UID:
almahu_9949697309302882
Format:
1 online resource (438 pages) :
,
illustrations (some color)
Edition:
First edition.
ISBN:
0-12-802632-4
Content:
Rugged Embedded Systems: Computing in Harsh Environments describes how to design reliable embedded systems for harsh environments, including architectural approaches, cross-stack hardware/software techniques, and emerging challenges and opportunities. A "harsh environment" presents inherent characteristics, such as extreme temperature and radiation levels, very low power and energy budgets, strict fault tolerance and security constraints, etc. that challenge the computer system in its design and operation. To guarantee proper execution (correct, safe, and low-power) in such scenarios, this contributed work discusses multiple layers that involve firmware, operating systems, and applications, as well as power management units and communication interfaces. This book also incorporates use cases in the domains of unmanned vehicles (advanced cars and micro aerial robots) and space exploration as examples of computing designs for harsh environments. Provides a deep understanding of embedded systems for harsh environments by experts involved in state-of-the-art autonomous vehicle-related projects Covers the most important challenges (fault tolerance, power efficiency, and cost effectiveness) faced when developing rugged embedded systems Includes case studies exploring embedded computing for autonomous vehicle systems (advanced cars and micro aerial robots) and space exploration
Note:
Front Cover -- Rugged Embedded Systems: Computing in Harsh Environments -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Contributors -- Preface -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1. Who This Book Is For -- 2. How This Book Is Organized -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Chapter 2: Reliable and power-aware architectures: Fundamentals and modeling -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Need for Reliable Computer Systems -- 2.1. Sustaining Quality of Service in the Presence of Faults, Errors, and Failures -- 2.2. Processing Phases of Computing System Resiliency -- 3. Measuring Resilience -- 3.1. Cost Metrics -- 3.2. Effectiveness Metrics -- 4. Metrics on Power-Performance Impact -- 5. Hard-Error Vulnerabilities -- 6. Soft-Error Vulnerabilities -- 6.1. Application Characterization Through Fault Injection -- 7. Microbenchmark Generation -- 7.1. Overview -- 7.2. Example of a Microbenchmark Generation Process -- 8. Power and Performance Measurement and Modeling -- 8.1. In-Band Versus Out-of-Band Data Collection -- 8.2. Processor Performance Counters -- 8.3. Power Modeling -- 9. Summary -- References -- Chapter 3: Real-time considerations for rugged embedded systems -- 1. Operating in Harsh Environments -- 2. Case Study: A Field Programmable Gate Array Prototype for the Validation of Real-Time Algorithms -- 3. Architecture -- 3.1. Prototype -- 3.2. Multiprocessor Interrupt Controller -- 4. Real-time Support -- 4.1. MPDP Algorithm -- 4.2. Implementation Details -- 5. Evaluation -- 6. Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 4: Emerging resilience techniques for embedded devices -- 1. Advancing Beyond Static Redundancy and Traditional Fault-Tolerance Techniques -- 1.1. Comparison of Techniques -- 1.1.1. Desirable characteristics -- 1.1.2. Sustainability metrics -- Fault exploitation -- Recovery granularity -- Fault capacity -- Fault coverage -- Critical components.
