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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Academic Peer Effects with Different Group Assignment Policies : Residential Tracking versus Random Assignment (2014)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9958246567702883
    Format: 1 online resource (45 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: This paper studies the relative academic performance of students tracked or randomly assigned to South African university dormitories. Tracked or streamed assignment creates dormitories where all students obtained similar scores on high school graduation examinations. Random assignment creates dormitories that are approximately representative of the population of students. Tracking lowers students' mean grades in their first year of university and increases the variance or inequality of grades. This result is driven by a large negative effect of tracking on low-scoring students' grades and a near-zero effect on high-scoring students' grades. Low-scoring students are more sensitive to changes in their peer group composition and their grades suffer if they live only with low-scoring peers. In this setting, residential tracking has undesirable efficiency (lower mean) and equity (higher variance) effects. The result isolates a pure peer effect of tracking, whereas classroom tracking studies identify a combination of peer effects and differences in teacher behavior across tracked and untracked classrooms. The negative pure peer effect of residential tracking suggests that classroom tracking may also have negative effects unless teachers are more effective in homogeneous classrooms. Random variation in peer group composition under random dormitory assignment also generates peer effects. Living with higher-scoring peers increases students' grades and the effect is larger for low-scoring students. This is consistent with the aggregate effects of tracking relative to random assignment. However, using peer effects estimated in randomly assigned groups to predict outcomes in tracked groups yields unreliable predictions. This illustrates a more general risk that peer effects estimated under one peer group assignment policy provide limited information about how peer effects might work with a different peer group assignment policy.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6787
    URL: Volltext  (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    FU Berlin
    UB Potsdam
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    Charité
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills / (2020)
    Washington, D.C. :The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    almafu_9959657462702883
    Format: 1 online resource (73 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-9345
    URL: Volltext  (kostenfrei)
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Fulltext
    FU Berlin
    EUV Frankfurt
    HTW Berlin
    Charité
  • 3
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Job search and hiring with two-sided limited information about workseekers’ skills (2020)
    [Washington, DC, USA] : World Bank Group, Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice & Africa Gender Innovation Lab
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1735946206
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten) , Illustrationen
    Series Statement: Policy research working paper 9345
    Content: This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms
    Additional Edition: Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Carranza, Eliana Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2020
    Language: English
    Keywords: Graue Literatur
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-9345
    URL: lizenzpflichtig
    URL: Deutschlandweit zugänglich
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    UB Potsdam
    MPI Bildungsforschung
  • 4
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Academic Peer Effects with Different Group Assignment Policies : Residential Tracking versus Random Assignment (2014)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    edoccha_9958246567702883
    Format: 1 online resource (45 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: This paper studies the relative academic performance of students tracked or randomly assigned to South African university dormitories. Tracked or streamed assignment creates dormitories where all students obtained similar scores on high school graduation examinations. Random assignment creates dormitories that are approximately representative of the population of students. Tracking lowers students' mean grades in their first year of university and increases the variance or inequality of grades. This result is driven by a large negative effect of tracking on low-scoring students' grades and a near-zero effect on high-scoring students' grades. Low-scoring students are more sensitive to changes in their peer group composition and their grades suffer if they live only with low-scoring peers. In this setting, residential tracking has undesirable efficiency (lower mean) and equity (higher variance) effects. The result isolates a pure peer effect of tracking, whereas classroom tracking studies identify a combination of peer effects and differences in teacher behavior across tracked and untracked classrooms. The negative pure peer effect of residential tracking suggests that classroom tracking may also have negative effects unless teachers are more effective in homogeneous classrooms. Random variation in peer group composition under random dormitory assignment also generates peer effects. Living with higher-scoring peers increases students' grades and the effect is larger for low-scoring students. This is consistent with the aggregate effects of tracking relative to random assignment. However, using peer effects estimated in randomly assigned groups to predict outcomes in tracked groups yields unreliable predictions. This illustrates a more general risk that peer effects estimated under one peer group assignment policy provide limited information about how peer effects might work with a different peer group assignment policy.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6787
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    Charité
  • 5
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Academic Peer Effects with Different Group Assignment Policies : Residential Tracking versus Random Assignment (2014)
    Washington, D.C., : The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9958246567702883
