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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Car License Auction : Theory and Experimental Evidences (2014)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792212933
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (38 p)
    Content: In Singapore and many Chinese cities, tens of thousands of people participate in car license auctions each month. In a car license auction, many car licenses are sold but each participant can only bid for one license. We examine the theoretical properties of three auction formats: Shanghai auction, Guangzhou auction, and Singapore auction. Our main results are that (1) No equilibrium of the Shanghai auction can guarantee an efficient allocation, (2) the Singapore auction allocates objects efficiently if and only if a unique market clearing price does not exist, and (3) the Guangzhou auction is efficient if bidders are symmetric. The experimental evidence confirms our theoretical prediction. Our experiment also shows that the learning effects over time are quite different among these auction formats
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 2, 2014 erstellt
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2497818
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Played over an Infinite Horizon (2013)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792593228
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (21 p)
    Content: In recent literature, empirical evidence shows that cooperation improves when games are infinitely repeated. We experimentally investigate the evolution of voluntary contributions to a public good played over an infinite horizon. The experiment also includes sessions of voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) games played over a finite horizon as a control. We find that in infinitely repeated VCM games (1) when subjects are inexperienced, there is no difference of contributions compared with finitely repeated games; (2) contributions remain at the same level after an unexpected restart; (3) most groups do not have a monotonic trend of contribution with repetition. The data provides strong support for heterogeneous subjects, which may explain the non-monotonic trend of average contributions in infinitely repeated VCM games. This non-monotonic trend is caused by one category of subjects who expect others to contribute in period t as they did in period t-1
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 1, 2013 erstellt
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2232925
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    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 3
    Article
    Article
    Evaluating car license auction mechanisms : theory and experimental evidence (2020)
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    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)176724200X
    ISSN: 1043-951X
    In: China economic review, Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1989, 60(2020) vom: Apr., Seite 1-17, 1043-951X
    In: volume:60
    In: year:2020
    In: month:04
    In: pages:1-17
    Additional Edition: 10.1016/j.chieco.2019.101387
    Language: English
    Keywords: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Procuring Commodities : First Price Sealed Bid or English Auction? (2011)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792907877
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Content: We use laboratory experiments to examine the relative performance of the English auction (EA) and the first price sealed bid auction (FPA) when procuring a commodity. The mean and variance of prices are lower in the FPA than in the EA. Bids and prices in EA agree with game theoretic predictions while they don't in the FPA. To resolve these deviations found in the FPA, we introduce a mixture model with three bidding rules: constant absolute mark-up, constant percentage mark-up, and strategic best response. A dynamic specification in which bidders can switch strategies as they gain experienced is estimated as a hidden Markov model. Initially about three quarters of the subjects are strategic bidders, but over time the number of strategic bidders falls to below sixty-five percent. There is a corresponding growth in those who use the constant absolute mark-up rule
    Note: In: Marketing Science, Forthcoming , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 26, 2011 erstellt , Volltext nicht verfügbar
    Language: English
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
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  • 5
    Article
    Article
    Voluntary contribution mechanism played over an infinite horizon (2014)
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    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)821749226
    Format: graph. Darst.
    ISSN: 1361-374X
    In: Pacific economic review, Richmond, Victoria : Wiley Publishing Asia, 1996, 19(2014), 3 vom: Aug., Seite 313-331, 1361-374X
    In: volume:19
    In: year:2014
    In: number:3
    In: month:08
    In: pages:313-331
    Language: English
    Keywords: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Discrete Rule Learning and the Bidding of the Sexes (2013)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792536364
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (36 p)
    Content: We present a hidden Markov model of discrete strategic heterogeneity and learning in first price independent private values auctions. The model includes three latent bidding rules: constant absolute mark-up, constant percentage mark-up, and strategic best response. Rule switching probabilities depend upon a bidder's past auction outcomes. We apply this model to a new experiment that varies the number of bidders, the auction frame between forward and reverse, and includes the collection of saliva samples - used to measure subjects' sex hormone levels. We find the proportion of bidders following constant absolute mark-up increases with experience, particularly when the number of bidders is large. The primary driver here is subjects' increased propensity to switch strategies when they experience a loss (win) reinforcement when following a strategic (heuristic) rule. This affect is stronger for women and leads them spend more time following boundedly rational rules. We also find women in the Luteal and Menstrual phases of their menstrual cycle bid less aggressively, in terms of surplus demanded, when following the best response rule. This combined with spending more time following simple rules of thumbs explains gender differences in earnings
    Note: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 3, 2013 erstellt
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2289734
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    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Procuring Commodities : First-Price Sealed-Bid or English Auctions? (2012)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1792730411
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Content: We use laboratory experiments to examine the relative performance of the English auction (EA) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPA) when procuring a commodity. The mean and variance of prices are lower in the FPA than in the EA. Bids and prices in the EA agree with game-theoretic predictions, but they do not agree in the FPA. To resolve these deviations found in the FPA, we introduce a mixture model with three bidding rules: constant absolute markup, constant percentage markup, and strategic best response. A dynamic specification in which bidders can switch strategies as they gain experience is estimated as a hidden Markov model. Initially, about three quarters of the subjects are strategic bidders, but over time, the number of strategic bidders falls to below 65%. There is a corresponding growth in those who use the constant absolute markup rule
    Note: In: Marketing Science, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2012 , In: pp. 317-333 , In: DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1120.0704 , Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2012 erstellt , Volltext nicht verfügbar
    Language: English
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
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  • 8
    Article
    Article
    Procuring commodities : first-price sealed-bid or English auctions? (2012)
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    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)71797765X
    Format: graph. Darst.
    ISSN: 0732-2399
    In: Marketing science, Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, 1982, 31(2012), 2 vom: März/Apr., Seite 317-333, 0732-2399
    In: volume:31
    In: year:2012
    In: number:2
    In: month:03/04
    In: pages:317-333
    Language: English
    Keywords: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Discrete rule learning in first price auctions (6)
    [Orange, CA] : Chapman University, Economic Science Institute
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1857683366
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: ESI working papers 23, 07
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    URL: kostenfrei
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  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Intergeneration Preference Transmission in Physician Families : Evidence and Theory (2023)
    [S.l.] : SSRN
    Details
    UID:
    (DE-627)1859968546
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (43 p)
    Content: We study the intergeneration transmission of physicians' economic preferences by examining the risk and altruistic preferences of medical students and one of their parents with incentivized experiments. We find that altruistic parents are more likely to raise altruistic children who are also more likely to choose a medical major in university. Additionally, the self-selection effect based on social preferences among physicians becomes more prominent in the aftermath of the pandemic. In contrast, we do not find a significant correlation between risk preferences within families or with occupational choices. We propose a theoretical framework capturing the intergeneration preference transmission and family-wise self-selection among (future) physicians. Lastly, we delve into the policy implications of our findings, offering insights into how intra-household support and risk-sharing mechanisms can help rectify the persistent market failure of inadequate labor supply in the medical industry
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4522898
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