UID:
almafu_9960119376502883
Format:
1 online resource (xix, 590 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
Edition:
Second edition.
ISBN:
1-139-17431-2
Content:
This book presents a theoretical treatment of externalities (i.e. uncompensated interdependencies), public goods, and club goods. The new edition updates and expands the discussion of externalities and their implications, coverage of asymmetric information, underlying game-theoretic formulations, and intuitive and graphical presentations. Aimed at well-prepared undergraduates and graduate students making a serious foray into this branch of economics, the analysis should also interest professional economists wishing to survey recent advances in the field. No other single source for the range of materials explored is currently available. Topics investigated include Nash equilibrium, Lindahl equilibria, club theory, preference-revelation mechanism, Pigouvian taxes, the commons, Coase Theorem, and static and repeated games. The authors use mathematical techniques only as much as necessary to pursue the economic argument. They develop key principles of public economics that are useful for subfields such as public choice, labor economics, economic growth, international economics, environmental and natural resource economics, and industrial organization.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
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Cover -- Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of tables and figures -- Preface -- Introduction to the theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods -- Views on market intervention -- 1.1 Some basic terms and definitions -- 1.2 Scope and importance of externalities, public goods, and club goods -- 1.3 Purposes of the book -- 1.4 Plan of the book -- Equilibrium concepts in public economics -- 2.1 Methodological considerations -- 2.2 Normative aspects -- 2.3 Equilibrium concepts -- 2.4 Local public goods, spillovers, and fiscal equivalence -- 2.5 Clubs and club goods -- 2.6 Policy failures -- Externalities -- Theory of externalities -- 3.1 Externalities as absence of markets -- 3.2 Property rights and externalities -- 3.3 Nonconvexity and externalities -- 3.4 More on transaction costs -- 3.5 Special types of externalities -- 3.6 Externalities and public goods as incentive structures -- 3.7 Concluding remarks -- Externalities, equilibrium, and optimality -- 4.1 Competitive equilibrium, externalities, and inefficiency -- 4.2 Pigouvian taxes and subsidies -- 4.3 Criticisms and modifications of the Pigouvian approach -- 4.4 Equilibrium and optimum quantities compared -- 4.5 Coase's contribution -- 4.6 Conclusions -- Appendix: Dual techniques -- Externalities and private information -- 5.1 Simple bargaining processes with private information -- 5.2 Bargaining with self-selection constraints -- 5.3 A demand-revealing scheme -- 5.4 Expected externalities and efficiency -- 5.5 Markets and private information -- 5.6 Concluding remarks -- Appendix: Constrained Pare to inefficiency of market equilibrium with hidden information -- Public goods -- Pure public goods: Nash-Cournot equilibria and Pareto optimality -- 6.1 A simple representation of individual behavior -- 6.2 Nash-Cournot equilibrium -- 6.3 An index of easy riding -- 6.4 An n-person economy.
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6.5 Some comparative statics -- 6.6 Optimal provision with distortionary taxes -- 6.7 Uncertainty and public good provision -- 6.8 A general pure public good model -- 6.9 Concluding remarks -- Appendix: Properties of the pure public good model -- Alternative mechanisms for provision of public goods -- 7.1 Pareto-optimal provision of public goods -- 7.2 Lindahl's thought experiment -- 7.3 Majority voting -- 7.4 Mechanism design and public goods -- 7.5 The Clarke-Groves demand-revealing mechanism -- 7.6 The Groves-Ledyard scheme -- 7.7 A Bayes-Nash demand-revealing mechanism -- 7.8 Concluding remarks -- Public goods in general -- 8.1 Public good provision with exclusion -- 8.2 Impure public goods -- 8.3 A model of congestion -- 8.4 Open access resources -- 8.5 Common property resources -- 8.6 Concluding remarks -- Appendix: The impure public good model -- Game theory and public goods -- 9.1 Cooperative provision of public goods -- 9.2 Noncooperative binary-choice models: Static two-person games -- 9.3 Binary-choice models: Extensions -- 9.4 Noncooperative continuous-choice models -- 9.5 Subgame perfect equilibrium -- 9.6 Collective action -- 9.7 Concluding remarks -- Departures from Nash-Cournot behavior -- 10.1 Nash equilibrium with contingent contributions -- 10.2 Matching behavior and subsidies -- 10.3 Nonmarket institutions and public goods -- 10.4 Nonzero conjectures and public goods -- Clubs and club goods -- Homogeneous clubs and local public goods -- 11.1 A brief history of club theory -- 11.2 A taxonomy of clubs -- 11.3 Clubs: Optimality and equilibrium -- 11.4 The basic model: Homogeneous clubs with fixed utilization rates -- 11.5 A graphic representation -- 11.6 The optimal number of clubs and local public goods -- 11.7 Summary -- Clubs in general -- 12.1 Club viewpoint and the partitioning issue.
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12.2 Homogeneous members: A total-economy viewpoint -- 12.3 Mixed clubs: A total-economy viewpoint -- 12.4 Alternative representations of the total-economy viewpoint -- 12.5 Mixed clubs: The replication issue -- 12.6 Other issues in club theory -- 12.7 Concluding remarks -- Institutional forms and clubs -- 13.1 Competitive market provision -- 13.2 Noncompetitive provision -- 13.3 Government provision of club goods -- 13.4 Transaction costs -- 13.5 Multiproduct clubs -- 13.6 Other institutional considerations -- 13.7 Some examples and concluding remarks -- Game theory and club goods -- 14.1 A cooperative game-theory formulation -- 14.2 Optimum club size and optimum number of clubs -- 14.3 A comparison of the cooperative game and nongame formulations -- 14.4 Noncooperative game theory and clubs: Recent advances -- 14.5 Cooperative game-theoretic formulation and institutional structures -- 14.6 An application: Cost allocation -- 14.7 Concluding remarks -- Uncertainty and the theory of clubs -- 15.1 Participation uncertainty -- 15.2 Utilization uncertainty: Capacity constraint -- 15.3 Effects of risk aversion -- 15.4 Utilization uncertainty: No capacity constraint -- 15.5 Supply-side uncertainty -- 15.6 Concluding remarks -- Intergenerational clubs -- 16.1 The model -- 16.2 The maintenance decision -- 16.3 Myopia and institutional form -- 16.4 Other considerations -- 16.5 Concluding remarks -- Appendix: Intergenerational club model -- Applications and future directions -- Empirical estimation and public goods -- 17.1 Estimation of demand for private goods versus public goods -- 17.2 Four estimation procedures -- 17.3 Distinguishing among models -- 17.4 Four specific studies -- 17.5 Concluding remarks -- Applications and empirics -- 18.1 Direct evaluation techniques and public goods -- 18.2 Indirect evaluation techniques and public goods.
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18.3 Applications of club theory -- 18.4 Applications of the joint-product model and the pure public good model -- 18.5 Concluding remarks -- Conclusions and directions for future research -- 19.1 Conclusions -- 19.2 Some directions for future research -- References -- Author index -- Subject index.
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English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-47718-2
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-47148-6
Language:
English
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174312
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