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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Experiments in Culture and Corruption : A Review (2012)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9958246438802883
    Format: 1 online resource (29 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: Two decades of empirical evaluation have shown that corruption has a negative impact on economic growth, political stability, judicial effectiveness, democratization, educational attainment, and equality of income. However, corruption exists, persists, and varies significantly by culture. Lab studies have recently come to the forefront in identifying both the incentives and disincentives for corrupt behavior. However, lab studies on culture and corruption have led to some puzzling, contradictory results. This paper begins with a discussion of non-experimental work in this area, and evaluates the experimental findings in the context of earlier research. The authors sketch out the channels through which culture interacts with corruption (through institutions and social norms), and argue that discrepancies in experimental results may be due to differences in design (including repetition or unobserved variation in beliefs) or to differences in the response to punishment across societies. In addition to exploring design-based reasons for previous contradictory findings, avenues for future research include: behavioral responses to different types of externalities; replicating results in different countries; and utilizing the lab to formulate effective anti-corruption measures.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6064
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    FU Berlin
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    Charité
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Biased Policy Professionals / (2017)
    Washington, D.C. :The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9958264317802883
    Format: 1 online resource (31 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: A large literature focuses on the biases of individuals and consumers, as well as "nudges" and other policies that can address those biases. Although policy decisions are often more consequential than those of individual consumers, there is a dearth of studies on the biases of policy professionals: those who prepare and implement policy on behalf of elected politicians. Experiments conducted on a novel subject pool of development policy professionals (public servants of the World Bank and the Department for International Development in the United Kingdom) show that policy professionals are indeed subject to decision making traps, including sunk cost bias, the framing of losses and gains, frame-dependent risk-aversion, and, most strikingly, confirmation bias correlated with ideological priors, despite having an explicit mission to promote evidence-informed and impartial decision making. These findings should worry policy professionals and their principals in governments and large organizations, as well as citizens themselves. A further experiment, in which policy professionals engage in discussion, shows that deliberation may be able to mitigate the effects of some of these biases.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-8113
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    FU Berlin
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    Charité
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service / (2013)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9958246574702883
    Format: 1 online resource (32 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: Pay schemes in the public sector aim to attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent literature has found positive effects of higher pay on ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation. This paper revisits this issue with a novel subject pool, students destined for the private and public sectors in Indonesia. The analysis uses dictator games and real effort tasks to examine wage effects on a measure of motivation that exactly matches the mission of the public sector task. The model and experimental design allow for precisely measuring (1) the distribution of ability over the effort task; (2) the distribution of motivational preferences for public sector missions; and (3) outside options when choosing to work for public sector missions. Three novel conclusions emerge. First, more pro-social workers do, in fact, exert higher effort in a pro-social task. Second, in contrast to previous research, motivated individuals are more likely to join the public sector when public sector pay is low than when it is high. Third, real public sector workers exhibit greater pro-sociality than private sector workers, even for entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6729
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    FU Berlin
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    Charité
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Was Weber Right? : The Effects of Pay for Ability and Pay for Performance on Pro-Social Motivation, Ability and Effort in the Public Sector (2015)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9958246519802883
    Format: 1 online resource (32 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: This paper examines the effects of pecuniary compensation on the ability and motivation of individuals in organizations with non-pecuniary or pro-social missions. In particular, the paper compares flat pay systems, unrelated with ability or effort, to two other systems that are considered superior: high-powered, pay for performance schemes and more traditional, "Weberian" schemes that calibrate pay to ability, independent of effort. The analysis uses a sample of future public sector workers and finds that all three pay schemes attract motivated workers into tasks with a pro-social mission. However, flat pay schemes also attract low ability workers. In the short run, pay-for-performance schemes generate higher effort than flat pay and pay-for-ability systems, a difference driven entirely by effects on unmotivated workers. Once selection effects are accounted for, however, workers with pay for ability and pay for performance exert statistically indistinguishable levels of effort in the pro-social task. Moreover, pay for ability elicits effort at lower cost than pay for performance.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-7261
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    FU Berlin
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    Charité
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Love the Job... or the Patient? : Task vs. Mission-Based Motivations in Health Care (2018)
    Washington, D.C. :The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9958383576102883
    Format: 1 online resource (26 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: A booming literature has argued that mission-based motives are a central feature of mission-oriented labor markets. This paper shifts the focus to task-based motivation and finds that it yields significantly more effort than mission-based motivation. Moreover, in the presence of significant task motivation, mission motivation has no additional effect on effort. The evidence emerges from experiments with nearly 250 medical and nursing students in Burkina Faso. The students exert effort in three tasks, from boring to interesting. In addition, for half of the students, mission motivation is present: their effort on the task generates benefits for a charity. Two strong results emerge. First, task motivation has an economically important effect on effort, more than doubling effort. Second, mission motivation increases effort, but only for mundane tasks and not when the task is interesting. Moreover, even for mundane tasks, the effects of mission motivation appear to be less than those of task motivation.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-8338
