Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

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Format: 1 Online-Ressource (20 p)

Content: In the 21st century, many developing countries will become emerging markets and will no longer be in need of the carrot-and-stick approach to development assistance most prevalent today: development financing made available conditional on certain policies and interventions. This paper suggests that interactions between development agencies and recipient governments are mostly about inputs deemed (but not known) to contribute to improvements in living standards in recipient countries, rather than outcomes. The paper argues that the development marketplace is beset by market imperfections because of externalities, principal-agent problems, and decision making under uncertainty, which not only make it difficult to achieve the right outcomes, but also take away incentives to learn about outcomes. A fundamental rethink of responsibilities and accountabilities in the development business would make sure that development outcomes are traded in the development marketplace. It would put recipient countries in charge of contracting development agencies to provide these outcomes. Development agencies would commit to and be held financially accountable for outcomes, that is, real improvements in welfare indicators. The paper describes the role of the evaluation function in aligning incentives with the ultimate goal of improving lives and provides examples of emerging solutions

Additional Edition: Gaarder, Marie M The Second Wave of Independence

Language: English

URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

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Format: 94 S. : graph. Darst.

Note: Braunschweig, Techn. Univ., Diss., 1981

Language: German

Keywords: Hochschulschrift ; Hochschulschrift

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Format: 1 Online-Ressource (20 Seiten)

Edition: 2014

Content: In the 21st century, many developing countries will become emerging markets and will no longer be in need of the carrot-and-stick approach to development assistance most prevalent today: development financing made available conditional on certain policies and interventions. This paper suggests that interactions between development agencies and recipient governments are mostly about inputs deemed (but not known) to contribute to improvements in living standards in recipient countries, rather than outcomes. The paper argues that the development marketplace is beset by market imperfections because of externalities, principal-agent problems, and decision making under uncertainty, which not only make it difficult to achieve the right outcomes, but also take away incentives to learn about outcomes. A fundamental rethink of responsibilities and accountabilities in the development business would make sure that development outcomes are traded in the development marketplace. It would put recipient countries in charge of contracting development agencies to provide these outcomes. Development agencies would commit to and be held financially accountable for outcomes, that is, real improvements in welfare indicators. The paper describes the role of the evaluation function in aligning incentives with the ultimate goal of improving lives and provides examples of emerging solutions

Additional Edition: Gaarder, Marie M The Second Wave of Independence

Language: English

URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)

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Format: xxi, 360 Seiten , Diagramme

ISBN: 0197300243

Language: English

Subjects: Political Science

Keywords: Brennstoff ; Klimaänderung ; Umweltpolitik ; Fossiler Brennstoff ; Emission ; Klimaänderung ; Entwicklungsländer ; Erde ; Fossiler Brennstoff ; Produktion ; Verbrauch ; Prognose ; Energiepolitik ; Rohstoffpolitik ; Umweltpolitik ; Demographie ; Entwicklungsländer ; Rahmenübereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über Klimaänderungen Kyoto-Protokoll ; Anthropogene Klimaänderung ; Fossiler Brennstoff ; Statistik

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Format: 1 online resource (19 p.)

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 1-4623-5384-3 , 1-4527-1684-6 , 1-283-51720-5 , 1-4527-0140-7 , 9786613829658

Series Statement: IMF working paper ; WP/06/142

Content: In oil-dependent countries, a major issue is how to stabilize fiscal spending when government revenue fluctuates along with the international price of oil. A stabilization fund would allow the government to pull through an oil price trough and absorb windfall revenue when prices are high. This paper focuses on two key issues. First, the paper proposes to base government spending on moving averages of past oil prices that are shown to behave nearly as a random walk. Second, it uses Monte Carlo simulations of a fiscal policy model to look at the probability that a given level of assets in the stabilization fund is exhausted over a certain number of years. The simulations show that with a fiscal policy based on moving averages over three to five years, a stabilization fund of about 75 percent of 2004 oil revenue would be adequate, which, in Nigeria, would equate to US$16-18 billion.

