feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
  • 2
    UID:
    almahu_9948177820102882
    Format: 1 online resource (viii, 238 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 9781108655583 (ebook)
    Content: 'Free will skepticism' refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action - i.e. the free will - required for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Critics fear that adopting this view would have harmful consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and laws. Optimistic free will skeptics, on the other hand, respond by arguing that life without free will and so-called basic desert moral responsibility would not be harmful in these ways, and might even be beneficial. This collection addresses the practical implications of free will skepticism for law and society. It contains eleven original essays that provide alternatives to retributive punishment, explore what (if any) changes are needed for the criminal justice system, and ask whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about the real-world implications of free will skepticism.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 26 Aug 2019). , Free will skepticism in law and society : an overview / Gregg D. Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw, and Derk Pereboom -- Free will denial and deontological constraints / Saul Smilansky -- Free will skepticism and its implications : the case for optimism / Gregg D. Caruso -- Beyond the retributive system / Bruce N. Waller -- Free will skepticism and prevention of crime / Derk Pereboom -- Deontology and deterrence for free will deniers / Benjamin Vilhauer -- Free will skepticism, general deterrence, and the "use" objection / Kevin J. Murtagh -- Fichte and psychopathy : criminal justice turned upside down / Michael Louis Corrado -- Causality and responsibility in mentally disordered offenders / John Callender -- The implications of free will skepticism for establishing criminal liability / Elizabeth Shaw -- Free will skepticism and criminal punishment : a preliminary ethical analysis / Farah Focquaert.
    Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9781108493475
    Language: English
    Subjects: Law
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY :Cambridge University Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9949080425102882
    Format: 1 online resource (ix, 389 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 9781108689304 (ebook)
    Series Statement: Law and the cognitive sciences
    Content: Within the criminal justice system, one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. This book argues against retributivism and develops a viable alternative that is both ethically defensible and practical. Introducing six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, Gregg D. Caruso contends that it is unclear that agents possess the kind of free will and moral responsibility needed to justify this view of punishment. While a number of alternatives to retributivism exist - including consequentialist deterrence, educational, and communicative theories - they have ethical problems of their own. Moving beyond existing theories, Caruso presents a new non-retributive approach called the public health-quarantine model. In stark contrast to retributivism, the public health-quarantine model provides a more human, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 07 May 2021). , Free will, legal punishment, and retributivism -- Free will skepticism : hard Incompatibilism and hard luck -- The epistemic argument against retributivism -- Additional reasons for rejecting retributivism -- Consequentialist, educational, and mixed theories of punishment -- Public health-quarantine model I : a non-retributive approach to criminal behavior -- Public health-quarantine model II : the social determinants of health & criminal behavior -- Public health-quarantine model III : human dignity, victims' rights, rehabilitation, and preemptive incapacitation -- Public health-quarantine model IV : punishment, deterrence, evidentiary standards, and indefinite detention.
    Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9781108484701
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9949419202102882
    Format: 1 online resource (77 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 9781009219730 (ebook)
    Series Statement: Cambridge elements. Elements in ethics,
    Content: This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it is used in contemporary philosophical debates and explores the justifiability of the moral practices associated with it, including moral praise/blame, retributive punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. After identifying and discussing several different varieties of responsibility-including causal responsibility, take-charge responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of responsibility associated with attributability, answerability, and accountability-it distinguishes between basic and non-basic desert conceptions of moral responsibility and considers a number of skeptical arguments against each. It then outlines an alternative forward-looking account of moral responsibility grounded in non-desert-invoking desiderata such as protection, reconciliation, and moral formation. It concludes by addressing concerns about the practical implications of skepticism about desert-based moral responsibility and explains how optimistic skeptics can preserve most of what we care about when it comes to our interpersonal relationships, morality, and meaning in life.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 10 Nov 2022).
    Additional Edition: Print version: ISBN 9781009219754
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    Book
    Book
    Lanham [u.a.] :Lexington Books,
    UID:
    almahu_BV041158451
    Format: VII, 324 S.
    ISBN: 978-0-7391-7731-0 , 978-1-4985-1621-1
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe ISBN 978-0-7391-7732-7
    Language: English
    Subjects: Philosophy
    RVK:
    Keywords: Willensfreiheit ; Skeptizismus ; Verantwortungsethik ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Aufsatzsammlung ; Aufsatzsammlung
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge university Press
    UID:
    gbv_1883163137
    Format: 1 online resource (79 pages) , digital, PDF file(s).