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
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    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    FU Berlin
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    Charité
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    The Governance Game (2017)
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048267368
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: World Development Report Background Papers
    Content: In this paper, the authors use the lab to test a series of policy proposals designed to constrain rent-seeking behaviour in a policymaking context. The baseline governance game is conducted in the following way: subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four, with one subject randomly selected to be the "policymaker", while the other three are the "citizens". Citizens are informed that they can use their endowments to contribute to a group account. Any amount contributed to the group account are doubled. Once citizens have made their contribution decisions, the policymaker observes the contribution decisions of each citizen, and the total amount in the group account. The policymaker formulates a distribution "policy" to distribute the tokens among all four group members. The game is repeated for 20 rounds. With this basic framework, the authors implement and test the effect of three institutions designed to constrain policymaker rent-seeking behaviour: voting, policy commitment, and punishment. The results show that voting and enforced commitment are the most effective policy mechanisms to constrain rent-seeking, and improve citizen welfare. The authors find policymaker punishment regimes to be largely ineffective, both in reducing rent-seeking and improving welfare of citizens
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/26085
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Borrowing to Keep up (with the Joneses) : Inequality, Debt, and Conspicuous Consumption (2020)
    Washington, D.C. :The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9959657461802883
    Format: 1 online resource (35 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: The quest for status is a powerful motivator, but does it affect inequality? This paper presents a novel lab experiment that was designed and conducted to identify the relationship between inequality, status signaling, debt, and conspicuous consumption. It reports three main findings: First, consumption increases when it is "conspicuous" (i.e. is both observable, and signals ability/status). Second, borrowing increases when consumption is conspicuous. More critically, this increase in loan-taking is driven by those at the bottom of the income distribution. Third, in the presence of conspicuous consumption, access to finance exacerbates inequality. The results point to a vicious cycle of inequality and costly borrowing.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-9354
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    FU Berlin
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    Charité
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Encouraging service delivery to the poor : does money talk when health workers are pro-poor? (2018)
    Washington, DC, USA : World Bank Group, Development Economics, Development Research Group
    Details
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049079576
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 8666
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-8666
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Author information: Robyn, Paul Jacob 1981-
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Love the job ... or the patient? : task vs. mission-based motivations in health care (2018)
    Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group, Development Research Group, Human Development Team
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1016353251
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 8338
    Content: A booming literature has argued that mission-based motives are a central feature of mission-oriented labor markets. This paper shifts the focus to task-based motivation and finds that it yields significantly more effort than mission-based motivation. Moreover, in the presence of significant task motivation, mission motivation has no additional effect on effort. The evidence emerges from experiments with nearly 250 medical and nursing students in Burkina Faso. The students exert effort in three tasks, from boring to interesting. In addition, for half of the students, mission motivation is present: their effort on the task generates benefits for a charity. Two strong results emerge. First, task motivation has an economically important effect on effort, more than doubling effort. Second, mission motivation increases effort, but only for mundane tasks and not when the task is interesting. Moreover, even for mundane tasks, the effects of mission motivation appear to be less than those of task motivation
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Banuri, Sheheryar Love the Job... or the Patient? Task vs. Mission-Based Motivations in Health Care Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2018
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-8338
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    URL: Deutschlandweit zugänglich
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Online Access
    Open Access Request
    UB Potsdam
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Borrowing to keep up (with the joneses) : inequality, debt, and conspicuous consumption (2020)
    [Washington, DC, USA] : World Bank Group, Middle East and North Africa Region, Office of the Chief Economist
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_173593545X
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 9354
    Content: The quest for status is a powerful motivator, but does it affect inequality? This paper presents a novel lab experiment that was designed and conducted to identify the relationship between inequality, status signaling, debt, and conspicuous consumption. It reports three main findings: First, consumption increases when it is "conspicuous" (i.e. is both observable, and signals ability/status). Second, borrowing increases when consumption is conspicuous. More critically, this increase in loan-taking is driven by those at the bottom of the income distribution. Third, in the presence of conspicuous consumption, access to finance exacerbates inequality. The results point to a vicious cycle of inequality and costly borrowing
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Banuri, Sheheryar Borrowing to Keep up (with the Joneses): Inequality, Debt, and Conspicuous Consumption Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2020
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-9354
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
    URL: Deutschlandweit zugänglich
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    UB Potsdam
    MPI Bildungsforschung
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