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  • 1
    Book
    Book
    Princeton, NJ :Princeton Univ. Press,
    UID:
    almafu_BV006813491
    Format: VIII, 572 S. : , graph. Darst.
    ISBN: 0-691-04317-5 , 978-0-691-04317-3
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics , Mathematics
    RVK:
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Keywords: Wirtschaftswissenschaften ; Methodologie ; Experiment ; Wirtschaftsforschung ; Wirtschaftswissenschaften ; Methode ; Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung ; Einführung ; Lehrbuch ; Lehrbuch ; Einführung ; Einführung ; Einführung
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  • 2
    UID:
    almahu_9949069087102882
    Format: 1 online resource (xii, 246 p.).
    ISBN: 9781849504065 (electronic bk.) :
    Series Statement: Research in experimental economics, v. 11
    Content: This volume consists of nine papers that use experimental and theoretical tools to examine issues pertaining to charitable auctions and fundraising. In recent years, the revenue-generating effects of different fundraising techniques have been a subject of increasing policy interest as private, religious and state originations have come to rely increasingly on fundraising activities for revenues. Experimental methods provide an ideal context for conducting the dialogue between economists, fundraisers and policymakers regarding the revenue and social consequences of alternative fundraising methods. Themes explored in the volume include the structure of charity auctions, charity lotteries, fund drives as well as some of broader issues underlying charitable behaviour. It explores the structure of different fundraising and charitable programs. It is a valuable resource for economists, fundraisers and policymakers interested in the consequences of their fundraising efforts.
    Note: Revenue from the saints, the showoffs and the predators : comparisons of auctions with price-preference values / Timothy C. Salmon, R. Mark Isaac -- Multiple public goods and lottery fund raising / Robert Moir -- The impact of social comparisons on nonprofit fund raising / Jen Shang, Rachel Croson -- Do donors care about subsidy type? : an experimental study / Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman -- Identifying altruism in the laboratory / Glenn W. Harrison, Laurie T. Johnson -- The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments / Matthew A. Halloran, James M. Walker, Arlington W. Williams -- Sealed bid variations on the silent auction / R. Mark Isaac, Kurt Schnier -- Raising revenues for charity : auctions versus lotteries / Douglas D. Davis, Laura Razzolini, Robert J. Reilly, Bart J. Wilson -- The optimal design of charitable lotteries : theory and experimental evidence / Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price, Shannon M. Price.
    Additional Edition: ISBN 9780762313013
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
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    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
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  • 3
    UID:
    gbv_1831633353
    ISBN: 0080887961
    Content: Many aspects of antitrust policy are influenced by the possibility that sellers in concentrated markets may have the power to raise prices above competitive levels. Of course, anyone can raise prices, so the issue is whether a change in structure, e.g., a merger, will allow one or more sellers to raise price profitably. A price increase by one seller diverts sales to others, so a firm is more likely to have market power when its competitors have limited capacity to expand their sales. Thus a merger that reduces competitors' capacity may create market power. Market power can also be sensitive to the trading institution, and this is the context that power issues first arose in experimental economics. Relatively high prices in posted-offer auctions are not surprising, since experimental economists have long noticed that prices in such markets tend to be above competitive levels, and will converge from above if they converge at all.
    In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 138-145, 0080887961
    In: 9780080887968
    In: 9780444826428
    In: 0444826424
    In: year:2008
    In: pages:138-145
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
    UID:
    gbv_1831633310
    ISBN: 0080887961
    Content: Even when markets seem to alternate between collusive and non-collusive phases, the price differences are difficult to interpret since a breakdown in collusion may be caused by a demand decrease that would have reduced prices in any case. This makes the laboratory an ideal setting to study factors that facilitate or hinder illegal price fixing. The main result from the experimental economics literature is that the market trading institutions are crucial in determining whether or not collusion will be successful in raising prices above competitive levels. This chapter examined the effects of seller discussions between rounds of a continuous double auction. In particular, the sellers were allowed to come together to a corner of one of the rooms and confer after the close of one trading period and before the start of another. Attempts to collude were as ineffective as they were inevitable. The problem is that each seller has a strong private incentive to defect and lower the asking price during the course of the double auction trading .
    In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 170-177, 0080887961
    In: 9780080887968
    In: 9780444826428
    In: 0444826424
    In: year:2008
    In: pages:170-177
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 5
    UID:
    gbv_1831633450
    ISBN: 0080887961
    Content: Market power arises in many posted-offer markets and drives a distinction between the competitive prediction and the Nash equilibrium for the market viewed as a stage game. Pricing patterns in such markets tend to be characterized by Edgeworth cycles that deteriorate as the sessions progress. The amplitude and frequency of the cycles are sensitive to design and procedural details, and vary considerably from experiment to experiment. Although persistent serial correlation in pricing proscribe any direct test of static Nash mixing predictions, rough correspondence between the central moments of predicted and observed densities has been observed in a variety of different instances. However, the persistent and very prominent deviations observed in an asymmetric design suggests that Nash mixing predictions do not uniformly organize behavior well. The circumstances under which mixing predictions may organize outcomes well merits further investigation.
