Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Format: 1 online resource (688 p.) ; , cm.

ISBN: 9781785363658 (e-book)

Series Statement: The international library of critical writings in economics series

Content: The research review discusses important papers in the Economics of Advertising since the Millennium. It covers embellishments of established theories, newer theories, and empirical testing of both. Topics include informative, persuasive, and comparative advertising, content analysis, targeting, information congestion, signalling, and information disclosure. Scholars of marketing and economics will find here both a back-drop and recent advances.

Note: The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings. , Recommended readings (Machine generated): C. Christou and N. Vettas (2008), 'On Informative Advertising and Product Differentiation', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26 (1), January, 92-112 -- Claude Fluet and Paolo G. Garella (2002), 'Advertising and Prices as Signals of Quality in a Regime of Price Rivalry', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20 (7), September, 907-30 -- Edward L. Glaeser and Gergely Ujhelyi (2010), 'Regulating Misinformation', Journal of Public Economics, 94 (3-4), April, 247-57 -- Ivan Pastine and Tuvana Pastine (2002), 'Consumption Externalities, Coordination, and Advertising', International Economic Review, 43 (3), August, 919-43 -- Ganesh Iyer, David Soberman and J. Miguel Villas-Boas (2005), 'The Targeting of Advertising', Marketing Science, 24 (3), Summer, 461-76 -- Greg Shaffer and Florian Zettelmeyer (2004), 'Advertising in a Distribution Channel', Marketing Science, 23 (4), Fall, 619-28 -- Kurt R. Brekke and Michael Kuhn (2006), 'Direct to Consumer Advertising in Pharmaceutical Markets', Journal of Health Economics, 25 (1), January, 102-30 -- Simon P. Anderson and Régis Renault (2006), 'Advertising Content', American Economic Review, 96 (1), March, 93-113 -- Justin P. Johnson and David P. Myatt (2006), 'On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design', American Economic Review, 96 (3), June, 756-84 -- Simon P. Anderson and Régis Renault (2013), 'The Advertising Mix for a Search Good', Management Science, 59 (1), January, 69-83 -- Oliver Board (2009), 'Competition and Disclosure', Journal of Industrial Economics, LVII (1), March, 197-213 -- Monic Sun (2011), 'Disclosing Multiple Product Attributes', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 20 (1), Spring, 195-224 -- Archishman Chakraborty and Rick Harbaugh (2014), 'Persuasive Puffery', Marketing Science, 33 (3), May-June, 382-400 -- Simon P. Anderson and Régis Renault (2009), 'Comparative Advertising: Disclosing Horizontal Match Information', RAND Journal of Economics, 40 (3), Autumn, 558-81 -- Francesca Barigozzi, Paolo G. Garella and Martin Peitz (2009), 'With a Little Help from My Enemy: Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 18 (4), Winter, 1071-94 -- Winand Emons and Claude Fluet (2012), 'Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30 (4), July, 352-60 -- Timothy Van Zandt (2004), 'Information Overload in a Network of Targeted Communication', RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (3), Autumn, 542-60 -- Simon P. Anderson and André de Palma (2012), 'Competition for Attention in the Information (overload) Age', RAND Journal of Economics, 43 (1), Spring, 1-25 -- Simon P. Anderson and André de Palma (2013), 'Shouting to Be Heard in Advertising', Management Science, 59 (7), July, 1545-56 , Justin P. Johnson (2013), 'Targeted Advertising and Advertising Avoidance', RAND Journal of Economics, 44 (1), Spring, 128-44 -- Daniel A. Ackerberg (2001), 'Empirically Distinguishing Informative and Prestige Effects of Advertising', RAND Journal of Economics, 32 (2), Summer, 316-33 -- Daniel A. Ackerberg (2003), 'Advertising, Learning, and Consumer Choice in Experience Good Markets: An Empirical Examination', International Economic Review, 44 (3), August, 1007-40 -- Michelle Sovinsky Goeree (2008), 'Limited Information and Advertising in the U.S. Personal Computer Industry', Econometrica, 76 (5), September, 1017-74 -- Ignatius Horstmann and Glenn MacDonald (2003), 'Is Advertising a Signal of Product Quality? Evidence from the Compact Disc Player Market, 1983-1992', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21 (3), March, 317-45 -- Bharat N. Anand and Ron Shachar (2011), 'Advertising, the Matchmaker', RAND Journal of Economics, 42 (2), Summer, 205-45 -- Jean-Pierre Dubé, Gunter J. Hitsch, and Puneet Manchanda (2005), 'An Empirical Model of Advertising Dynamics', Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 3 (2), June, 107-44 -- Gregory Lewis (2011), 'Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors', American Economic Review, 101 (4), June, 1535-46] -- Simon P. Anderson, Federico Ciliberto and Jura Liaukonyte (2013), 'Information Content of Advertising: Empirical Evidence from the OTC Analgesic Industry', International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31 (5), September, 355-67

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic books. ; Electronic books ; Electronic books

URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/Research_Reviews/9781783478873/9781783478873.xml

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URL: FULL  ((Currently Only Available on Campus))

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ISBN: 9780444636911

Content: This chapter focuses on the economic mechanisms at work in recent models of advertising finance in media markets developed around the concept of two-sided markets. The objective is to highlight new and original insights from this approach, and to clarify the conceptual aspects. The chapter first develops a canonical model of two-sided markets for advertising, where platforms deliver content to consumers and resell their “attention” to advertisers. A key distinction is drawn between free media and pay media, where the former result from the combination of valuable consumer attention and low ad-nuisance cost. The first part discusses various conceptual issues such as equilibrium concepts and the nature of inefficiencies in advertising markets, and concrete issues such as congestion and second-degree discrimination. The second part is devoted to recent contributions on issues arising when consumers patronize multiple platforms. In this case, platforms can only charge incremental values to advertisers, which reduce their market power and affect their price strategies and advertising levels. The last part discusses the implications of the two-sided nature of the media markets for the choice of content and diversity.