Note: "June 2006." , ""Contents""; ""I. AN OIL STABILIZATION FUND FOR NIGERIA""; ""A. Introduction and Overview""; ""B. Views in the Literature""; ""C. Stabilizing Fiscal Spending""; ""D. Model Description""; ""E. Application to Nigeria""; ""References"" , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-4518-6402-7

Language: English

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Format: 1 online resource (20 pages)

Series Statement: Policy research working papers.

Content: In the 21st century, many developing countries will become emerging markets and will no longer be in need of the carrot-and-stick approach to development assistance most prevalent today: development financing made available conditional on certain policies and interventions. This paper suggests that interactions between development agencies and recipient governments are mostly about inputs deemed (but not known) to contribute to improvements in living standards in recipient countries, rather than outcomes. The paper argues that the development marketplace is beset by market imperfections because of externalities, principal-agent problems, and decision making under uncertainty, which not only make it difficult to achieve the right outcomes, but also take away incentives to learn about outcomes. A fundamental rethink of responsibilities and accountabilities in the development business would make sure that development outcomes are traded in the development marketplace. It would put recipient countries in charge of contracting development agencies to provide these outcomes. Development agencies would commit to and be held financially accountable for outcomes, that is, real improvements in welfare indicators. The paper describes the role of the evaluation function in aligning incentives with the ultimate goal of improving lives and provides examples of emerging solutions.

Language: English

DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-7069

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Format: Online-Ressource (19 p)

Edition: Online-Ausg.

ISBN: 1451864027 , 9781451864021

Series Statement: IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 06/142

Content: In oil-dependent countries, a major issue is how to stabilize fiscal spending when government revenue fluctuates along with the international price of oil. A stabilization fund would allow the government to pull through an oil price trough and absorb windfall revenue when prices are high. This paper focuses on two key issues. First, the paper proposes to base government spending on moving averages of past oil prices that are shown to behave nearly as a random walk. Second, it uses Monte Carlo simulations of a fiscal policy model to look at the probability that a given level of assets in the stabilization fund is exhausted over a certain number of years. The simulations show that with a fiscal policy based on moving averages over three to five years, a stabilization fund of about 75 percent of 2004 oil revenue would be adequate, which, in Nigeria, would equate to US$16-18 billion

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Bartsch, Ulrich How Much Is Enough? Monte Carlo Simulations of an Oil Stabilization Fund for Nigeria Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006 ISBN 9781451864021

Language: English

DOI: 10.5089/9781451864021.001

URL: kostenfrei

URL: kostenfrei

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Format: IV, 182 S. , Ill., graph. Darst. , 24 cm

ISBN: 9783862470716

Series Statement: MEMS technology and engineering 15

Note: Zugl.: Freiburg, Univ., Diss., 2010 , Zsfassnung in dt. und engl.

Language: English

Subjects: Physics

Keywords: Mikrogenerator ; Elektret ; MEMS ; Resonator ; Ionenstrahlätzen ; Energy Harvesting ; Hochschulschrift

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

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ISBN: 3921814642

In: 2

Language: German

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Format: Online-Ressource

Content: Development agencies expend large amounts of money and manpower ostensibly to achieve development outcomes that improve living conditions in developing countries. If development agencies cared only about development outcomes and these were easily observable in a timely manner, development agencies would ‘buy’ the best outcomes they could get for their money. And if someone else could get it for them at a lower cost, they would transfer the funds to this other agency. Unfortunately, outcomes are not easily observable, they often take years to appear, and frequently the ‘shopper’ cares more about being seen shopping than about what ends up in the cart. So how do we go about creating a functioning market for development outcomes? What role can the evaluation function play in helping the process of internalizing development outcomes into the development agencies’ objective functions and thereby aligning incentives with the ultimate goal of improving lives? We present the development business through the lenses of the literature on externalities, principal–agent problems, and decision-making under uncertainty. We also present examples of solutions from multilateral and bilateral development institutions.

Language: English

URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)