Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund

UID:

Format: XXII, 45 S , graph. Darst

ISBN: 0833025546

Language: Undetermined

UID:

Format: 1 Online-Ressource

ISBN: 9780833095152 , 9780833093134

Content: Space is now a congested, contested, and competitive environment. Space systems must become more resilient to potential adversary actions and system failures, but changes to space systems are costly. To reduce costs, the Air Force asked RAND to identify non-materiel means—doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy—to enhance space resilience over the near and far terms

Note: English

Language: Undetermined

URL: kostenfrei

UID:

Format: 1 Online-Ressource

ISBN: 9780833044372 , 9780833041173

Content: U.S. communities depend on reliable, safe, and secure rail systems. Each weekday, more than 12 million passengers take to U.S. railways. This book explains a framework for security planners and policymakers to guide cost-effective rail-security planning, specifically for the risk of terrorism. Risk is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequences. This book focuses on addressing vulnerabilities and limiting consequences

Note: English

Language: Undetermined

URL: kostenfrei

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (xxii, 70 pages) : , color illustrations

ISBN: 0-8330-9515-3

Series Statement: Research report Enhancing space resilience through non-materiel means

Content: "Space is now a congested, contested, and competitive environment. Space systems must become more resilient to potential adversary actions and system failures, but changes to space systems are costly. To provide a complete look at resilience and possibly realize some benefit at lower cost, the Air Force asked RAND to identify non-materiel means--doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy--to enhance space resilience over the near and far terms. The authors developed implementation options to improve resilience based on a notional space protection operational concept: enhancing the capability of space operators to respond, in a timely and effective manner, to adversary counterspace actions. Operators need actionable information, appropriate organization and tactics, and dynamic command and control, supported by appropriate tools and decision aids, relevant training and exercises, and qualified personnel brought into the career field. The authors also recommend that Air Force Space Command develop a formal, end-to-end, space protection concept of operations (CONOPS) that captures all elements needed to improve resilience. In addition, the CONOPS could potentially follow the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution in certain situations, such as when responding to adversary counterspace actions. For the near-term options, the rough order of magnitude (ROM) nonrecurring engineering (NRE) cost of implementation is estimated to be between $2.5 million and $3.6 million. For the far-term options, the ROM NRE cost is estimated to be between $109 million and $166 million, with the ROM recurring cost between $4 million and $5.4 million per year"--Publisher's description.

Note: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph , "RR-1067-AF"--Page 4 of cover , Preface -- , Figures -- , Tables -- , Summary -- , Acknowledgments -- , Abbreviations -- , Introduction: , Background -- , Objectives -- , Scope -- , Space resilience -- , Approach -- , Report structure -- , Resilience and civil institutions: , General approaches for building resilient operations: , Impact avoidance -- , Adaptation and flexibility -- , Recovery and restoration -- , Potential applications to the space operations community -- , Summary -- , Resilience and U.S. government civil space agencies: , Civil policy considerations: , Full and open access -- , Rapid delivery -- , Continuity of operations -- , Security classification -- , Civil practices: , Information -- , Organization and tactics -- , Command and control -- , Training -- , Personnel -- , Summary -- , Resilience and Air Force space operations: , Operational concept -- , Findings: information: , Space order of battle -- , Limited intelligence at SOPS/SWS -- , Space knowledge of intelligence personnel -- , Space Weather effects -- , Summary -- , Findings: organization and tactics: , Space protection lead -- , Space protection tactics -- , Tactics-sharing -- , Summary -- , Findings: command and control: , Satellite C2 contacts -- , Responsibilities and authorities -- , Anomaly resolution -- , Summary -- , Findings: training: , Space protection training -- , Exercises -- , Multiple satellite C2 systems -- , Summary -- , Findings: personnel: , Initial qualifications -- , Career progression -- , Trained operators -- , Summary -- , Cost of implementation options -- , Detailed recommendations -- , Resilience and a world with international and commercial partners: , Information -- , Organization and tactics -- , Command and control -- , Recommendations: , Overarching recommendations: , Resilience as a priority -- , Space protection CONOPS -- , Detailed recommendations: , Near-term recommendations -- , Far-term recommendations -- , ROM costs -- , Space resilience cost analysis. , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-8330-9313-4

Language: English

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (xxii, 70 pages) : , color illustrations

ISBN: 0-8330-9515-3

Series Statement: Research report Enhancing space resilience through non-materiel means

