Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

UID:

Format: 1 Online-Ressource (XVII, 135 p. 68 illus., 60 illus. in color).

Edition: 1st ed. 2020

ISBN: 978-981-157-160-2

Series Statement: Lecture Notes in Social Networks

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-981-157-159-6

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-981-157-161-9

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-981-157-162-6

Language: English

Keywords: Anwendungssoftware ; Social Media ; Graphentheorie ; Rechnernetz ; Dezentralisation ; Verhalten ; Evolution

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-15-7160-2

URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)

URL: http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032244244&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA

URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)

URL: Buchcover

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (xv, 457 pages) : , digital, PDF file(s).

ISBN: 1-108-84903-2 , 1-108-85978-X

Content: Learn how to analyse and manage evolutionary and sequential user behaviours in modern networks, and how to optimize network performance by using indirect reciprocity, evolutionary games, and sequential decision making. Understand the latest theory without the need to go through the details of traditional game theory. With practical management tools to regulate user behaviour, and simulations and experiments with real data sets, this is an ideal tool for graduate students and researchers working in networking, communications, and signal processing.

Note: Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Jul 2021). , Cover -- Half-title -- Title page -- Copyright information -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Basic Game Theory -- 1.1 Strategic-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium -- 1.2 Extensive-Form Games and Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- 1.3 Incomplete Information: Signal and Bayesian Equilibrium -- 1.4 Repeated Games and Stochastic Games -- Part I Indirect Reciprocity -- 2 Indirect Reciprocity Game in Cognitive Networks -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The System Model -- 2.2.1 Social Norms -- 2.2.2 Action Rules -- 2.3 Optimal Action Rule -- 2.3.1 Reputation Updating Policy -- 2.3.2 Stationary Reputation Distribution -- 2.3.3 Payoff Function -- 2.3.4 Optimal Action Using an Alternative Algorithm -- 2.4 Action Spreading Due to Natural Selection -- 2.4.1 Action Spreading Algorithm Using the Wright-Fisher Model -- 2.4.2 Action Spreading Algorithm Using the Replicator Dynamic Equation -- 2.5 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and Simulations -- 2.5.1 Binary Reputation Scenario -- 2.5.2 Multilevel Reputation Scenario -- 2.6 Conclusion -- References -- 3 Indirect Reciprocity Game for Dynamic Channel Access -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 System Model -- 3.2.1 Action -- 3.2.2 Social Norm: How to Assign Reputation -- 3.2.3 Power Level and Relay Power -- 3.2.4 Channel Quality Distribution -- 3.3 Theoretical Analysis -- 3.3.1 Reputation Updating Policy -- 3.3.2 Power Detection and Power Detection Transition Matrix -- 3.3.3 Stationary Reputation Distribution -- 3.3.4 Payoff Function and Equilibrium of the Indirect Reciprocity Game -- 3.3.5 Stability of the Optimal Action Rule -- 3.4 Simulation -- 3.4.1 Evolutionary Stability of Optimal Action a[sub(2) sup(*)] -- 3.4.2 System Performance -- 3.4.3 Different Social Norms -- 3.5 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Multiuser Indirect Reciprocity Game for Cooperative Communications -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 System Model. , 4.2.1 Physical Layer Model with Relay Selection -- 4.2.2 Incentive Schemes Based on the Indirect Reciprocity Game -- 4.2.3 Overheads of the Scheme -- 4.2.4 Payoff Functions -- 4.3 Steady-State Analysis Using Markov Decision Processes -- 4.3.1 Stationary Reputation Distribution -- 4.3.2 Long-Term Expected Payoffs at Steady States -- 4.3.3 Equilibrium Steady State -- 4.4 Evolutionary Modeling of the Indirect Reciprocity Game -- 4.4.1 Evolutionary Dynamics of the Indirect Reciprocity Game -- 4.4.