Umfang:
344 p.
ISBN:
9781107042209
,
9781107324909
,
9781107660397
Serie:
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Inhalt:
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation
Anmerkung:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 24 Nov 2014)
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 9781107042209
Weitere Ausg.:
Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Brokers, voters, and clientelism New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013 ISBN 1107042208
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 1107660394
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 9781107042209
Weitere Ausg.:
ISBN 9781107660397
Sprache:
Englisch
Fachgebiete:
Politologie
,
Ethnologie
Schlagwort(e):
Demokratie
;
Klientelismus
;
Wahlverhalten
;
Verteilungspolitik
;
Internationaler Vergleich
;
Wahl
;
Manipulation
;
Broker
DOI:
10.1017/CBO9781107324909
URL:
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