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2. Autonomous Hardware-Oriented Mitigation Techniques for Survivable Systems -- 2.1. Functional Diagnosis of Reconfigurable Fabrics -- 2.1.1. Reconfiguration Algorithm1: Divide-and-conquer method -- 2.1.2. Reconfiguration Algorithm2: FaDReS -- Hardware organization in FaDReS technique -- Anomaly detection, isolation, and recovery -- 2.1.3. Reconfiguration Algorithm3: PURE -- 2.1.4. Reconfiguration Algorithm 4: FHME -- Fault mitigation strategy -- Detection of hardware faults -- Fault diagnosis using dynamic redundancy -- Phase 1-Identifying a healthy APE -- Phase 2-Isolation of faulty APEs -- Fault recovery -- 2.2. FPGA Refurbishment Using Evolutionary Algorithms -- 2.2.1. Fault isolation via back tracing -- 2.2.2. NDER technique -- 2.2.3. Evaluating the efficacy of NDER approach -- 2.3. Summary -- 3. Tradeoffs of Resilience, Quality, and Energy in Embedded Real-Time Computation -- 3.1. Performance, Power, and Resilience Characterization for FaDReS and PURE Algorithms -- 3.2. Energy Savings and Fault-Handling Capabality of FHME -- 3.2.1. Energy saving in reconfigurable design -- 3.2.2. Online recovery results of FHME core -- 3.2.3. Comparisons and tradeoffs for TMR vs. DRFI -- 3.3. Reliability and Energy Tradeoffs at NTV -- 3.3.1. Soft errors in logic paths -- 3.3.2. NMR systems at near-threshold voltage -- 3.3.3. Energy cost of mitigating variability in NMR arrangements -- 3.3.4. Cost of increased reliability at NTV -- 3.4. Summary -- References -- Chapter 5: Resilience for extreme scale computing -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Resilience in Scientific Applications -- 3. System-Level Resilience -- 3.1. User-Level Checkpointing -- 3.2. Privileged-Level Checkpointing -- 4. Application-Specific Fault Tolerance Techniques -- 5. Resilience for Exascale Supercomputers -- 5.1. Checkpoint/Restart at Exascale -- 5.2. Flat I/O Bandwidth.
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5.3. Task-Based Programming Models -- 5.4. Performance Anomalies -- 6. Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 6: Security in embedded systems* -- 1. Not Covered in This Chapter -- 2. Motivation -- 2.1. What Is Security? -- 2.2. Fundamental Principles -- 2.2.1. Confidentiality -- 2.2.2. Integrity -- 2.2.3. Availability -- 2.3. Threat Model -- 2.3.1. Vulnerability -- 2.3.2. Threat -- 2.3.3. Risk -- 2.3.4. Asset -- 2.3.5. Exposure -- 2.3.6. Safeguard -- 2.4. Access Control -- 2.4.1. Identification -- 2.4.2. Authentication -- 2.4.3. Authorization -- 2.4.4. Accountability -- 2.5. Security Policy -- 2.6. Why Cyber? -- 2.7. Why is Security Important? -- 2.8. Why Are Cyber Attacks so Prevalent and Growing? -- 2.8.1. Mistakes in software -- 2.8.2. Opportunity scale created by the Internet -- 2.8.3. Changing nature of the adversaries -- 2.8.4. Financial gain opportunities -- 2.8.5. Ransomware -- 2.8.6. Industrial espionage -- 2.8.7. Transformation into cyber warfare -- 2.9. Why Isnt Our Security Approach Working? -- 2.9.1. Asymmetrical -- 2.9.2. Architectural flaws -- 2.9.3. Software complexity-many vulnerabilities -- 2.9.4. Complacence, fear, no regulatory pressure to act -- 2.9.5. Lack of expertise -- 2.10. What Does This Mean for the IoT Security? -- 2.11. Attacks Against Embedded Systems -- 2.11.1. Stuxnet -- 2.11.2. Flame, Gauss, and Duqu -- Flame -- Gauss -- Duqu -- 2.11.3. Routers -- Aviation -- Automotive -- Medical -- Pace makers -- Diabetes glucose monitors and insulin pumps -- 2.12. ATM ``Jackpotting´´ -- 2.13. Military -- 2.14. Infrastructure -- 2.14.1. Electric grid -- 2.15. Point-Of-Sale Systems -- 2.16. Social Engineering -- 2.16.1. Spoofing email -- 2.16.2. Phishing -- 2.16.3. Password guessing -- 2.17. How Bad Could This Be? -- 2.17.1. Heartbleed -- 2.17.2. Shellshock -- 2.17.3. Blackouts -- 3. Security & -- Computer Architecture.