Content: "Space is now a congested, contested, and competitive environment. Space systems must become more resilient to potential adversary actions and system failures, but changes to space systems are costly. To provide a complete look at resilience and possibly realize some benefit at lower cost, the Air Force asked RAND to identify non-materiel means--doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy--to enhance space resilience over the near and far terms. The authors developed implementation options to improve resilience based on a notional space protection operational concept: enhancing the capability of space operators to respond, in a timely and effective manner, to adversary counterspace actions. Operators need actionable information, appropriate organization and tactics, and dynamic command and control, supported by appropriate tools and decision aids, relevant training and exercises, and qualified personnel brought into the career field. The authors also recommend that Air Force Space Command develop a formal, end-to-end, space protection concept of operations (CONOPS) that captures all elements needed to improve resilience. In addition, the CONOPS could potentially follow the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution in certain situations, such as when responding to adversary counterspace actions. For the near-term options, the rough order of magnitude (ROM) nonrecurring engineering (NRE) cost of implementation is estimated to be between $2.5 million and $3.6 million. For the far-term options, the ROM NRE cost is estimated to be between $109 million and $166 million, with the ROM recurring cost between $4 million and $5.4 million per year"--Publisher's description.

Note: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph , "RR-1067-AF"--Page 4 of cover , Preface -- , Figures -- , Tables -- , Summary -- , Acknowledgments -- , Abbreviations -- , Introduction: , Background -- , Objectives -- , Scope -- , Space resilience -- , Approach -- , Report structure -- , Resilience and civil institutions: , General approaches for building resilient operations: , Impact avoidance -- , Adaptation and flexibility -- , Recovery and restoration -- , Potential applications to the space operations community -- , Summary -- , Resilience and U.S. government civil space agencies: , Civil policy considerations: , Full and open access -- , Rapid delivery -- , Continuity of operations -- , Security classification -- , Civil practices: , Information -- , Organization and tactics -- , Command and control -- , Training -- , Personnel -- , Summary -- , Resilience and Air Force space operations: , Operational concept -- , Findings: information: , Space order of battle -- , Limited intelligence at SOPS/SWS -- , Space knowledge of intelligence personnel -- , Space Weather effects -- , Summary -- , Findings: organization and tactics: , Space protection lead -- , Space protection tactics -- , Tactics-sharing -- , Summary -- , Findings: command and control: , Satellite C2 contacts -- , Responsibilities and authorities -- , Anomaly resolution -- , Summary -- , Findings: training: , Space protection training -- , Exercises -- , Multiple satellite C2 systems -- , Summary -- , Findings: personnel: , Initial qualifications -- , Career progression -- , Trained operators -- , Summary -- , Cost of implementation options -- , Detailed recommendations -- , Resilience and a world with international and commercial partners: , Information -- , Organization and tactics -- , Command and control -- , Recommendations: , Overarching recommendations: , Resilience as a priority -- , Space protection CONOPS -- , Detailed recommendations: , Near-term recommendations -- , Far-term recommendations -- , ROM costs -- , Space resilience cost analysis. , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-8330-9313-4

Language: English

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (xxii, 70 pages) : , color illustrations

ISBN: 0-8330-9515-3

Series Statement: Research report Enhancing space resilience through non-materiel means

Content: "Space is now a congested, contested, and competitive environment. Space systems must become more resilient to potential adversary actions and system failures, but changes to space systems are costly. To provide a complete look at resilience and possibly realize some benefit at lower cost, the Air Force asked RAND to identify non-materiel means--doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy--to enhance space resilience over the near and far terms. The authors developed implementation options to improve resilience based on a notional space protection operational concept: enhancing the capability of space operators to respond, in a timely and effective manner, to adversary counterspace actions. Operators need actionable information, appropriate organization and tactics, and dynamic command and control, supported by appropriate tools and decision aids, relevant training and exercises, and qualified personnel brought into the career field. The authors also recommend that Air Force Space Command develop a formal, end-to-end, space protection concept of operations (CONOPS) that captures all elements needed to improve resilience. In addition, the CONOPS could potentially follow the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution in certain situations, such as when responding to adversary counterspace actions. For the near-term options, the rough order of magnitude (ROM) nonrecurring engineering (NRE) cost of implementation is estimated to be between $2.5 million and $3.6 million. For the far-term options, the ROM NRE cost is estimated to be between $109 million and $166 million, with the ROM recurring cost between $4 million and $5.4 million per year"--Publisher's description.

