Wirtschaft ; Aufsatzsammlung
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Burlington : Emerald Group Publishing Limited
    UID:
    (DE-627)722702183
    Format: Online-Ressource (515 p.)
    ISBN: 9780762311156
    Content: This volume contains ten papers, by many prominent authors, examining antitrust issues of current interest. The first paper summarizes the other papers and presents original research on the meaning of consumer welfare and the sources of buyer power. The next five articles evaluate older antitrust cases to determine whether the decisions reached, the relief ordered, or both, enhanced consumer welfare
    Note: Description based upon print version of record , ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS; Chapter 1; Chapter 2; Chapter 3; Chapter 4; Chapter 5; Chapter 6; Chapter 7; Chapter 8; Chapter 9; Chapter 10;
    Additional Edition: 9781849502788
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Antitrust Law and Economics, Volume 21
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Oxford [u.a.] : Elsevier JAI | Birmingham, AL, USA : EBSCO Industries, Inc.
    UID:
    (DE-603)420282726
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (ix, 504 pages) , figure, table
    ISBN: 9780080471983 , 0080471986 , 0762311150 , 9780762311156
    Series Statement: Research in law and economics v. 21
    Content: This volume contains ten papers, by many prominent authors, examining antitrust issues of current interest. The first paper summarizes the other papers and presents original research on the meaning of consumer welfare and the sources of buyer power. The next five articles evaluate older antitrust cases to determine whether the decisions reached, the relief ordered, or both, enhanced consumer welfare. The seventh paper describes a new measure of efficiency that gives greater weight to consumer harm and applies it to a recent merger. The next paper explains a new way in which vertical foreclosur.
    Additional Edition: 0762311150
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 9
    UID:
    (DE-627)1836029063
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (46 p)
    Content: The goals of antitrust law continue to be debated because there is no single goal that is unambiguously correct. There is one goal, however, that now commands wider support than any other: protecting consumers and small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct – conduct that creates market power, transfers wealth from consumers or small suppliers, and fails to provide them with compensating benefits. This goal is the predominant objective in the legislative histories, it is broadly supported by the American people, it is easier to administer than total welfare, and it is now espoused by the majority of courts. Proponents of total welfare advance two principal arguments, but neither warrants elevating it over consumer and small supplier protection. First, from a normative perspective, total welfare is arguably the superior goal because it considers the welfare of all participants in the economy, including producers and consumers outside the relevant market. It ignores, however, the transfer of wealth that anticompetitive conduct causes, a transfer that many people regard as exploitative and unfair. Second, from a legal perspective, total welfare is arguably the goal of section 2 of the Sherman Act because it allows a firm to gain monopoly power through superior efficiency. But this safe harbor is equally consistent with a consumer protection goal, since it encourages firms to succeed in the marketplace by providing customers with better products, lower prices, and wider choice
    Note: In: Fordham Law Review, Vol. 81, (2013) , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2013 erstellt
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 10
    Book
    Book
    Amsterdam : Elsevier, JAI
    UID:
    (DE-603)123470218
    Format: IX, 504 Seiten , Diagramme
    ISBN: 0762311150
    Series Statement: Research in law & economics v.21
    Note: Literaturangaben
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. Further information can be found on the KOBV privacy pages