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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)1791628885
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
    Series Statement: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 16-28
    Content: This essay stems from an invitation from the editor of The Global ANALYST (Hyderabad) to prepare a 2500 word response to the question: “Has the U.S. Economy Really Recovered?” The curmudgeonly character of my response speaks to different orientations toward the economic theory of public policy. Most economists identify economics as enabling them to act as policy mechanics, similar to J. M. Keynes's musing about dentistry. In contrast, I explore the question from the orientation of complex systems theory, explaining in the process that policy action doesn't so much overcome social problems as it creates them. Such events as the so-called crisis of 2008 are intelligible outcomes of an institutional framework where public ordering has come to occupy the foreground of social action, with private ordering becoming relegated to the background
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 29, 2016 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 2
    UID:
    (DE-627)1791889255
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
    Series Statement: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-47
    Content: This essay is written for a Festschrift to commemorate Jürgen Backhaus's contribution to law and economics in recognition of his long service as Editor of the European Journal of Law and Economics. Scholars of law and economics have long been intrigued by the possibility that legal processes operate to promote economic efficiency. This essay probes the problematical character of the efficiency claim. This appraisal operates by refracting the efficiency claim through Vilfredo Pareto's (1935) distinction between logical and non-logical action. What results from this refraction is recognition that economic efficiency is an objectively meaningful concept only inside a model of competitive equilibrium. Outside that model, economic efficiency depends on the perspective of a theorizing subject. Economic efficiency pertains to the form of an argument but not to its substance. Efficiency claims are Paretian derivations and not refutable hypotheses
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 4, 2015 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 3
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792009151
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (26 p)
    Series Statement: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-30
    Content: This essay is written for a Festschrift to commemorate Jürgen Backhaus's contributions to political economy on the occasion of his retirement from the University of Erfurt. Jürgen is a penetrating and wide-ranging scholar from whom I have learned much since we first met in 1974. It would be easy to write a book to commemorate the numerous paths of influence and insight I have received from Jürgen. But I have only this paper through which to offer my commemoration and I have chosen a topic that arose at our very first meeting. That topic was the debate between Joseph Schumpeter and Rudolf Goldscheid regarding different approaches to the discharge of Austria's public debt at the end of the First World War and the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That point of departure leads quickly into a consideration of divergent approaches to the theory of public finance, and particularly the conceptualization of capital accounts for political entities and the place of political presuppositions within a theory of public finance
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 12, 2015 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792063725
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
    Series Statement: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-04
    Content: This essay sketches the central features of Gordon Tullock's (1922-2014) contributions to law and economics. My reference to Tullock as a “maverick scholar” is to indicate that he stood apart from the mainstream of law and economics scholarship as this is represented by Richard Posner's canonical statement that the common law reflects a relentless pursuit of economic efficiency. In contrast, Tullock denied efficiency claims on behalf of common law. Examination of Tullock's contrary claim illustrates how any analytical claim necessarily rests on and is derived from some preceding set of conceptual presuppositions because such qualities as “efficiency” are not objects of direct apprehension but rather are inferences from particular theoretical frameworks
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 19, 2015 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)179206375X
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
    Series Statement: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-03
    Content: Gordon Tullock (1922-2014) was a thinker par excellence. As with most thinkers, the tale of his life is told mostly through his scholarship. Accordingly, this essay reviews Tullock's scholarship in such fields as public choice, law and economics, rent seeking, bureaucracy, social conflict, and non-human societies. Tullock is often cast as exemplifying a reductionist style of homo economicus reasoning. This is a severe misreading of Tullock, a caricature of Tullock. To the contrary, Tullock was a social theorist who thought in terms of interaction among heterogeneous agents who in no way reduced those agents to some representative agent. Tullock's primary orientation was to theorize from inside his phenomena, in contrast to most social theorists who seek to theorize from some position outside their phenomena. Tullock was also a warm and sensitive man who was filled with a zest for whimsy, which is a quality that often accompanies highly creative people, though he sometimes had trouble directing that whimsy as he might have hoped
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 19, 2015 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 6
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792221118
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
    Content: This is a preliminary draft of the fourth of what will be eight chapters in a book titled Politics as a Peculiar Business: Public Choice in a System of Entangled Political Economy. This chapter starts by explaining that a universal feature of competition is its selection for excellence among competitors. This is a purely formal attribute of competition. Just what qualities are actually selected through competition depends on the context of competition, which is myriad in number. One can, for instance, be an excellent swimmer without being a terrific diver. Most of this chapter explains how the triadic character of democratic processes selects for different qualities than the dyadic character of market processes
    Note: In: Politics as a Peculiar Business: Public Choice in a System of Entangled Political Economy, Forthcoming , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 3, 2014 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)179231471X
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (14 p)
    Series Statement: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 14-08
    Content: In bringing economic analysis to bear on whether a dispute is settled without trial, the presumed institutional setting is typically one of private property where the parties are residual claimants to their legal expenses. Many disputes, however, are between private and public parties. In these disputes there is a conflict between substantive rationalities because public parties are not residual claimants. Just as the substantive content of action can vary depending on whether the actor operates within a context of private or common property, so can the substance of dispute settlement vary. While a public actor cannot pocket legal expenses that are saved through settlement, the expenses of trial can serve as an investment in pursuing future political ambitions
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 10, 2014 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792479808
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
    Series Statement: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 13-24
    Content: James Buchanan's Public Principles of Public Debt is universally associated with the claim that debt allows the cost of public activity to be shifted onto future generations. This claim treats a generation as a unitary and acting entity. While such treatment is standard fare for macro theorists who work with representative agents and societal averages in place of the individuals who constitute a society, such treatment conflicts with Buchanan's Cost and Choice and, indeed, his entire oeuvre. This essay undertakes an act of rational reconstruction that renders his 1958 claim both reasonable and consistent with his formulation in Cost and Choice where cost can be experienced only by individuals. This rational reconstruction reveals a cleavage between public debt approached through macro theory and public debt approached through public finance. Public Principles was generally treated by economists as macro theory when it was really about public finance and political economy
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 25, 2013 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792479786
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (60 p)
    Series Statement: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 13-25
    Content: Democratic governments can be either national or federal in form. Whether the form of democracy matters, how it matters if, indeed, it does matter, and for whom it might matter are the types of questions this paper explores. Federalism is generally described as a pro-liberty form of government. Yet it is surely reasonable to wonder how the presence of two sources of political power within the same territory can be more favorable to liberty than when there is but a single source. It turns out that the pro-liberty quality of federalism is a possible but not a necessary feature of federalism. This essay explores this two-edged quality of federalism to discern more clearly the relation between federalism and liberty
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 25, 2013 erstellt
    Language: English
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  • 10
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792479794
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
    Series Statement: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 13-26
    Content: This essay is written for a symposium on Luigino Bruni's The Genesis and Ethos of the Market. That book identifies a tradition of Neapolitan civil economy that arose in the 18th century, and which the author opposes to the more familiar tradition of Smithian political economy. The difference in traditions is located in contrasting theories of society in which markets are situated. Where Bruni reduces the Smithian tradition to a prisoners' or Hobbesian dilemma, he reduces the Neapolitan tradition to a stag hunt. While this essay accepts the general superiority of the stag hunt as a framework for organizing social theory, it also explains the misleading character of Bruni's reduction of society to a universal stag hunt. In place of that reduction, this essay treats societies as ecologies of stag hunts which in turn leads to recognition that societies are continually turbulent and conflictual and not placid and peaceful
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 25, 2013 erstellt
    Language: English
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