Note: Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph , "RR-1067-AF"--Page 4 of cover , Preface -- , Figures -- , Tables -- , Summary -- , Acknowledgments -- , Abbreviations -- , Introduction: , Background -- , Objectives -- , Scope -- , Space resilience -- , Approach -- , Report structure -- , Resilience and civil institutions: , General approaches for building resilient operations: , Impact avoidance -- , Adaptation and flexibility -- , Recovery and restoration -- , Potential applications to the space operations community -- , Summary -- , Resilience and U.S. government civil space agencies: , Civil policy considerations: , Full and open access -- , Rapid delivery -- , Continuity of operations -- , Security classification -- , Civil practices: , Information -- , Organization and tactics -- , Command and control -- , Training -- , Personnel -- , Summary -- , Resilience and Air Force space operations: , Operational concept -- , Findings: information: , Space order of battle -- , Limited intelligence at SOPS/SWS -- , Space knowledge of intelligence personnel -- , Space Weather effects -- , Summary -- , Findings: organization and tactics: , Space protection lead -- , Space protection tactics -- , Tactics-sharing -- , Summary -- , Findings: command and control: , Satellite C2 contacts -- , Responsibilities and authorities -- , Anomaly resolution -- , Summary -- , Findings: training: , Space protection training -- , Exercises -- , Multiple satellite C2 systems -- , Summary -- , Findings: personnel: , Initial qualifications -- , Career progression -- , Trained operators -- , Summary -- , Cost of implementation options -- , Detailed recommendations -- , Resilience and a world with international and commercial partners: , Information -- , Organization and tactics -- , Command and control -- , Recommendations: , Overarching recommendations: , Resilience as a priority -- , Space protection CONOPS -- , Detailed recommendations: , Near-term recommendations -- , Far-term recommendations -- , ROM costs -- , Space resilience cost analysis. , English

Additional Edition: ISBN 0-8330-9313-4

Language: English

UID:

Format: 1 Online-Ressource (xxii, 70 pages)

ISBN: 9780833093134 , 0833093134 , 0833093134 , 9780833093134

Series Statement: Research report RR-1067-AF

Content: "Space is now a congested, contested, and competitive environment. Space systems must become more resilient to potential adversary actions and system failures, but changes to space systems are costly. To provide a complete look at resilience and possibly realize some benefit at lower cost, the Air Force asked RAND to identify non-materiel means--doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy--to enhance space resilience over the near and far terms.The authors developed implementation options to improve resilience based on a notional space protection operational concept: enhancing the capability of space operators to respond, in a timely and effective manner, to adversary counterspace actions. Operators need actionable information, appropriate organization and tactics, and dynamic command and control, supported by appropriate tools and decision aids, relevant training and exercises, and qualified personnel brought into the career field. The authors also recommend that Air Force Space Command develop a formal, end-to-end, space protection concept of operations (CONOPS) that captures all elements needed to improve resilience. In addition, the CONOPS could potentially follow the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution in certain situations, such as when responding to adversary counterspace actions. For the near-term options, the rough order of magnitude (ROM) nonrecurring engineering (NRE) cost of implementation is estimated to be between 2.5 million dollars and 3.6 million dollars. For the far-term options, the ROM NRE cost is estimated to be between 109 million dollars and 166 million dollars, with the ROM recurring cost between 4 million dollars and 5.4 million dollars per year"--Publisher's description

Note: "RAND Project Air Force" --Title page , "RR-1067-AF"--Cover page 4 , Includes bibliographical references (pages 63-70) , Preface -- Figures -- Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction: Background -- Objectives -- Scope -- Space resilience -- Approach -- Report structure -- 2. Resilience and civil institutions: General approaches for building resilient operations: Impact avoidance -- Adaptation and flexibility -- Recovery and restoration -- Potential applications to the space operations community -- Summary -- 3. Resilience and U.S. government civil space agencies: Civil policy considerations: Full and open access -- Rapid delivery -- Continuity of operations -- Security classification -- Civil practices: Information -- Organization and tactics -- Command and control -- Training -- Personnel -- Summary -- 4. Resilience and Air Force space operations: Operational concept -- Findings: information: Space order of battle -- Limited intelligence at SOPS/SWS -- Space knowledge of intelligence personnel -- Space Weather effects -- Summary -- Findings: organization and tactics: Space protection lead -- Space protection tactics -- Tactics-sharing -- Summary -- Findings: command and control: Satellite C2 contacts -- Responsibilities and authorities -- Anomaly resolution -- Summary -- Findings: training: Space protection training -- Exercises -- Multiple satellite C2 systems -- Summary -- Findings: personnel: Initial qualifications -- Career progression -- Trained operators -- Summary -- Cost of implementation options -- Detailed recommendations -- 5. Resilience and a world with international and commercial partners: Information -- Organization and tactics -- Command and control -- 6. Recommendations: Overarching recommendations: Resilience as a priority -- Space protection CONOPS -- Detailed recommendations: Near-term recommendations -- Far-term recommendations -- ROM costs -- Appendix A: Space resilience cost analysis.