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy -- 4.5 Energy Detection -- 4.6 Simulation Results -- 4.7 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- 5 Indirect Reciprocity Data Fusion Game and Application to Cooperative Spectrum Sensing -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Indirect Reciprocity Data Fusion Game -- 5.2.1 System Model -- 5.2.2 Action and Action Rule -- 5.2.3 Social Norm: How to Assign Reputation -- 5.2.4 Decision Consistency Matrix -- 5.2.5 Reputation Updating Policy -- 5.2.6 Payoff Function -- 5.2.7 Equilibrium of the Indirect Reciprocity Data Fusion Game -- 5.3 Application to Cooperative Spectrum Sensing -- 5.3.1 System Model -- 5.3.2 Fusion Game for the Single-Channel (K=1) and Hard Fusion Case -- 5.3.3 Fusion Game for the Single-Channel (K=1) and Soft Fusion Case -- 5.3.4 Fusion Game for the Multichannel (K> -- 1) Case -- 5.4 Simulation -- 5.4.1 The Optimal Action Rule and Its Evolutionary Stability -- 5.4.2 System Performance -- 5.4.3 Anticheating -- 5.5 Conclusion -- References -- Part II Evolutionary Games -- 6 Evolutionary Game for Cooperative Peer-to-Peer Streaming -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The System Model and Utility Functions -- 6.2.1 System Model -- 6.2.2 Utility Functions -- 6.3 Agent Selection within a Homogeneous Group -- 6.3.1 Centralized Agent Selection -- 6.3.2 Distributed Agent Selection -- 6.3.3 Evolutionary Cooperative Streaming Game. , 6.3.4 Analysis of the Cooperative Streaming Game -- 6.4 Agent Selection within a Heterogeneous Group -- 6.4.1 Two-Player Game -- 6.4.2 Multiplayer Game -- 6.5 A Distributed Learning Algorithm for an ESS -- 6.6 Simulation Results -- 6.7 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Evolutionary Game for Spectrum Sensing and Access in Cognitive Networks -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 System Model -- 7.2.1 Network Entity -- 7.2.2 Spectrum Sensing Model -- 7.2.3 Synchronous and Asynchronous Scenarios -- 7.3 Evolutionary Game Formulation for the Synchronous Scenario -- 7.3.1 Evolutionary Game -- 7.3.2 Replicator Dynamics of Spectrum Sensing -- 7.3.3 Replicator Dynamics of Spectrum Access -- 7.3.4 Analysis of the ESS -- 7.4 Evolutionary Game Formulation for the Asynchronous Scenario -- 7.4.1 ON-OFF Primary Channel Model -- 7.4.2 Analysis of SUs' Access Time T[sub(a)] -- 7.4.3 Analysis of the ESS -- 7.5 A Distributed Learning Algorithm for the ESSs -- 7.6 Simulation Results -- 7.6.1 ESSs of the Synchronous and Asynchronous Scenarios -- 7.6.2 Stability of the ESSs -- 7.6.3 Performance Evaluation -- 7.7 Conclusion -- References -- 8 Graphical Evolutionary Game for Distributed Adaptive Networks -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Related Works -- 8.3 Graphical Evolutionary Game Formulation -- 8.3.1 Introduction to the Graphical Evolutionary Game -- 8.3.2 Graphical Evolutionary Game Formulation -- 8.3.3 Relationship to Existing Distributed Adaptive Filtering Algorithms -- 8.3.4 Error-Aware Distributed Adaptive Filtering Algorithm -- 8.4 Diffusion Analysis -- 8.4.1 Strategies and Utility Matrix -- 8.4.2 Dynamics of p[sub(m)] and q[sub(m|m)] -- 8.4.3 Diffusion Probability Analysis -- 8.5 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy -- 8.5.1 ESS in Complete Graphs -- 8.5.2 ESS in Incomplete Graphs -- 8.6 Simulation Results -- 8.6.1 Mean-Square Performance -- 8.6.2 Diffusion Probability. , 8.6.3 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy -- 8.7 Conclusion -- References -- 9 Graphical Evolutionary Game for