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  • 1
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076359
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (80 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: Uruguay Round negotiations on market access were a success. Tariff cuts covered a larger share of world trade than those of the Kennedy or Tokyo Rounds and will save importers some
    Additional Edition: Finger, Michael J Market Access Advances and Retreats
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 2
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076376
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (59 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: October 1999 - At the Uruguay Round, developing countries took on obligations not only to reduce trade barriers but also to undertake significant reforms of regulations and trade procedures. The Round did not, however, take into account the cost of implementing these reforms - a full year's development budget for many of the least developed countries - nor did it ask whether the money might be more productive in other development uses. At the Uruguay Round, developing countries took on unprecedented obligations not only to reduce trade barriers but to implement significant reforms both of trade procedures (including import licensing procedures and customs valuation) and of many areas of regulation that establish the basic business environment in the domestic economy (including intellectual property law and technical, sanitary, and phytosanitary standards. This will cost substantial amounts of money.
    Content: World Bank project experience in areas covered by the agreements suggests that an entire year's development budget is at stake in many of the least developed countries. Institutions in these areas are weak in developing countries, and would benefit from strengthening and reform. But Finger and Schuler's analysis indicates that the obligations reflect little awareness of development problems and little appreciation for the capacities of the least developed countries to carry out the functions that these reforms of regulations and trade procedures address. The content of these obligations can be characterized as the advanced countries saying to the others, Do it my way! Moreover, these developing countries had limited capacity to participate in the Uruguay Round negotiations, so the process has generated no sense of ownership of the reforms to which membership in the World Trade Organization obligates them.
    Content: From their perspective, the implementation exercise has been imposed imperially, with little concern for what it will cost, how it will be carried out, or whether it will support their development efforts. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to support effective developing country participation in the WTO system. This research was supported by the global and regional trust fund component of the World Bank/Netherlands Partnership Program. Michael Finger may be contacted at jfinger@worldbank.org
    Additional Edition: Finger, Michael J Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 3
    UID:
    b3kat_BV040616898
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (1 online resource (30 p.))
    Edition: Online-Ausgabe World Bank E-Library Archive Sonstige Standardnummer des Gesamttitels: 041181-4
    Content: December 1999 - The Uruguay Round tariff negotiations did not achieve a country-by-country balancing of concessions given and concessions received. How governments bargained was determined less by their national interests than by the interests of their politically important industrial constituencies. How tightly are trade negotiators held to winning a dollar of concession for each dollar of concession granted? The outcome of the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations suggests that such constraints were not tight. None of the delegations interviewed by Finger, Reincke, and Castro had tried to calculate for themselves the extent of concessions received. And the surplus or deficit of concessions received (over concessions given) varied widely among countries. Measuring the percentage point dollar of concessions given and received (a percentage point dollar being a reduction of the tariff by one percentage point on
    Note: Weitere Ausgabe: Finger, Michael J: Market Access Bargaining in the Uruguay Round
    Additional Edition: Reproduktion von Finger, Michael J. Market Access Bargaining in the Uruguay Round 1999
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
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  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C : The World Bank
    UID:
    b3kat_BV048267221
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Other papers
    Content: In Global Economic Prospects 1995 it was explained that antidumping is ordinary protection with a good public relations program. In fact, antidumping is often more costly to importing countries than ordinary protection through tariffs. The reason antidumping is such a costly form of protection is that the threat of antidumping action provides leverage to the importing country to force exporters into settled agreements which raise export prices. Exporters are frequently faced with the choice of having a tariff applied against their export sales or agreeing to raise prices (a 'price undertaking') or limit sales (a 'voluntary export restraint' or VER). Since exporters can typically increase their profits with a price undertaking or a voluntary export restraint, they frequently prefer a settled agreement to the imposition of an antidumping duty. Sometimes simply the threat of an antidumping action will induce a settlement because the uncertainty of the antidumping process itself will cause a loss of customers. These settled agreements, however, impose large costs on consumers and importing industries since they do not provide any tariff revenue to the government. The effect on the importing country is similar to the OPEC cartel: the exporting countries charge higher prices to the importing countries through an agreed limitation on sales or minimum prices. The difference between OPEC and antidumping is that with antidumping it is importing country policy that forces up the prices of imports to its consumers and industries
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 5
    UID:
    b3kat_BV049076333
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten))
    Edition: Online-Ausg
    Content: December 1999 - The Uruguay Round tariff negotiations did not achieve a country-by-country balancing of concessions given and concessions received. How governments bargained was determined less by their national interests than by the interests of their politically important industrial constituencies. How tightly are trade negotiators held to winning a dollar of concession for each dollar of concession granted? The outcome of the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations suggests that such constraints were not tight. None of the delegations interviewed by Finger, Reincke, and Castro had tried to calculate for themselves the extent of concessions received. And the surplus or deficit of concessions received (over concessions given) varied widely among countries. Measuring the percentage point dollar of concessions given and received (a percentage point dollar being a reduction of the tariff by one percentage point on
    Additional Edition: Finger, Michael J Market Access Bargaining in the Uruguay Round
    Language: English
    URL: Volltext  (URL des Erstveröffentlichers)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Washington, D.C. :The World Bank,
    UID:
    edoccha_9960787143902883
    Series Statement: Other papers
    Content: In Global Economic Prospects 1995 it was explained that antidumping is ordinary protection with a good public relations program. In fact, antidumping is often more costly to importing countries than ordinary protection through tariffs. The reason antidumping is such a costly form of protection is that the threat of antidumping action provides leverage to the importing country to force exporters into settled agreements which raise export prices. Exporters are frequently faced with the choice of having a tariff applied against their export sales or agreeing to raise prices (a 'price undertaking') or limit sales (a 'voluntary export restraint' or VER). Since exporters can typically increase their profits with a price undertaking or a voluntary export restraint, they frequently prefer a settled agreement to the imposition of an antidumping duty. Sometimes simply the threat of an antidumping action will induce a settlement because the uncertainty of the antidumping process itself will cause a loss of customers. These settled agreements, however, impose large costs on consumers and importing industries since they do not provide any tariff revenue to the government. The effect on the importing country is similar to the OPEC cartel: the exporting countries charge higher prices to the importing countries through an agreed limitation on sales or minimum prices. The difference between OPEC and antidumping is that with antidumping it is importing country policy that forces up the prices of imports to its consumers and industries.
