UID:
almafu_9960120087702883
Format:
1 online resource (xi, 340 pages) :
,
digital, PDF file(s).
ISBN:
0-511-98358-1
Content:
The market does not spontaneously generate democratic or participatory economic institutions. This book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable and, if so, what strategic changes might be required to regulate the market-mediated interaction of economic agents. The contributors bring contemporary microeconomic theory to bear on a range of related issues, including the relationship between democratic firms and efficiency in market economies; incentives and the relative merits of various forms of internal democratic decision-making; and the effects of democratically accountable firms on innovation, saving, investment, and on the informational and disciplinary aspects of markets. Various approaches to the study of economic interaction (game theory, transactions' cost analysis, social choice theory, rent-seeking, etc.) are considered in an attempt to understand the relationship between power and efficiency in market economies.
Note:
Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
,
Post-Walrasian political economy -- The democratic firm : an agency-theoretic evaluation / Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis -- Alternative employment and payment systems / D.M. Nuti -- Toward a framework for analyzing institutions and institutional change / Leonid Hurwicz -- Imperfect choice and rule-governed behavior / Ronald A. Heiner -- Organizational equilibria and institutional stability / Ugo Pagano -- Agency problems and the future of comparative systems' theory / Mieke Meurs -- After the employment relation : problems on the road to enterprise democracy / Louis Putterman.
,
(cont.) Unions versus cooperatives / Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein -- Demand variability and work organization / David I. Levine -- Democracy versus appropriability : can labor-managed firms flourish in a capitalist world? / Gregory K. Dow --Cooperation, conflict, and control in organizations / Avner Ben-Ner -- Wage bargaining and the choice of production technique in capitalist firms / Gilbert L. Skillman and Harl E. Ryder -- The motivational role of an external agent in the informationally-participatory firm / Masahiko Aoki -- Unstable ownership / Tone Ognedal -- The simple analytics of a membership market in a labor-managed economy / Ernst Fehr -- Investment planning in market socialism / Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin, John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre -- Capitalism and democracy : a summing up of the arguments / Martin L. Weitzman.
,
English
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-06411-2
Additional Edition:
ISBN 0-521-43223-5
Language:
English
URL:
Volltext
(lizenzpflichtig)
URL:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511983580
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