Information Diffusion in Social Networks -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Diffusion Dynamics over Complete Networks -- 9.2.1 Basic Concepts of Evolutionary Game Theory -- 9.2.2 Evolutionary Game Formulation -- 9.2.3 Information Diffusion Dynamics over a Complete Network -- 9.3 Diffusion Dynamics over Uniform-Degree Networks -- 9.3.1 Basic Concepts of Graphical EGT -- 9.3.2 Graphical Evolutionary Game Formulation -- 9.3.3 Diffusion Dynamics over Uniform-Degree Networks -- 9.4 Diffusion Dynamics over Nonuniform-Degree Networks -- 9.4.1 General Case -- 9.4.2 Two Special Cases -- 9.5 Experiments -- 9.5.1 Synthetic Networks and a Real-World Network -- 9.5.2 Twitter Hashtag Data Set Evaluation -- 9.6 Conclusion -- References -- 10 Graphical Evolutionary Game for Information Diffusion in Heterogeneous Social Networks -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Heterogeneous System Model -- 10.2.1 Basics of Evolutionary Game Theory -- 10.2.2 Unknown User-Type Model -- 10.2.3 Known User-Type Model -- 10.3 Theoretical Analysis for the Unknown User-Type Model -- 10.4 Theoretical Analysis for the Known User-Type Model -- 10.5 Experiments -- 10.5.1 Synthetic Data Experiments -- 10.5.2 Real Data Experiments -- 10.6 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- Part III Sequential Decision-Making -- 11 Introduction to Sequential Decision-Making -- 11.1 Decision-Making in Networks -- 11.2 Social Learning -- 11.3 Multiarmed Bandit -- 11.4 Reinforcement Learning -- 12 Chinese Restaurant Game: Sequential Decision-Making in Static Systems -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 System Model -- 12.3 Equilibrium Grouping and Advantage in Decision Order -- 12.3.1 Equilibrium Grouping -- 12.3.2 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- 12.4 Signals: Learning Unknown States -- 12.4.1 Best Response of Customers. , 12.4.2 Recursive Form of the Best Response -- 12.5 Simulation Results and Analysis -- 12.5.1 Advantage of Playing Positions vs. Signal Quality -- 12.5.2 Price of Anarchy -- 12.5.3 Case Study: Resource Pool and Availability Scenarios -- 12.6 Application: Cooperative Spectrum Access in Cognitive Radio Networks -- 12.6.1 System Model -- 12.6.2 Simulation Results -- 12.7 Conclusion -- References -- 13 Dynamic Chinese Restaurant Game: Sequential Decision-Making in Dynamic Systems -- 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 System Model -- 13.2.1 Bayesian Learning for the Restaurant State -- 13.3 Multidimensional MDP-based Table Selection -- 13.4 Application to Cognitive Radio Networks -- 13.4.1 System Model -- 13.4.2 Bayesian Channel Sensing -- 13.4.3 Belief State Transition Probability -- 13.4.4 Channel Access: Two Primary Channels Case -- 13.4.5 Channel Access: Multiple Primary Channels Case -- 13.4.6 Analysis of Interference to the PU -- 13.5 Simulation Results -- 13.5.1 Bayesian Channel Sensing -- 13.5.2 Channel Access in the Two Primary Channels Case -- 13.5.3 Fast Algorithm for Multichannel Access -- 13.5.4 Interference Performance -- 13.6 Conclusion -- References -- 14 Indian Buffet Game for Multiple Choices -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 System Model -- 14.2.1 Indian Buffet Game Formulation -- 14.2.2 Time Slot Structure of the Indian Buffet Game -- 14.3 Indian Buffet Game without Budget Constraints -- 14.3.1 Recursive Best Response Algorithm -- 14.3.2 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- 14.3.3 Homogeneous Case -- 14.4 Indian Buffet Game with Budget Constraints -- 14.4.1 Recursive Best Response Algorithm -- 14.4.2 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- 14.4.3 Homogeneous Case -- 14.5 Non-Bayesian Social Learning -- 14.6 Simulation Results -- 14.6.1 Indian Buffet Game without Budget Constraints -- 14.6.2 Indian Buffet Game with Budget Constraints. , 14.6.3 Non-Bayesian Social Learning Performance.