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe McLeod, Gary, 1948- Enhancing space resilience through non-materiel means Santa Monica, California : RAND Corporation, [2016]

Language: English

Keywords: Electronic book

URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)

URL: kostenfrei

UID:

Format: 1 online resource (143 pages)

Edition: 2011 Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web

ISBN: 9780833044372 , 0833041177 , 9780833041173

Content: Cover -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One - Introduction -- Background -- Objectives and Scope -- Approach -- Outline of Book -- Chapter Two - What Are the Key Rail-Attack Threats and Their Consequences? -- Introduction -- Weapons and Tactics Used Against Rail Systems -- The Targets of Terrorist Attacks in Rail Systems -- Outcomes of Past Terrorist Attacks on Rail Systems -- Lessons from the Threat Assessment -- Chapter Three - Qualitative Risk Assessment for a Notional Passenger-Rail System -- Introduction -- Laying Out a Notional Rail System -- Determining Attack Scenarios -- Qualitatively Assessing Terrorism Risk -- Chapter Four - Baseline Security and Operational Characteristics of the Notional Rail System -- Introduction -- Defining the Baseline Security Measures -- Notional Rail System Description -- Defining Security Layers for the Notional Rail System -- Chapter Five - Cost-Effectiveness Assessment of Security-Improvement Options for the Notional Rail System -- Introduction -- Assessment-Process Overview -- Characterizing and Estimating Costs of Security-Improvement Options -- Process-Based Security-Improvement Options: Implementing Enhanced Security Training -- Technology-Based Security-Improvement Options: Installing Perimeter Fencing and Intrusion-Detection Systems Adjacent to Ground-Level Tracks -- Infrastructure- or Facility-Modification Security-Improvement Options: Installing Blast-Resistant Containers in Stations -- Perimeter-Layer Cost-Effectiveness Assessment Process -- Prioritize Attack Scenarios by Level of Assessed Risk -- Assess Relative Effectiveness of Security-Improvement Options -- Combine Effectiveness Assessments with Costs -- Generate Preferred List of Security-Improvement Options at the Perimeter Layer.

Content: U.S. communities depend on reliable, safe, and secure rail systems. Each weekday, more than 12 million passengers take to U.S. railways. Recent attacks on passenger-rail systems around the world highlight the vulnerability of rail travel and the importance of rail security for these passengers. The use of passenger rail and the frequency with which terrorists target it call for a commitment to analyzing and improving rail security in the United States. This book explains a framework for security planners and policymakers to use to guide cost-effective rail-security planning, specifically for the risk of terrorism. Risk is a function of threat (presence of terrorists with intent, weapons, and capability to attack), vulnerability (likelihood of damage at a target, given an attack), and consequences (nature and scale of damages if an attack succeeds). While effective security solutions may address all three components of risk, this book focuses on addressing vulnerabilities and limiting consequences, since these are the two components of risk most within the realm of rail-security personnel. The analysis is based on a notional rail system that characterizes rail systems typically found in the United States. The methodology presented is useful for planning rail-security options.

Note: Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources , Cover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter One - Introduction; Background; Objectives and Scope; Approach; Outline of Book; Chapter Two - What Are the Key Rail-Attack Threats and Their Consequences?; Introduction; Weapons and Tactics Used Against Rail Systems; The Targets of Terrorist Attacks in Rail Systems; Outcomes of Past Terrorist Attacks on Rail Systems; Lessons from the Threat Assessment; Chapter Three - Qualitative Risk Assessment for a Notional Passenger-Rail System; Introduction; Laying Out a Notional Rail System , Determining Attack ScenariosQualitatively Assessing Terrorism Risk; Chapter Four - Baseline Security and Operational Characteristics of the Notional Rail System; Introduction; Defining the Baseline Security Measures; Notional Rail System Description; Defining Security Layers for the Notional Rail System; Chapter Five - Cost-Effectiveness Assessment of Security-Improvement Options for the Notional Rail System; Introduction; Assessment-Process Overview; Characterizing and Estimating Costs of Security-Improvement Options; Perimeter-Layer Cost-Effectiveness Assessment Process , Limitations on Using the Analytical Assessment ProcessChapter Six - Rail-Security Policy Considerations; Rail-Security Lessons at the System Level; The Future of Rail Security; Rail Security Versus the Security of Everything Else; Conclusions; Appendix A - Qualitative Risk Assessment of Rail-Attack Scenarios; Appendix B - Cost-Effectiveness Assessment Details; References , Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web

Additional Edition: ISBN 9780833041173

Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Securing America's passenger-rail systems Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation, 2007 ISBN 9780833041173

Additional Edition: Print version Securing America's Passenger-Rail Systems

Language: English

Keywords: USA ; Personenverkehr ; Sicherheit

URL: Volltext

URL: Volltext

URL: Volltext  (lizenzpflichtig)