    ISBN: 9781009271172 , 9781009500425 , 9781009271158
    Series Statement: Cambridge elements. Elements in philosophy of mind
    Content: Neurolaw is an area of interdisciplinary research on the meaning and implications of neuroscience for the law and legal practices. This Element addresses the potential contributions of neuroscience, and the brain sciences more generally, to criminal justice decision-making and policy. It distinguishes between three different areas and domains of investigation in neurolaw: assessment, intervention, and revision. The first concerns brain-based assessments, which may be used for predicting future violence, lie detection, judging legal insanity, and the like. The second concerns potential treatments and other interventions that aim at rehabilitating criminals and/or preventing crime before it occurs. The third investigates the ways that neuroscience may impact the law by changing or revising commonsense views about human nature and the causes of human action.
    Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 28 Feb 2024)
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9781009500425
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 9781009500425
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    New York, NY :Oxford University Press,
    UID:
    almahu_9947420863502882
    Format: 1 online resource
    ISBN: 9780190460754 (ebook) :
    Content: 'Neuroexistentialism' brings together some of the world's leading philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and legal scholars to tackle our neuroexistentialist predicament and explore what the mind sciences can tell us about morality, love, emotion, autonomy, consciousness, selfhood, free will, moral responsibility, criminal punishment, meaning in life, and purpose.
    Note: Previously issued in print: 2018.
    Additional Edition: Print version : ISBN 9780190460723
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Lanham, Md. :Lexington Books,
    UID:
    edocfu_9959238789102883
    Format: 1 online resource (334 p.)
    ISBN: 1-4985-1621-1 , 0-7391-7732-X
    Content: Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility is an edited collection of new essays by an internationally recognized line-up of contributors. It is aimed at readers who wish to explore the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications.
    Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; I: Philosophical Explorations: Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications; 1 Skepticism about Free Will; 2 The Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility?; 3 Determinism, Incompatibilism and Compatibilism, Actual Consciousness and Subjective Physical Worlds, Humanity; 4 The Stubborn Illusion of Moral Responsibility; 5 Be a Skeptic, Not a Metaskeptic; 6 Free Will as a Case of "Crazy Ethics"; 7 The Potential Dark Side of Believing in Free Will (and Related Concepts); 8 The People Problem; 9 Living Without Free Will , 10 If Free Will Doesn't Exist, Neither Does Water11 Free Will and Error; II: Scientific Explorations: The Behavioral, Cognitive, and Neurosciences; 12 The Complex Network of Intentions; 13 Experience and Autonomy; 14 What Does the Brain Know and When Does It Know It?; 15 If Free Will Did Not Exist, It Would Be Necessary to Invent It; 16 Free Will, an Illusion?; References; Index; About the Contributors , English
    Additional Edition: ISBN 1-299-68852-7
    Additional Edition: ISBN 0-7391-7731-1
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 9
    Book
    Book
    Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press
    UID:
    gbv_173741659X
    Format: ix, 389 Seiten , 23 cm
    Edition: 1st paperback edition
    ISBN: 9781108723480 , 9781108484701
    Series Statement: Law and the cognitive sciences
    Content: "Within the criminal justice system, one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. This book argues against retributivism and develops a viable alternative that is both ethically defensible and practical. Introducing six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, Gregg D. Caruso contends that it is unclear that agents possess the kind of free will and moral responsibility needed to justify this view of punishment. While a number of alternatives to retributivism exist - including consequentialist deterrence, educational, and communicative theories - they have ethical problems of their own. Moving beyond existing theories, Caruso presents a new non-retributive approach called the public health-quarantine model. In stark contrast to retributivism, the public health-quarantine model provides a more human, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior." -- Publisher
    Note: Includes bibliographical references and index
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9781108689304
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe Caruso, Gregg D., 1972 - Rejecting retributivism Cambridge, United Kingdom : Cambridge University Press, 2021 ISBN 9781108689304
    Language: English
    Keywords: Retorsion ; Vermeidung ; Strafrecht
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Lanham, Md. :Lexington Books,
    UID:
    almahu_9948318222202882
    Format: 1 online resource (vii, 324 p.)
    Edition: Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books.
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. Further information can be found on the KOBV privacy pages