Additional Edition: ISBN 1-108-49474-9

Language: English

URL: lizenzpflichtig

URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108859783

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (343 pages)

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 9783838272436

Series Statement: Chinesische Perspektiven: Ökonomie ; v.4

Note: Intro -- Danksagung -- 1 Chinas neue Strategie für langfristiges Wachstum und Entwicklung: Imperative und Implikationen -- 2 Neue Institutionen für ein neues Entwicklungsmodell -- 3 Die neue Normalität in der Entwicklung Chinas -- 4 Das Ende der demografischen Dividende Chinas: Die Perspektiven für ein BIP-Wachstum -- 5 Die Industrialisierung Chinas: Pfadabhängigkeit und der Übergang zu einem neuen Modell -- 6 Der Sparkurs und die globale Wirtschaftsleistung Chinas -- 7 Aufbruch zu einer innovativen Volkswirtschaft: Ergebnisse aus der Datenanalyse chinesischer Unternehmen -- 8 Chinas Agrarentwicklung: Erfolge und Herausforderungen -- 9 Städtische und ländliche Migration: Trends und Auswirkungen im Zeitraum 2008 bis 2012 -- 10 Reformen für eine langfristige Entwicklung - Chinas öffentliches Finanzsystem -- 11 Index des provinzialen Geschäftsumfeldes in China - Kurzfassung des Berichts 2013 -- 12 Wird China eine umweltfreundliche Industrie aufbauen können? -- 13 Kann China sich grün entwickeln? -- 14 Chinas Klimaschutzmaßnahmen im internationalen Kontext: Das Problem Australien und Chinas -- 15 Chinas steigender Energiebedarf und das Trilemma der Energiepolitik -- 16 Finanzielle Restriktionen für ausländische Direktinvestitionen chinesischer Privatunternehmen -- 17 Determinanten des chinesischen IKT-Exports: Eine Analyse auf Unternehmensebene.

Additional Edition: Print version: Garnaut, Ross China: Ein neues Modell für Wachstum und Entwicklung Berlin : Ibidem Verlag,c2022

Language: German

Keywords: Electronic books. ; Electronic books.

URL: Click to View

URL: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/th-brandenburg/detail.action?docID=7135219

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (167 p.)

Edition: First edition.

ISBN: 0-429-17646-5 , 1-4822-6661-X , 1-280-12139-4 , 9786613525253 , 1-135-19735-0 , 0-203-87022-0

Content: "Motion structures are simply assemblies of resistant bodies connected by movable joints. Unlike conventional structures, they allow large shape transformations to satisfy practical requirements and they can be used in:shelters, emergency structures and exhibition standsaircraft morphing wingssatellite solar panels and space antennasmorphing core materials for compositesmedical implants for minimum invasive surgery.Though traditionally the subject falls within structural engineering, motion structures are more closely related to other mechanisms, and they draw on the principles of kinematic and geometrical analysis in their design. Indeed their design and analysis can be viewed as an extension of the theory of mechanisms, such as rigid origami, and can make effective use of a wealth of mathematical principles.This book outlines the relevant underlying theory and motion structural concepts, and uses a number of innovative but simple structures as examples."--Provided by publisher.

Note: Description based upon print version of record. , Front Cover; Motion Structures; Copyright Page; Contents; Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. Fundamental concepts, methods and classification; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Kinematics of linkages; 2.3 Overconstrained linkages; 2.4 Mechanisms and structures; 3. Planar double chain linkages; 3.1 Scissor-like elements and their assemblies; 3.2 Closed double chain; 3.3 Supports for double chains; 3.4 Growth of a double chain; 3.5 Conclusions; 4. Spatial rings and domes; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Rings; 4.3 Domes; 4.4 Other design considerations; 5. Spatial motion structures based on the Bennett linkage , 5.1 Introduction5.2 Single-layer assembly of Bennett linkages; 5.3 Multi-layer assemblies of Bennett linkages; 5.4 Alternative form of Bennett linkage; 5.5 Physical model of alternative form of Bennett linkage; 5.6 Assemblies of alternative form linkages; 5.7 Applications; 6. Spatial motion structures based on Bricard linkages; 6.1 Threefold-symmetric Bricard linkages and its assemblies; 6.2 Alternative forms of threefold-symmetric Bricard linkage; 6.3 Line and plane symmetric Bricard linkage and its alternative forms; 7. Layouts of spatial motion structures; 7.1 Tilings and patterns , 7.2 Layouts for the Bennett linkage7.3 Assemblies of Myard linkages; 7.4 Assemblies of threefold-symmetric Bricard linkages; 7.5 Conclusion and discussion; Notes; References; Index , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-415-55489-6

Language: English

DOI: 10.1201/9781482266610

UID:

Format: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 138 Seiten) , Illustrationen

Series Statement: Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research DP18731

Content: How does group identity affect belief formation? To address this question, we conduct a series of online experiments with a representative sample of individuals in the US. Using the setting of the 2020 US presidential election, we find evidence of intergroup preference across three distinct components of the belief formation cycle: a biased prior belief, avoidance of outgroup information sources, and a belief-updating process that places greater (less) weight on prior (new) information. We further find that an intervention reducing the salience of information sources decreases outgroup information avoidance by 50%. In a social learning context in wave 2, we find participants place 33% more weight on ingroup than outgroup guesses. Through two waves of interventions, we identify source utility as the mechanism driving group effects in belief formation. Our analyses indicate that our observed effects are driven by groupy participants who exhibit stable and consistent intergroup preferences in both allocation decisions and belief formation across all three waves. These results suggest that policymakers could reduce the salience of group and partisan identity associated with a policy to decrease outgroup information avoidance and increase policy uptake.