    In: Handbook of experimental economics results, Amsterdam : North Holland, 2008, (2008), Seite 62-70, 0080887961
    In: 9780080887968
    In: 9780444826428
    In: 0444826424
    In: year:2008
    In: pages:62-70
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 6
    UID:
    almahu_9947931024602882
    Format: xii, 246 p.
    Edition: Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.
    Series Statement: Research in experimental economics ; v. 11
    Language: English
    Keywords: Electronic books.
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  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Bingley, U.K : Emerald
    UID:
    gbv_661526313
    Format: Online-Ressource
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    ISBN: 9781849504065
    Series Statement: Research in experimental economics 0193-2306 v. 11
    Content: Revenue from the saints, the showoffs and the predators : comparisons of auctions with price-preference values / Timothy C. Salmon, R. Mark Isaac -- Multiple public goods and lottery fund raising / Robert Moir -- The impact of social comparisons on nonprofit fund raising / Jen Shang, Rachel Croson -- Do donors care about subsidy type? : an experimental study / Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman -- Identifying altruism in the laboratory / Glenn W. Harrison, Laurie T. Johnson -- The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments / Matthew A. Halloran, James M. Walker, Arlington W. Williams -- Sealed bid variations on the silent auction / R. Mark Isaac, Kurt Schnier -- Raising revenues for charity : auctions versus lotteries / Douglas D. Davis, Laura Razzolini, Robert J. Reilly, Bart J. Wilson -- The optimal design of charitable lotteries : theory and experimental evidence / Andreas Lange, John A. List, Michael K. Price, Shannon M. Price. - This volume consists of nine papers that use experimental and theoretical tools to examine issues pertaining to charitable auctions and fundraising. In recent years, the revenue-generating effects of different fundraising techniques have been a subject of increasing policy interest as private, religious and state originations have come to rely increasingly on fundraising activities for revenues. Experimental methods provide an ideal context for conducting the dialogue between economists, fundraisers and policymakers regarding the revenue and social consequences of alternative fundraising methods. Themes explored in the volume include the structure of charity auctions, charity lotteries, fund drives as well as some of broader issues underlying charitable behaviour. It explores the structure of different fundraising and charitable programs. It is a valuable resource for economists, fundraisers and policymakers interested in the consequences of their fundraising efforts
    Note: Description based upon print version of record , Cover; Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors; Contents; List of Contributors; Preface; Revenue from the Saints, the Showoffs and The Predators: Comparisons of Auctions with Price-Preference Values; Sealed Bid Variations on the Silent Auction; Raising Revenues for Charity: Auctions Versus Lotteries; The Optimal Design of Charitable Lotteries: Theory and Experimental Evidence; Multiple Public Goods and Lottery Fund Raising; The Impact of Social Comparisons on Nonprofit Fund Raising; Do Donors Care about Subsidy Type? An Experimental Study , Identifying Altruism in the Laboratory*The Voluntary Provision of a Public Good with Binding Multi-Round Commitments; , Online-Ausg.
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors
    Language: English
    Subjects: Economics
    RVK:
    Keywords: Electronic books
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  • 8
    UID:
    gbv_68581873X
    Format: Online-Ressource (xii, 246 p)
    Edition: Online-Ausg. Palo Alto, Calif ebrary 2011 Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    ISBN: 0762313013 , 0080457002
    Series Statement: Research in experimental economics v. 11
    Note: Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Experiments investigating fundraising and charitable contributors Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier JAI, 2006 ISBN 0762313013
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Princeton, NJ :Princeton University Press,
    UID:
    almafu_9959975613902883
    Format: 1 online resource (584 p.)
    ISBN: 9780691233376
    Content: A small but increasing number of economists have begun to use laboratory experiments to evaluate economic propositions under carefully controlled conditions. Experimental Economics is the first comprehensive treatment of this rapidly growing area of research. While the book acknowledges that laboratory experiments are no panacea, it argues cogently for their effectiveness in selected situations. Covering methodological and procedural issues as well as theory, Experimental Economics is not only a textbook but also a useful introduction to laboratory methods for professional economists.Although the authors present some new material, their emphasis is on organizing and evaluating existing results. The book can be used as an anchoring device for a course at either the graduate or advanced undergraduate level. Applications include financial market experiments, oligopoly price competition, auctions, bargaining, provision of public goods, experimental games, and decision making under uncertainty. The book also contains instructions for a variety of laboratory experiments.
    Note: Frontmatter -- , Contents -- , Preface -- , Acknowledgments -- , CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW -- , CHAPTER 2 DECISIONS AND GAMES -- , CHAPTER 3 DOUBLE-AUCTION MARKETS -- , CHAPTER 4 POSTED-OFFER MARKETS -- , CHAPTER 5 BARGAINING AND AUCTIONS -- , Chapter 6 PUBLIC GOODS, EXTERNALITIES, AND VOTING -- , Chapter 7 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION -- , CHAPTER 8 INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS IN RISKY SITUATIONS -- , CHAPTER 9 ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND EXPERIMENTAL METHODS: SUMMARY AND EXTENSIONS -- , Index , In English.
    Language: English
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