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3.1. Processor Architectures and Security Flaws -- 3.2. Solving the Processor Architecture Problem -- 3.3. Fully Exploiting Metadata Tags -- 3.4. Processor Interlocks for Policy Enforcement -- 3.5. Micro-Policies -- 3.5.1. μ-Policies enforce security -- 3.5.2. Memory safety μ-policy -- 3.5.3. Control flow integrity μ-policy -- 3.5.4. Taint tracking μ-policy -- 3.5.5. Composite policies -- 3.6. Self-Protection -- 3.6.1. Metadata protection -- 3.6.2. PIPE protection -- 3.6.3. The Dover processor -- References -- Chapter e6: Embedded security -- 1. Important Security Concepts -- 1.1. Identification and Registration -- 1.2. Authentication -- 1.2.1. Level 1 -- 1.2.2. Level 2 -- 1.2.3. Level 3 -- 1.2.4. Level 4 -- 1.2.5. Multifactor authentication -- 1.3. Authorization -- 1.4. Cryptography -- 1.4.1. Shared key encryption -- 1.4.2. Public key technologies -- Public key encryption -- Digital signature basics -- Hashing the message to a message digest -- Public key encryption of the message digest -- Signature verification -- Integrity without nonrepudiation -- 1.4.3. Certificates, CAs, and CA hierarchies-public key infrastructure -- Digital certificates are containers for public keys -- Certificate authorities issue (and sign) digital certificates -- Certificate revocation for dealing with public keys gone bad -- 1.4.4. SSL Transport Layer Security -- 1.5. Other Ways to Keep Secrets -- 1.5.1. One-time pad -- 1.5.2. Steganography -- 1.5.3. One-way functions -- 1.5.4. Elliptic curve cryptography -- 1.6. Discovering Root Cause -- 1.6.1. Automatically determining root cause -- 1.7. Using Diversity for Security [4] -- 1.8. Defense in Depth -- 1.9. Least Privilege -- 1.10. Antitampering -- 2. Security and Network Architecture -- 2.1. IPsec -- 2.1.1. Transport mode -- 2.1.2. Tunnel mode -- 2.1.3. VPN -- 2.1.4. TLS/SSL -- 2.2. Firewalls -- 2.3. Intrusion Detection.
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2.3.1. Network intrusion-detection systems -- 2.3.2. Host intrusion-detection systems -- 2.3.3. Limitations -- 2.4. Antivirus Systems -- 2.5. Security Information Management -- 2.6. Network-Based Attacks -- 2.6.1. Denial of service (DoS) -- Types of DoS attacks -- Internet control message protocol (ICMP) flood -- (S)SYN flood -- Distributed denial-of-service -- 2.6.2. Man-in-the-middle -- Defenses against the attack -- 2.7. Introduction-Based Routing [12] -- 3. Software Vulnerability and Cyber Attacks -- 3.1. Common Weakness Enumeration -- 3.2. Common Vulnerability and Exposures -- 3.3. Who Are the Attackers -- 3.3.1. Script kiddies -- 3.3.2. Vandals -- 3.3.3. Profiteers -- 3.4. How Do the Attackers Operate? -- 3.4.1. Zero-day exploits -- 3.4.2. The good guys vs the bad guys -- 3.4.3. Vulnerability timeline -- 3.4.4. RSA attack -- 3.4.5. Multistage attacks -- 3.4.6. Advanced persistent threats -- 3.4.7. Insiders -- 3.5. How Could We Stop the Attacks? -- 3.5.1. What would have stopped the Stuxnet attack against SCADA controllers? -- 3.5.2. What would have stopped the target attack against POS systems? -- 3.6. Buffer Overflow Attacks -- 3.6.1. Use of the stack -- 3.6.2. Real stack overflow attacks -- 3.6.3. Heap overflow attacks -- 3.6.4. Stack protection -- 3.6.5. Writing secure code -- 3.7. Return-Oriented Programming Attacks -- 3.7.1. Return-into-library technique -- 3.7.2. Borrowed code chunks -- 3.7.3. Attacks -- 3.7.4. x86 architecture -- 3.7.5. Defenses -- 3.8. Code Injection Attacks -- 3.9. Side-Channel Attacks -- 3.9.1. Examples -- 3.9.2. Countermeasures -- 4. Security and Operating System Architecture -- 4.1. Least Privilege -- 4.2. Defense in Depth -- 4.2.1. Information assurance -- 4.3. Secure Operating Systems -- 4.3.1. HardenedBSD -- 4.3.2. Qubes OS -- 4.3.3. SELinux -- 4.3.4. Secure the boot and execution -- 4.3.5. UEFI.
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4.3.6. Coreboot.
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-12-802459-3
Language:
English
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