In: Handbook of media economics ; volume 1, Amsterdam : Elsevier, North Holland, 2015, (2015), Seite 41-90, 9780444636911

In: year:2015

In: pages:41-90

Language: English

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-62721-6.00002-0

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 9780444636911

In: Handbook of media economics ; volume 1, Amsterdam : Elsevier, North Holland, 2015, (2015), Seite xiii-xvi, 9780444636911

In: year:2015

In: pages:xiii-xvi

Language: English

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-62721-6.09986-8

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 0080887961

Content: Every experimentalist will sooner or later come across a situation in which results from initial baseline treatments conform nicely to the Nash equilibrium, but subsequent changes in parameters push the data in ways not predicted by Nash. This may happen when one begins by giving theory its best shot, reserving stress tests for later. Such tests often involve changing a parameter that, on the basis of intuition, is likely to alter behavior, but which has no effect on the Nash equilibrium. The dilemma is based on a situation in which two vacationers have purchased identical objects, which are then lost on the flight home. The airline tells them to fill out claim forms independently, with the promise that both claims will be paid if they match. Otherwise, both travelers are only reimbursed at the lower of the claims, with a small penalty for the high claimant and an equally small reward for the low claimant. Even with a very low penalty and reward, each person has an incentive to undercut any anticipated common claim amount, and so the only Nash equilibrium (in pure or mixed strategies) is at the lowest possible claim.

In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 549-558, 0080887961

In: 9780080887968

In: 9780444826428

In: 0444826424

In: year:2008

In: pages:549-558

Language: English

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00061-3

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 9780444636911

Content: Media industries typically exhibit two fundamental features, high fixed costs and heterogeneity of consumer preferences. Daily newspaper markets, for example, tend to support a single product. In other examples, such as radio broadcasting, markets often support multiple differentiated offerings. Both contexts can deliver preference externalities, when the options and well-being for consumers depend on the number and mix of consumers according to their content preferences. This chapter presents evidence on these fundamental features of media markets. We then incorporate these features into a suite of theoretical models to obtain both a description of media markets as well as predictions for how they would be expected to function. In Section 1.3, we turn to “results,” i.e., empirical evidence on the questions illuminated by the theoretical models. We then explore the effects of technological change, and we suggest directions for future work.

In: Handbook of media economics ; volume 1, Amsterdam : Elsevier, North Holland, 2015, (2015), Seite 3-40, 9780444636911

In: year:2015

In: pages:3-40

Language: English

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-62721-6.00001-9

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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ISBN: 9780080464756

Content: Media industries are important drivers of popular culture. A large fraction of leisure time is devoted to radio, magazines, newspapers, the Internet, and television (the illustrative example henceforth). Most advertising expenditures are incurred for these media. They are also mainly supported by advertising revenue. Early work stressed possible market failures in program duplication and catering to the Lowest Common Denominator, indicating lack of cultural diversity and quality. The business model for most media industries is underscored by advertisers' demand to reach prospective customers. This business model has important implications for performance in the market since viewer sovereignty is indirect. Viewers are attracted by programming, though they dislike the ads it carries, and advertisers want viewers as potential consumers. The two sides are coordinated by broadcasters (or “platforms”) that choose ad levels and program types, and advertising finances the programming. Competition for viewers of the demographics most desired by advertisers implies that programming choices will be biased towards the tastes of those with such demographics. The ability to use subscription pricing may help improve performance by catering to the tastes of those otherwise under-represented, though higher full prices tend to favor broadcasters at the expense of viewers and advertisers. If advertising demand is weak, program equilibrium program selection may be too extreme as broadcasters strive to avoid ruinous subscription price competition, but strong advertising demand may lead to strong competition for viewers and hence minimum differentiation (“la pensée unique”). Markets (such as newspapers) with a high proportion of ad-lovers may be served only by monopoly due to a circulation spiral: advertisers want to place ads in the paper with most readers, but readers want to buy the paper with more ads.

In: Handbook of the economics of art and culture, Amsterdam : Elsevier North-Holland, 2006, (2006), Seite 567-614, 9780080464756

In: 1280636653

In: 0080464750

In: 0444508708

In: 9780444508706

In: year:2006

In: pages:567-614

Language: English

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0676(06)01018-0

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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Format: 32 S. : , graph. Darst.

Series Statement: CESifo working papers 3096 : Category 11, Industrial organisation

Note: Auch im Internet unter den Adressen www.SSRN.com, www.RePEc.org und www.CESifo.de verfügbar

Language: English

UID:

Format: 10 S.

Series Statement: CESifo working paper 3677 : Category 11, Industrial organisation

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, PDF

Language: English

Subjects: Economics

URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)

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Format: 46, [3] S. : graph. Darst.

Series Statement: Centre für Economic Policy Research 〈London〉: Discussion paper series 1328 : International trade

Language: English

Subjects: Economics

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Format: 47, [2] S. : , graph. Darst.

Series Statement: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 7513

Language: English

URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)