    Format: 1 online resource (45 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: This paper studies the relative academic performance of students tracked or randomly assigned to South African university dormitories. Tracked or streamed assignment creates dormitories where all students obtained similar scores on high school graduation examinations. Random assignment creates dormitories that are approximately representative of the population of students. Tracking lowers students' mean grades in their first year of university and increases the variance or inequality of grades. This result is driven by a large negative effect of tracking on low-scoring students' grades and a near-zero effect on high-scoring students' grades. Low-scoring students are more sensitive to changes in their peer group composition and their grades suffer if they live only with low-scoring peers. In this setting, residential tracking has undesirable efficiency (lower mean) and equity (higher variance) effects. The result isolates a pure peer effect of tracking, whereas classroom tracking studies identify a combination of peer effects and differences in teacher behavior across tracked and untracked classrooms. The negative pure peer effect of residential tracking suggests that classroom tracking may also have negative effects unless teachers are more effective in homogeneous classrooms. Random variation in peer group composition under random dormitory assignment also generates peer effects. Living with higher-scoring peers increases students' grades and the effect is larger for low-scoring students. This is consistent with the aggregate effects of tracking relative to random assignment. However, using peer effects estimated in randomly assigned groups to predict outcomes in tracked groups yields unreliable predictions. This illustrates a more general risk that peer effects estimated under one peer group assignment policy provide limited information about how peer effects might work with a different peer group assignment policy.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-6787
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    FU Berlin
  • 6
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills (2020)
    World Bank, Washington, DC
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1759620467
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper No. 9345
    Content: This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms
    Note: Africa , South Africa , Sub-Saharan Africa , English
    Language: English
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Stabi Berlin
  • 7
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills / (2020)
    Washington, D.C. :The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    edoccha_9959657462702883
    Format: 1 online resource (73 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-9345
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    Charité
  • 8
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills / (2020)
    Washington, D.C. :The World Bank,
    Details
    UID:
    edocfu_9959657462702883
    Format: 1 online resource (73 pages)
    Series Statement: Policy research working papers.
    Content: This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.
    Language: English
    DOI: 10.1596/1813-9450-9345
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Open Access Request
    FU Berlin
  • 9
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Academic Peer Effects with Different Group Assignment Policies : Residential Tracking versus Random Assignment (2014)
    World Bank, Washington, DC
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_1759680249
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: Policy Research Working Paper No. 6787
    Content: This paper studies the relative academic performance of students tracked or randomly assigned to South African university dormitories. Tracked or streamed assignment creates dormitories where all students obtained similar scores on high school graduation examinations. Random assignment creates dormitories that are approximately representative of the population of students. Tracking lowers students' mean grades in their first year of university and increases the variance or inequality of grades. This result is driven by a large negative effect of tracking on low-scoring students' grades and a near-zero effect on high-scoring students' grades. Low-scoring students are more sensitive to changes in their peer group composition and their grades suffer if they live only with low-scoring peers. In this setting, residential tracking has undesirable efficiency (lower mean) and equity (higher variance) effects. The result isolates a pure peer effect of tracking, whereas classroom tracking studies identify a combination of peer effects and differences in teacher behavior across tracked and untracked classrooms. The negative pure peer effect of residential tracking suggests that classroom tracking may also have negative effects unless teachers are more effective in homogeneous classrooms. Random variation in peer group composition under random dormitory assignment also generates peer effects. Living with higher-scoring peers increases students' grades and the effect is larger for low-scoring students. This is consistent with the aggregate effects of tracking relative to random assignment. However, using peer effects estimated in randomly assigned groups to predict outcomes in tracked groups yields unreliable predictions. This illustrates a more general risk that peer effects estimated under one peer group assignment policy provide limited information about how peer effects might work with a different peer group assignment policy
    Note: English , en_US
    Language: English
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Stabi Berlin
  • 10
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Call Me Maybe : Experimental Evidence on Frequency and Medium Effects in Microenterprise Surveys (2020)
    Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
    Details
    UID:
    gbv_180628765X
    Format: 1 Online-Ressource
    Series Statement: World Bank Economic Review
    Content: This study analyzes the effects of differences in survey frequency and medium on microenterprise survey data. A sample of enterprises were randomly assigned to monthly in-person, weekly in-person, or weekly phone surveys for a 12-week panel. The results show few differences across the groups in measured means, distributions, and deviations of measured data from an objective data-quality standard provided by Benford's Law. However, phone interviews generated higher within-enterprise variation through time in several variables and may be more sensitive to social desirability bias. Higher-frequency interviews did not lead to persistent changes in reporting or increase permanent attrition from the panel but did increase the share of missed interviews. These findings show that collecting high-frequency survey data by phone does not substantially affect data quality. However, researchers who are particularly interested in within-enterprise dynamics should exercise caution when choosing survey medium
    Language: Undetermined
    URL: kostenfrei
    URL: kostenfrei
    Library Location Call Number Volume/Issue/Year Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Online Resource
    Stabi Berlin
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