Language: English

Keywords: Graue Literatur

URL: Deutschlandweit zugänglich

URL: Deutschlandweit zugänglich

Author information: Bauer, Kevin 1991-

Author information: Hett, Florian 1984-

UID:

ISBN: 0080887961

Content: The presence of public goods seriously challenges traditional or natural solutions for the allocation of private goods. Important policy questions, of whether this chapter can rely on the market to provide optimal amounts of public goods such as air pollution, and how much we can rely on natural processes such as voluntary contribution to solve environmental problems, boil down to fundamental issues about human nature, i.e., about whether people are selfish or cooperative. Existing experiments on incentive-compatible mechanisms have focused on a few mechanisms. The data, combined with theoretical investigation, give us a fresh perspective on implementation among real people. For these mechanisms that have been studied in the laboratory, need more replications and robustness tests. Meanwhile, many mechanisms have never been tested in the laboratory. Equilibrium selection problem is almost untouched in this context. Therefore, more experiments should be conducted in this exciting field.

In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 625-643, 0080887961

In: 9780080887968

In: 9780444826428

In: 0444826424

In: year:2008

In: pages:625-643

Language: English

DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00067-4

URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

UID:

Format: xviii, 249 Seiten , 21 cm

ISBN: 9789811081613 , 9811081611

Content: "Promoting cultural understanding in a globalized world, this text is a key tool for students interested in further developing their understanding of Chinese society and culture. Written by a team of experts in their fields, this book provides a survey of Chinese culture, delving deeper into areas such as Chinese philosophy, religion, politics and education. It offers the reader a wide range of essential facts to better understand contemporary China through its history and cultural background, touching on key areas such as the development of science and technology in China, as well as the country's economy and trade history, and is a key read for scholars and students in Chinese Culture, Sociology and Politics."--

Content: Philosophy and Religion -- Politics and Law -- Education, Science and Technology -- Language and Writing -- Literature -- Economy and Trade -- National Defense and Military Culture -- Sports -- Cultural Industries -- National Spirit

Note: Translated from the Chinese

Additional Edition: ISBN 9789811081620

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe Understanding Chinese Culture Singapore : Palgrave Macmillan, 2018 ISBN 9789811081620

Language: English

Subjects: Ethnology

Keywords: China ; Philosophie ; Religion ; Politik ; Recht ; Wissenschaft ; Technik ; Sprache ; Literatur ; Wirtschaft ; Militär

URL: Inhaltsverzeichnis

URL: Klappentext

UID:

Format: 1 Online-Ressource (XIV, 649 p. 525 illus., 357 illus. in color)

Edition: 1st ed. 2020

ISBN: 9789811501425

Series Statement: Mechanisms and Machine Science 79

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-981-150-141-8

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-981-150-143-2

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe ISBN 978-981-150-144-9

Language: English

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-15-0142-5

URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)

UID:

Format: 1 Online-Ressource (168 p.)

ISBN: 9781482266610 , 9780415554893 , 9780367865573 , 9780429176463

Content: Motion structures are simply assemblies of resistant bodies connected by movable joints. Unlike conventional structures, they allow large shape transformations to satisfy practical requirements and they can be used in:shelters, emergency structures and exhibition standsaircraft morphing wingssatellite solar panels and space antennasmorphing core ma

Note: English

Language: Undetermined

URL: kostenfrei

UID:

Format: IX, 229 p. 71 illus. , online resource.

ISBN: 9783319325576

Series Statement: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 9576

Content: This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed proceedings of the Third International Conference on High Performance Computing and Applications, HPCA 2015, held in Shanghai, China, in July 2015. The 24 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 50 submissions. The papers cover the following research areas: numerical algorithms and solutions; high performance and grid computing; novel approached to high performance computing; massive data storage and processing; hardware acceleration; applications.

Note: Numerical algorithms and solutions- High performance and grid computing -- Novel approach to high performance computing -- Massive data storage and processing.-Hardware acceleration -- Applications.

In: Springer eBooks

Additional Edition: Printed edition: ISBN 9783319325569

Language: English

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-32557-6

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32557-6

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)

URL: Cover