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 7
    UID:
    edoccha_9958108049502883
    Format: 1 online resource (30 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: December 1999 - The Uruguay Round tariff negotiations did not achieve a country-by-country balancing of concessions given and concessions received. How governments bargained was determined less by their national interests than by the interests of their politically important industrial constituencies. How tightly are trade negotiators held to winning a dollar of concession for each dollar of concession granted? The outcome of the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations suggests that such constraints were not tight. None of the delegations interviewed by Finger, Reincke, and Castro had tried to calculate for themselves the extent of concessions received. And the surplus or deficit of concessions received (over concessions given) varied widely among countries. Measuring the percentage point dollar of concessions given and received (a percentage point dollar being a reduction of the tariff by one percentage point on USD 1 of imports, or by trading partners on exports), they found that the outcome of negotiations varied enormously from one country to another. For 13 of 27 countries, net concessions (positive or negative) were at least 75 percent of the size of concessions received. Negotiations were widely perceived to involve equal sacrifice for the common good, with all countries expected to cut tariffs on the same percentage of imports. Ability to pay was also a consideration: a smaller fraction of imports was liberalized for developing countries. The authors found a tendency toward equality (in percentage of imports affected) across participating countries' concessions, particularly when developing countries' unilateral liberalization was considered - including the part of it that was not bound at the Uruguay Round. Delegations emphasized how important it was for them to look after the interests of politically important sectors (including rice for Japan and the Republic of Korea and textiles for the United States and the European Union). This paper is a product of Trade, Development Research Group. Michael Finger may be contacted at jfinger@worldbank.org.
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 8
    UID:
    edocfu_9958108049502883
    Format: 1 online resource (30 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: December 1999 - The Uruguay Round tariff negotiations did not achieve a country-by-country balancing of concessions given and concessions received. How governments bargained was determined less by their national interests than by the interests of their politically important industrial constituencies. How tightly are trade negotiators held to winning a dollar of concession for each dollar of concession granted? The outcome of the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations suggests that such constraints were not tight. None of the delegations interviewed by Finger, Reincke, and Castro had tried to calculate for themselves the extent of concessions received. And the surplus or deficit of concessions received (over concessions given) varied widely among countries. Measuring the percentage point dollar of concessions given and received (a percentage point dollar being a reduction of the tariff by one percentage point on USD 1 of imports, or by trading partners on exports), they found that the outcome of negotiations varied enormously from one country to another. For 13 of 27 countries, net concessions (positive or negative) were at least 75 percent of the size of concessions received. Negotiations were widely perceived to involve equal sacrifice for the common good, with all countries expected to cut tariffs on the same percentage of imports. Ability to pay was also a consideration: a smaller fraction of imports was liberalized for developing countries. The authors found a tendency toward equality (in percentage of imports affected) across participating countries' concessions, particularly when developing countries' unilateral liberalization was considered - including the part of it that was not bound at the Uruguay Round. Delegations emphasized how important it was for them to look after the interests of politically important sectors (including rice for Japan and the Republic of Korea and textiles for the United States and the European Union). This paper is a product of Trade, Development Research Group. Michael Finger may be contacted at jfinger@worldbank.org.
    Language: English
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    World Bank, Washington, DC
    UID:
    gbv_175964711X
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Content: In Global Economic Prospects 1995 it was explained that antidumping is ordinary protection with a good public relations program. In fact, antidumping is often more costly to importing countries than ordinary protection through tariffs. The reason antidumping is such a costly form of protection is that the threat of antidumping action provides leverage to the importing country to force exporters into settled agreements which raise export prices. Exporters are frequently faced with the choice of having a tariff applied against their export sales or agreeing to raise prices (a “price undertaking”) or limit sales (a “voluntary export restraint” or VER). Since exporters can typically increase their profits with a price undertaking or a voluntary export restraint, they frequently prefer a settled agreement to the imposition of an antidumping duty. Sometimes simply the threat of an antidumping action will induce a settlement because the uncertainty of the antidumping process itself will cause a loss of customers. These settled agreements, however, impose large costs on consumers and importing industries since they do not provide any tariff revenue to the government. The effect on the importing country is similar to the OPEC cartel: the exporting countries charge higher prices to the importing countries through an agreed limitation on sales or minimum prices. The difference between OPEC and antidumping is that with antidumping it is importing country policy that forces up the prices of imports to its consumers and industries
    Note: English , en_US
    Language: Undetermined
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
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